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Abstract 
 
Riding‟s (1991) wholist-analytic dimension of cognitive style proposes a 
unidimensional view of global-analytic constructs, however, very little empirical 
evidence exists in support of a relationship between the styles in the wholist-analytic 
family, which has led to suggestions that style is best conceptualised as a more 
complex multidimensional construct (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003).   
 
Another major problem for Riding‟s (1991) wholist-analytic style construct is its lack 
of temporal reliability (Peterson, Deary and Austin, 2003; Rezaei and Katz, 2004; 
Parkinson, Mullally and Redmond, 2004; Cook, 2008).  Furthermore, the current 
thesis argues that in addition to problems of reliability, the wholist-analytic 
dimension lacks predictive and construct validity.  This thesis outlines two major 
methodological limitations with the current wholist-analytic ratio measurement, 
which have raised doubts over the efficacy of the ratio in discriminating between part 
processing and whole processing style. 
 
Firstly, the wholist-analytic ratio is confounded by reflective-impulsive style 
differences (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert and Phillips, 1964).  Secondly, the nature 
of the tasks, combined with strategy preferences, set up an asymmetry in the basis of 
the wholist-analytic ratio.   
 
A new measure of wholist-analytic style, hereafter called the „Wholist-Analytic Style 
(WAS) Analysis‟ has been developed to experimentally manipulate the presentation 
order of the subtests and the number of parts in the geometric stimuli.  Performances 
on the WAS analysis and the CSA were compared to other styles in the wholist-
analytic family to test the unidimensional approach to style.   
 
It was found that the wholist-analytic ratio is confounded by sensitivity to reflective 
style, with much of its discriminatory power being limited to the first subtest, and 
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there is an asymmetry in the part-whole processing basis of the wholist-analytic ratio.  
Furthermore, there is a consistent relationship between reflective-impulsive style and 
part-whole processing.  
 
This thesis proposes the theory of diminished reflection, which renders the wholist-
analytic ratio invalid in its current form.  The theory can account for the hereto-
unexplained lack of temporal reliability of the wholist-analytic ratio and offers a 
practical solution to improve both the validity and stability of the ratio.  This thesis 
offers partial support for the unidimensional perspective of style but makes strong 
links between reflective-impulsive style and part-whole processing preferences. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
Riding‟s (1991) conception of wholist-analytic style represents a unidimensional 
perspective of global-analytic style constructs.  This unitary perspective is widely 
held amongst cognitive style researchers (e.g. Miller, 1987; Riding and Cheema, 
1991; Allinson and Hayes, 1996; Ehrman and Leaver, 2003) and holds that many of 
the bi-polar constructs in the styles literature are measuring different aspects of a 
single super-ordinate dimension.  The logical extension of this theoretical viewpoint 
is that relationships should be evident between the global-analytic constructs that 
have been subsumed within the wholist-analytic style family.  To date there is very 
limited evidence to suggest that such relationships exist and this dearth of 
correlational data has led to suggestions that style is best conceptualised as a more 
complex multidimensional construct (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003).  The 
lack of consistent evidence in support of the unidimensional perspective may to some 
extent be attributed to pervasive methodological problems with the methods 
employed to measure many of the style constructs.   
 
1.1 Problems of measurement 
 
Many of the global-analytic styles lack psychometrically sound methods of 
measuring them; some of the methods used to measure field independent-dependent 
style (Witkin, 1950) have been criticised for correlating with fluid ability (Cronbach, 
1970; Cronbach and Snow, 1981; Grigorenko and Sternberg, 1997; Sternberg and 
Grigorenko, 1997); the method used to measure reflective-impulsive style (Kagan et 
al., 1964) lacks internal validity, temporal reliability and has been argued to be 
biased toward local processing (Ault, Mitchell and Hartman, 1976; Cairns and 
Cammock, 1978; Buela-Casal, Carretero-Dios, Santos-Roig and Burmudez, 2003); 
and the convergent-divergent style dimension (Hudson, 1967) doesn‟t have a 
standard measure to assess the construct. 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1.1 Field independent-dependent style measures 
  
It is widely reported that the Embedded Figures Test (EFT), designed to measure 
field-independent-dependent style (Witkin, 1950) is a measure of fluid ability rather 
than a value free bipolar measure of style (Cronbach, 1970; Cronbach and Snow, 
1981; Grigorenko and Sternberg, 1997; Sternberg and Grigorenko, 1997). Hayes and 
Allinson stated, “While Witkin‟s theory of field independence-dependence is a 
theory of cognitive style, the Embedded-Figures Test is a measure of ability.” (Hayes 
and Allinson, 1994, p. 56).    Later revisions of the EFT, like the Childrens‟ 
Embedded Figures Test (CEFT, Karp and Konstadt, 1971) also have problems with 
validity, the changes made to the EFT to make it child friendly made such a 
fundamental difference to the scoring and method of the EFT that it ceased to be a 
measure of field independent-dependent style and instead measured the latency to 
first response which is a characteristic of reflective-impulsive style. 
 
1.1.2 Reflective-impulsive style measures 
 
Reflective-impulsive style (Kagan et al., 1964) differentiates a tendency to approach 
novel tasks that are characterised by uncertainty.  Reflective individuals approach 
such tasks with a degree of caution to ensure accuracy, whereas impulsive 
individuals have a tendency to respond quickly to the detriment of accuracy.  The 
method developed to measure reflective-impulsive style is the Matching Familiar 
Figures Test (MFFT); it was designed to provide a level of complexity that induces 
response uncertainty and presents a fixed set of response alternatives from which to 
choose.   
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Administration of the test relies heavily on the experimenter accurately recording 
response latencies to ensure internal consistency and validity.  The MFFT has also 
been shown to have low internal stability (Ault, et al., 1976) and in response to such 
findings a revised version of the MFFT has been devised, the MFFT-20 has 
demonstrated greater internal stability and much improved test-re-test reliability 
(Cairns and Cammock, 1978; Buela-Casal et al., 2003) but lacks discriminative 
power when used on adult samples (Carretero, Santos-Dios and Buela-casal, 2008).  
The original version of the MFFT is generally employed in style comparison studies 
not the psychometrically improved MFFT-20 (e.g. Riding and Dyer, 1983; Jamieson, 
1992; Allinson and Hayes, 1996). 
 
The scoring of the MFFT is based on latency to first response and the number of 
incorrect responses offered.  It is the response uncertainty and the scoring method 
which characterise the MFFT as a measure of reflection-impulsivity rather than the 
specific nature of the task stimuli; however, Zelniker and Jeffrey (1979) have 
provided evidence that the task itself may favour local rather than global processing.  
Therefore the MFFT may be confounded by measurements of local and global 
processing preferences because of the nature of the tasks employed. 
 
1.1.3 Convergent-divergent thinking style measures 
 
Convergent-divergent thinking style (Hudson, 1967) reflects the relative tendency to 
favour convergent thinking to generate one correct answer with the tendency to 
favour divergent thinking to generate a number of possible solutions.  There is no 
validated, reliable test of convergent-divergent thinking; instead convergent thinking 
is inferred from any test which requires the identification of one correct solution and 
divergent thinking is inferred from any test, which requires the generation of multiple 
ideas or solutions.  Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) review of the styles literature 
suggest that convergent thinking has “usually been inferred from success on tests 
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which may be based on figural input (such as the EFT; MFFT)” (Riding and 
Cheema, 1991, p. 200).  This is likely to reduce the validity of measurement since 
responses are potentially confounded by differences in field independent-dependent 
style and reflective-impulsive style.   
 
Most recent studies have employed verbal or numerical intelligence type items as the 
measure of convergent thinking and performance on open ended tests such as the 
object uses test and attribute tests as a measure of divergent thinking (Al Naeme, 
1991; Bahar and Hansell, 1999; Runco, 2007; Nielson, Pickett and Simonton, 2008).  
The assessment of convergent-divergent style relies on relative performance on 
closed or open tasks but efforts to standardise the scoring of the tasks to aid 
comparisons sometimes confound style with ability.  For example, Al Naeme (1991) 
and Bahar and Hansell (1999) placed a finite limit on the number of responses to be 
generated on open-ended tests and therefore rendered the test a measure of ability not 
style (Hudson, 1967). 
 
It is unlikely that the concept of unidimensional style will be adequately addressed 
without a systematic assessment and comparison of the global-analytic constructs 
with a focus on careful selection and validation of the measures used to assess each 
style.  The two pervasive problems with current style measurements are the 
confounds with ability and with similar style constructs.  Since global-analytic styles 
are theorised to be related, it is all the more important that adequate methodologies 
and psychometrically sound instruments are employed which control for the 
influence of other styles and allow a clear picture of relationships to emerge.  The 
current thesis tests the unidimensional perspective of style, constructing and 
validating three measures of style with the aim to avoid the confounding variables of 
related style constructs and ability, which pervade the existing measures. 
 
The problems with measurement also extend to the super-ordinate measures of style; 
Riding‟s (1991) wholist-analytic dimension suffers from low temporal reliability 
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(Peterson et al., 2003; Rezaei and Katz, 2004; Parkinson et al., 2004; Cook, 2008), 
but is argued to have demonstrated good validity (Riding, 2003).  This thesis 
contends that the wholist-analytic ratio measure is sensitive to differences in 
reflective-impulsive style.  The reduced validity, which is caused by the confounding 
influence of a related style construct, can offer an explanation for the low temporal 
reliability reported in the literature. 
 
1.2 Reliability and validity of Riding’s (1991) wholist-analytic dimension 
 
Riding (2005a) has acknowledged that the wholist-analytic dimension lacks temporal 
reliability; he has argued that reliability is desirable in a test but not essential and that 
validity is a more important characteristic.  Riding (2003) provides an example of a 
test which is valid but not reliable; the startle test as the name suggests request 
naivety from the participant to assess their startle response, which can only validly be 
measured on first presentation of the test.  Subsequent presentations of the test will 
not elicit a genuine startle response and therefore the test is valid at the first sitting 
but has poor temporal reliability.  In this situation there is a theoretical explanation 
for why a test cannot be relied upon to measure the same construct or behaviour 
twice.   
 
This is not the case for Riding‟s (1991) wholist-analytic style dimension; to date, no 
explanation has been provided as to why the wholist-analytic dimension has low 
temporal reliability.  Wholist-analytic style is conceptualised as a stable, relatively 
fixed characteristic which influences the organisation and processing of information 
as a whole or as a collection of parts (Riding, 2005); therefore, stability over time 
should be expected and in this case deemed a necessary characteristic of any valid, 
psychometric measure of wholist-analytic style, given an adequate sampling and test-
retest period (Kline, 2000). 
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The current thesis provides a much needed explanation for the low temporal stability 
of the wholist-analytic style measure but in doing so raises questions over the 
validity of the current methodology, which is employed to assess part and whole 
processing differences.  The wholist-analytic ratio methodology has two important 
limitations: 
 
Firstly, it confounds individual differences in reflective-impulsive style with part and 
whole processing styles, which leads to a reduction in the validity and reliability of 
the measure.  Wholist-analytic style is measured by a ratio expressing the relative 
response latencies to two subtests, the first subtest consists of matching figures tasks 
and the second subtest consists of embedded figures tasks.  Presentation order of the 
tasks is not counterbalanced and therein lays the problem; reflective characteristics 
lead to a tendency to approach early test items with caution (Nietfeld and Bosma, 
2003; Davies and Graff, 2006) leading to analytic order ratios being produced 
because of the effects of reflective-impulsive style and not because of the effects of 
differences in part-whole processing preferences.  This effect is based on naivety and 
response uncertainty, which will dissipate at subsequent test sessions explaining the 
low reliability reported in the literature.   
 
The second methodological issue relates to the type of tasks employed within the 
subtests.  The wholist-analytic dimension purports to measure the relative ability of 
respondents to use their preferred processing style compared to their ability to 
employ their non-preferred style.  The implications of the ratio measurement is that 
the matching figure tasks and the embedded figure tasks are designed to favour 
whole processing strategies and part processing strategies, respectively, however, 
this is not strictly the case.  The matching figures task does favour a whole 
processing approach over a part processing approach, but an embedded figures task 
doesn‟t just favour a part processing approach, it excludes a whole processing 
approach.   
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When this is combined with the prediction that, where possible, part processors and 
whole processors will habitually employ their preferred style, then an asymmetry has 
emerged in the nature of the processing being compared between part and whole 
processors.  Part processors will be judged based on the efficacy of a part processing 
strategy across congruent and incongruent task demands, and whole processors will 
be judged on their relative ability to whole and part process tasks in congruent task 
conditions.   
 
The methodological limitations outlined here suggest that the wholist-analytic ratio is 
sensitive to differences in reflective-impulsive style and also measures the analytics 
tendency to choose part processing over whole processing whilst measuring the 
wholists relative ability to part and whole process.  These limitations raise doubts 
over the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio.  The theory of diminished reflection 
proposed here and the hypothesised asymmetry in the nature of processing being 
measured will be systematically tested in the current thesis.   
 
1.3 Validity studies 
 
A large body of research has been accumulated which informs the validity of the 
wholist-analytic dimension, demonstrating that the wholist-analytic dimension has 
successfully discriminated social and interpersonal preferences and functioning (e.g. 
Riding, 1991; 1994; Riding and Craig, 1998; Riding and Craig, 1999), learning and 
instructional preferences (e.g. Riding and Sadler-Smith, 1992; Riding and Douglas, 
1993; Riding and Watts, 1997; Riding and Al Sanabani, 1998; Sadler-Smith and 
Riding, 1999), subject preferences (e.g. Riding and Pearson, 1994; Newton, Tymms 
and Carrick, 1995; Riding and Agrell, 1997; Riding and Grimley, 1999; Riding, 
Grimley, Dahraei and Banner, 2003; Roberts, 2006) and differences in brain activity 
(Riding, Glass, Butler and Pleydell-Pearce, 1997; Glass and Riding, 1999).   
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The unitary perspective of style dictates that the wholist-analytic dimension should 
predict two types of behaviour; behaviour which can be attributed to preferences in 
part and whole processing, and behaviour which can be attributed to preferences 
which are characteristic of related global-analytic constructs.  Much of the validity 
research predicts the latter but provides very little convincing evidence that the 
wholist-analytic ratio method is successfully discriminating between tasks or 
preferences on the basis of differences in part-whole processing. 
 
The unidimensional perspective of style makes it possible for the wholist-analytic 
ratio to be confounded by reflective-impulsive style, as suggested here, and still 
predict differences which are characteristic of related style constructs.   
 
1.4 Chapter summary and conclusion 
 
The criticisms of wholist-analytic style outlined above focus on the methodological 
problems of the wholist-analytic ratio and the poor psychometric properties of the 
related style measures.  It is argued that the wholist-analytic ratio is confounded by 
reflective-impulsive style and is measuring non-comparable differences in part-
whole processing between wholists and analytics.  The main aim of the research is to 
demonstrate that whilst the wholist-analytic construct has sound theoretical 
foundations, the current ratio method used to measure wholist-analytic style lacks 
validity and it is the problems with validity which have led to the widely reported 
lack of reliability, offering a much needed explanation for the problems with 
temporal reliability.  The effects of the methodological limitations, outlined here, on 
the reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension will be examined and a number of 
recommendations will be made to improve both the validity and the reliability.  
Finally, the unidimensional theory of style will be explored by comparing four 
measures of global-analytic style. 
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Chapter 2: Predictive validity of the Wholist-Analytic Dimension 
 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
The wholist-analytic dimension of Riding‟s CSA (Riding, 1991) is based on the 
concept that we all have the capacity for part processing and for whole processing 
but that many of us have an habitual tendency to favour one form of processing over 
the other.  Part processing is the organisation or analysis of an object or situation into 
separate parts; it is essentially a process of differentiation.  Whole processing is the 
organisation or viewing of an object or situation as a gestalt; it is essentially a 
process of synthesis.  
 
The wholist-analytic dimension is a bipolar construct with an individual‟s position 
along the continuum determined by their relative tendency to organise information in 
wholes or parts.  Those who have a relative tendency for whole processing are 
termed „wholists‟ and those who have a relative tendency for part processing are 
termed „analytics‟.  Some individuals do not demonstrate a processing preference 
and these are termed „intermediates‟. 
 
Riding and Cheema (1991) proposed the wholist-analytic construct in an effort to 
consolidate the confusing styles literature; their review identified over thirty different 
style constructs, which they judged to be measuring different aspects of a single 
global-analytic style.   
 
2.1.1 The wholist-analytic style family 
 
The wholist-analytic dimension was theorised to be a super-ordinate style, which 
encompassed the other global-analytic styles within the wholist-analytic family 
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(Riding and Cheema, 1991).  Five of the most researched styles were termed 
principal styles, these were: reflective-impulsive style (Kagan et al., 1964); 
convergent-divergent style (Hudson, 1967); field independent-dependent style 
(Witkin, 1950); serialist-holist style (Pask, 1972); and, leveller-sharpener style 
(Holzman and Klein, 1954).  
 
This unitary perspective of global-analytic style suggests that wholists will have a 
relatively more impulsive, divergent, field dependent, holist, and leveller style. 
Analytics, on the other hand, will have a relatively more reflective, convergent, field 
independent, serialist and sharpener style.   
 
Reflective-impulsive style 
 
Reflective-impulsive style distinguishes between tendencies for careful reflection 
versus impulsive action.  In uncertain situations reflectives are characterised by a 
tendency to focus on accuracy rather than speed and impulsives are characterised by 
a focus on speed over accuracy (Kagan et al., 1964).  
 
Convergent-divergent style 
 
Convergent-divergent style distinguishes those who perform relatively better during 
tasks which require convergent thinking to achieve one correct answer or open ended 
tasks which require divergent thinking to generate a number of possible solutions 
(Hudson, 1967). 
 
Field independent-dependent style 
 
Field independent-dependent style distinguishes those who are more influenced by 
surrounding context and whose judgements are more dependent on contextual cues 
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and those who tend to view objects as independent of their context and are less 
influenced by contextual cues (Witkin, 1950). 
 
Serialist-holist and leveller-sharpener styles 
 
Serialist-holist style refers to a tendency to process information in serial or parallel 
fashion (Pask, 1972).  Leveller-sharpener style refers to the tendency to focus on 
similarities or differences, levellers will blur the distinctions between concepts or 
groupings and sharpeners will heighten the differences (Holzman and Klein, 1954).  
 
2.1.2 Predictive validity 
 
If a measurement can demonstrate predictive validity then it provides support for the 
efficacy of the test; predictive validity, as the name suggests, relates to whether a test 
can predict some other criterion variable (Kline, 2000).  In the context of the wholist-
analytic dimension, there are two types of criteria which may be predicted: first, 
criteria that relate to the characteristics and behaviour associated with the super-
ordinate dimension of wholist-analytic style; second, criteria that relate to the 
characteristics associated with the subordinate dimensions of style such as the five 
principal styles dimensions already described.  The two types of criteria will be 
termed „super-ordinate predictive validity‟ and „subordinate predictive validity‟ for 
ease of reference. 
 
Super-ordinate predictive validity should discriminate between performance on tasks, 
which favour part or whole processing and should discriminate between observed 
behaviours or preferences, which can be explained in terms of individual differences 
in part or whole processing. 
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Subordinate predictive validity should discriminate between performance on tasks 
which favour impulsive, field dependent, divergent, holist, leveller style 
characteristics and those which favour reflective, field independent, convergent, 
serialist, sharpener style characteristics.  It should also discriminate between 
observed behaviours and preferences, which can be explained in terms of individual 
differences in the characteristics, which define the styles within the wholist-analytic 
family. 
 
Super-ordinate predictions represent the fundamental individual differences upon 
which the construct of the wholist-analytic dimension is based.  They are the 
defining characteristics, which distinguish wholists from analytics.  A number of 
super-ordinate predictions have been made and some examples of these have been 
summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: Wholist-Analytic Style: Defining Characteristics (Riding, 1994, p. 5-
6, 10 and 15) 
 
Wholists Analytics 
See a situation as a whole See a situation as a collection of 
parts 
Difficulty separating a situation into 
its parts 
Good at detecting similarities and 
differences 
Can obtain an overall perspective Will focus on one or two aspects of a 
situation to the exclusion of others 
Likely to form a balanced view Likely to form extreme views or 
attitudes 
Will not habitually take a structured 
approach 
Take a structured approach to 
learning 
May need help imposing structure in 
unstructured situations 
Will impose order in unstructured 
situations 
 Will prefer information that is set 
out in a clearly organised way 
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This chapter will evaluate a group of studies, which collectively address predictive 
validity. Many of these studies manipulate the structure of learning material or forms 
of study in a way that is predicted to differentially affect part and whole processors.  
Much of the research reviewed takes an inductive approach with post hoc 
interpretation of results and whilst there is some evidence in support of subordinate 
predictions, there is very little support for the super-ordinate predictions outlined 
above.   
 
The substantial body of research which addresses predictive validity of the wholist-
analytic dimension has been organised into seven categories: instructional 
preferences (e.g. Sadler-Smith and Riding, 1999); structural preferences in study 
material (e.g. Riding and Sadler-Smith, 1992; Riding and Douglas, 1993; Riding and 
Watts, 1997; Riding and Al Sanabani, 1998;) subject performance (Riding and 
Pearson, 1994; Newton, Tymms and Carrick, 1995; Riding and Agrell, 1997; Riding 
and Grimley, 1999; Riding, Grimley, Dahraei and Banner, 2003; Roberts, 2006) ; eye 
witness memory (Emmet, Clifford and Gwyer, 2003); local-global processing 
(Peterson and Deary, 2006); EEG asymmetries (Riding et al., 1997; Glass and 
Riding, 1999) and motor skills (Riding and Al-Salih, 2000). 
 
2.2 Wholist-analytic style and instructional preferences 
 
In this context instructional preferences is an inclusive term used to refer to: 
preferences in instructional methods (e.g. lectures, tutorials, distance learning, 
computer assisted learning, role play, discussion groups), preferences for 
instructional media (e.g. handouts, PowerPoint slides, overhead transparencies, 
videos, text books, journal articles) and preferences for types of assessment (e.g. 
examinations, group assignments, multiple choice tests, essays).  Sadler-Smith and 
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Riding (1999) explored the self-reported instructional preferences of wholists and 
analytics. 
 
Sadler-Smith and Riding (1999) assessed two hundred and forty business students, 
between the age of eighteen and fifty eight years, on the CSA and a self-report 
measure of instructional preferences.   The instructional preferences inventory was 
constructed using a five-point Likert scale indicating strong dislike to strong 
preference for items relating to instructional method, instructional media and 
assessment preferences.  Responses to the instructional preference inventory were 
subjected to a factor analysis.   
 
Instructional method preferences produced three factors labelled as dependent, 
autonomous and collaborative instructional preferences.  Dependent methods were 
characterised as lectures, tutorials and surgeries; autonomous methods were 
characterised as open, distance, flexible learning and computer assisted learning; and, 
collaborative methods included role-play, discussion groups and business games.    
 
The findings revealed that wholists demonstrated a significantly stronger preference 
for collaborative methods than analytics.  No significant effect of style was reported 
for autonomous or dependent methods.  This finding is consistent with the notion 
that analytics are more isolated and self reliant (Riding, 1991) and are therefore less 
likely than wholists to express a preference for role play, discussion groups and 
business games which involve close interaction with others.   
 
Instructional media preferences produced two factors labelled as non-print based 
media and print based media.  Non-print based media consisted of overhead 
transparencies, videos, and PowerPoint slides; and, print based media consisted of 
handouts, workbooks, textbooks, and journal articles.   
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Wholists expressed a stronger preference than analytics for non-print based media; 
no effects were reported for print based media.  Riding and Sadler-Smith suggested 
that wholists preferred the non-print based media because it presented an overall 
view by the visual image and is non-linear in comparison to print based media.  
However, if the difference between non-print and print-based media is primarily one 
of visual versus verbal then a main effect of verbal-imagery style should have been 
evident.  It also seems misleading to suggest that videos, overhead projector slides 
and PowerPoint slides are non-linear. 
 
Assessment preferences also produced two factors, characterised as formal and 
informal.  Formal assessments referred to examinations, tests and essay questions; 
and, informal assessments referred to individual assignments, group assignments, 
multiple choice questions and short answer questions. 
 
There were no significant main effects of style on assessment preference and no 
interaction effects between wholist-analytic style and verbal-imagery style.  There 
was three-way interaction with wholist-analytic and verbal-imagery styles only when 
sex was introduced as a third factor.  According to Sadler-Smith and Riding, wholists 
had a slightly stronger preference for informal assessment methods.  Sadler-Smith 
and Riding suggested that this is because wholists like the lack of rigid structure, 
which characterises informal assessment methods; however, it is misleading to 
suggest that multiple choice questions and individual assignments are not structured.   
 
All of the findings above represented very small effect sizes: d = 0.28 for the 
difference in collaborative method preference; d = 0.12 and 0.26 for the difference in 
informal assessment preference, the only moderate effect size was produced by the 
difference in non-print media preference (d = 0.50).  The small effect sizes may well 
be a result of a lack of variation in self-reported preferences; participant means were 
typically between 3 and 4, which is not uncommon when employing five-point Likert 
scales. 
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Despite the conclusions drawn by Sadler-Smith and Riding, it is also possible that all 
the findings can be attributed to social preferences rather than structural differences 
relating to part-whole processing.   The non-print based media is delivered by 
lecturers and involves social interaction, which is absent from the print-based media.  
The inclusion of the group assignments in the informal assessment category may 
have swayed wholist and analytic preferences; Riding and Read (1996) found that 
students generally preferred group or pair work but wholists had the greater 
preference for group and pair work and analytics had the greatest tolerance for 
individual work. 
 
This study, therefore, provides some evidence that wholists and analytics differ in 
their interpersonal preferences for group or individual instructional methods but 
provides no evidence for the influence of part-whole processing differences on 
instructional preferences. 
 
2.3 Wholist-analytic style and structural preferences in study material 
 
The next study more directly addresses differences in structural preferences, which 
should be predicted by part-whole processing preferences.  Riding and Watts (1997) 
administered the CSA to ninety, fifteen and sixteen year old, female students.  They 
were offered three study skills handouts with an unstructured-verbal format, a 
structured-verbal format or a structured-pictorial format.  The unstructured format 
was not chosen by anyone, forty-one students chose the verbal format and forty-nine 
chose the pictorial.  A log linear analysis revealed significant interaction between 
format and verbal-imager style with verbalisers preferring the structured-verbal 
format and imagers choosing the structured-pictorial format.  There was no 
significant interaction of structure and wholist-analytic style.  There was a small 
interaction effect, which approached statistical significance indicating a wholist 
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preference for the pictorial format and an analytic preference for the verbal.  Riding 
and Watt‟s post hoc interpretation of the findings argued that the wholists preferred 
the pictorial version because it was livelier and the analytics preferred the verbal 
version because it was more neat and tidy.  Neither of these explanations pertains to 
the defining characteristics of part and whole processing styles.  
 
When given a choice all participants opted for the structured material over the 
unstructured material; an alternative methodology would be to examine the 
performance of wholist and analytic individuals when choice is constrained and this 
approach was taken by Riding and Sadler-Smith (1992) 
 
Riding and Sadler-smith (1992) randomly allocated one hundred and twenty nine, 
fourteen to nineteen year olds, to one of three types of study material and measured 
their recall performance.  The material, which related to hot water systems, was 
manipulated by structure, large step or small step; by advance organiser, present or 
absent; by verbal emphasis, high or moderate; and by diagram type, abstract or 
pictorial.   Three versions were developed 1) Large step, without organiser, high 
verbal, abstract diagram; 2) small step, without organiser, moderate verbal, pictorial 
diagram; 3) small step, with organiser, moderate verbal, pictorial diagram.   
 
The high-low verbal emphasis and the abstract-pictorial diagram was expected to 
differentially affect the performance of verbalisers and imagers; the large-small step 
structure and the presence or absence of the advance organiser was predicted to 
differentially affect the wholists and analytics.   
 
Riding and Sadler-Smith did not hypothesise the direction of the effect on wholists 
and analytics but they did state that Wholists “need help seeing the structure and 
sections of learning material” and analytics “require a unifying overview to be 
provided so that they can integrate the sections into a whole view” (Riding and 
Sadler-Smith, 1992, p. 327).  The implication is that the small step structure would 
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improve the performance of wholists and the presence of an advance organiser would 
improve the performance of the analytics. 
 
Riding and Sadler-Smith‟s findings showed that that neither the presence of the 
organiser or the step size had a differential effect on the recall of wholists and 
analytics.  Similarly, neither the level of verbal material or the abstract „v‟ pictorial 
nature of the diagram had any differential effect on the recall of verbalisers or 
imagers.  They did however find a three-way interaction between wholist-analytic 
style, verbal-imager style and material format.   
 
They interpreted the findings by introducing the notion of unitary and complimentary 
styles.  They argued that whilst wholist-analytic styles and verbal-imager styles are 
independent, imager style provides an overall or „whole‟ perspective and verbaliser 
style creates a preference for semantic verbal representations, which are analytic in 
nature.  Wholist-imagers and analytic-verbalisers are described as having unitary 
styles, which provide either a wholist view or an analytic view, respectively.   
Analytic-imagers and wholist-verbalisers have complimentary styles, which in 
combination provide both a whole and part processing facility.   
 
In the light of their findings, Riding and Sadler-Smith suggested that the small step 
structure provided the greatest benefit for the complimentary styles and that the small 
step organiser was redundant because wholist-verbalisers and analytic-imagers could 
“generate a whole view and a more specific analytic view of information” (Riding 
and Sadler-Smith, 1992, p. 336).  No post hoc statistical tests were reported to 
investigate the nature of the interaction, however, sufficient information was reported 
to allow a calculation of the effect sizes.  There was a large effect from version one 
(large step) to version two (small step) for the wholist-verbalisers and the analytic-
imagers (d = -0.83 and -1.86, respectively, see Table 2.2) and there was little effect 
from version two (no organiser) to version three (organiser) (d = 0.00 to 0.36).    
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Table 2.2: Three-way interaction: VI style, WA Style and material format  
 
 Version 1: 
Large step 
No organiser 
High verbal 
Abstract diagram 
Version 2: 
Small step 
No organiser 
Moderate verbal 
Pictorial diagram 
Version 3: 
Small step 
Organiser 
Moderate verbal 
Pictorial diagram 
Wholist-
Verbaliser 
66.07, 71.25 91.42, 86.00 89.28, 81.66 
d = -1.86, -0.83 d = 0.15, 0.36 
Wholist-
Imager 
82.14, 70.00 80.21, 75.38 91.07, 81.25 
d = 0.10, -0.50 d = -0.60, -0.44 
Wholist 
 
75.71, 70.50 85.09, 80.00 90.00, 81.50 
d = -0.53, -0.63 d = -0.28, -0.11 
Analytic-
Verbaliser  
72.44, 62.85 87.14, 72.00 89.29, 81.66 
d = -0.64, -0.50 d = -0.13, -0.57 
Analytic-
Imager 
53.57, 51.25 87.01, 79.09 87.01, 78.18 
d = -1.78, -1.48 d = 0.00, 0.05 
Analytic 
 
65.58, 58.63 87.07, 75.71 88.19, 80.00 
d = -1.00, -0.93 d = -0.07, -0.24 
 
Note: recall performance means are reported for process-test first, then post- test.  Effect 
sizes (d) show the effect of the difference between version one and version two and the effect 
of the difference between version two and version three for post and process tests. 
 
They also argued, “analytic-verbalisers will benefit from an emphasis on discrete 
elements” (Riding and Sadler-Smith, 1992, p. 336) and stated that the organiser only 
facilitated the analytic-verbalisers; this is an overstatement of the findings.  The 
difference between the process-test recall in the second and third versions represents 
a very small effect (d = 0.13); the effect size for the post-test recall is more moderate 
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(d = 0.57).  It also does not account for the fact that the wholist-imagers also appear 
to have been facilitated by the organiser (d = -0.60 and –0.44).   
 
It is clear from Table 2.2 that all groups performed least well on version one, whether 
this is due to the large step structure or the high verbal content and abstract diagrams 
is unclear because the methodology is limited in this regard.  It is also clear that the 
analytics have poorer recall on version one than the wholists; this performance is 
higher for analytic-verbalisers but lower for analytic-imagers, which reflects the 
verbal nature of the material.  What is not clear is why the wholist-imagers have 
much better recall on version one than the wholist-verbalisers given the verbal nature 
of the material. 
 
The manipulation of three variables in this way would have provided more useful 
results if the methodology had included all combinations of the variables (see Table 
2.3) using a mixed design.   
 
Table 2.3: Suggested variable combinations 
 
Condition Step Organiser Verbal/Diagram 
Version 1 Large Present High/Abstract 
Version 2 Large Present Low/Pictorial 
Version 3 Large Absent High/Abstract 
Version 4 Large Absent Low/Pictorial 
Version 5 Small Present High/Abstract 
Version 6 Small Present Low/Pictorial 
Version 7 Small Absent High/Abstract 
Version 8 Small Absent Low/Pictorial 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This issue, combined with a small sample size, approximately ten people per group 
per condition, does limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the study and have 
raised the possibility of type two errors. 
 
The lack of a priori hypotheses and the post hoc explanations of findings have done 
little to validate the central characteristics of wholist and analytic style.  There was 
no significant interaction effect of structure and wholist-analytic style and the three-
way interaction with verbal-imager style was not substantiated with post hoc 
statistical data. 
 
A more effective methodology was employed by Riding and Al-Sanabani (1998).  
They tested the recall of two hundred pupils aged ten to fifteen years; participants 
read three passages and after each passage were required to answer twenty questions 
without referring back to the text.  The passages were manipulated between groups 
by format and conceptual structure.  For half of the pupils, each passage was 
presented as one long paragraph. For the other half each passage contained additional 
format or conceptual structure; passage one was separated into sections with a title 
before each section, passage two provided an overview after the text and passage 
three provided an overview at the beginning of the text. 
 
No significant interaction was found between the use of sections with headings and 
wholist-analytic style, which is contrary to Douglas and Riding‟s (1993) results 
which stated that wholists benefited from a cue to the whole when a title was 
presented before or after a passage but analytics did not. 
 
There was also no interaction between wholist-analytic style, verbal-imager style and 
the use of sections with headings which is contrary to the results found by Riding and 
Sadler-Smith (1992) which found that complimentary styles benefited from a small 
step structure but unitary styles did not. 
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Riding and Al-Sanabani (1998) did find some interaction between sections with 
headings, wholist-analytic style and gender.  With paragraph headings, analytics did 
best for males and females, which directly contradicts Riding and Douglas (1993) 
who found that wholists benefited from headings but analytics did not.  Conversely, 
without paragraph headings analytics did best amongst the females and wholists did 
best amongst the males.  This three-way interaction with gender cannot easily be 
explained from a part-whole processing point of view.  
 
With regard to the effects of conceptual structure, there was no interaction between 
the presence and absence of an overview with wholist- analytic style, regardless of 
whether the overview was at the beginning or end of the passage; there was also no 
interaction between overview, wholist-analytic style and verbal-imager style.  This is 
not consistent with Riding and Sadler-Smith‟s (1992) results, which lead to the 
expectation that unitary styles would be facilitated by an overview.   
 
The only statistical interaction involving wholist-analytic style is that with gender 
and overview.  The pattern was similar to the previous findings with paragraph 
headings; when the overview was present analytics did better than wholists amongst 
the males, but there was no difference between analytics and wholists amongst 
females; and without the overview wholists performed best amongst males and 
analytics performed best amongst females. 
 
In summary, the studies that have directly manipulated the structure of study 
materials have provided no support for the predictive validity of the wholist-analytic 
dimension with regards to either super-ordinate or subordinate predictions.  There is 
no evidence to suggest that the manipulation of structure or format has a differential 
effect on wholists and analytics.  Some three-way interaction with structure, verbal-
imagery style and wholist-analytic style was found (Riding and Sadler-Smith, 1992) 
which led to post hoc interpretations that invoked the notion of complimentary and 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unitary styles.  However, these findings were not substantiated with post hoc 
statistical tests and were not replicated by Riding and Al-Sanabani (1998). 
 
There were some significant three-way interactions between verbal-imager styles, 
wholist-analytic styles and gender (Riding and Al-Sanabani, 1998), that is not 
accounted for by either super-ordinate or subordinate predictions and to some extent 
contradicted the findings of Riding and Douglas (1993).   
 
2.4 Wholist-analytic style and subject performance 
 
The next group of studies explored the role of cognitive style in science performance.  
Newton et al., (1995) found that Wholist-Imagers demonstrated lowest performance 
on GCSE science examinations, with analytic-verbalisers in 3
rd
 place, analytic-
imagers in 2
nd
 place and wholist-verbalisers performing best.   Riding and Agrell 
(1997) tested fourteen, sixteen year old Canadians and found that analytic-imagers 
performed worst in science, analytic-verbalisers came 3
rd
, wholist-verbalisers came 
2
nd
 and wholist-imagers performed the best.  Riding and Grimley (1999) found 
superior performance by wholist-imagers, with analytic-verbalisers in 2
nd
 place, 
analytic-imagers in 3
rd
 and wholist-verbalisers performing worst. 
 
Riding and Grimley (1999) claimed that unitary styles led to superior performance in 
science but it is clear from Table 2.4 that these findings have not been replicated.  
For ease of reference the shaded areas denote unitary styles and the un-shaded areas 
denote complimentary styles. 
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Table 2.4: Complimentary and unitary style groupings in order of best (1
st
 
place) to worst (4
th
 place) performance in Science 
   
 
Studies 
 
1
st place
 
 
2
nd place
 
 
 
3
rd place
 
 
 
4
th place
 
Newton et al. (1995) Wholist-
Verbaliser 
Analytic-
Imager 
Analytic-
Verbaliser 
Wholist-
Imager 
Riding and Agrell 
(1997) 
Wholist-
Imager 
Wholist-
Verbaliser 
Analytic-
Verbaliser 
Analytic-
Imager 
Riding and Grimley 
(1999) 
Wholist-
Imager 
Analytic-
Verbaliser 
Analytic-
Imager 
Wholist-
Verbaliser 
 
Note: Unitary style combinations shaded 
 
The results are also equivocal when considering the effect of wholist-analytic style; 
Riding and Grimley (1999) examined performance on multi-media learning in 
science in comparison to traditional learning methods in science.  They found 
superior performance by analytics in the traditional learning mode and superior 
performance by wholists in the multi media mode.  Riding and Grimley (1999) 
suggested that the difference exists because analytics have trouble with small 
viewing windows, which is characteristic of multi media methods, which makes it 
more difficult to obtain a whole view.  However, this contradicts the findings of 
Riding and Pearson (1994).   
 
Riding and Pearson (1994) assessed the cognitive style of one hundred and nineteen, 
twelve to thirteen year olds (sixty-three males and fifty-six females) and examined 
the effect of style on performance in six traditionally taught subjects.  Wholists 
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showed superior performance in geography and French; intermediates showed 
superior performance in English, history and science.  Analytics performed poorly in 
science, geography and French.   
 
Conversely, Riding et al. (2003) found analytics achieved better attainment ratings in 
science than wholists.  The effect of style on attainment was examined for ten 
subjects (music, art, technology, English, history, maths, science, languages [German 
or French], religious education and geography).  Science was the only subject that 
produced a main effect of wholist-analytic style.  Attainment was operationalised as 
teacher ratings based on a five-point scale and is therefore subjective, this is 
particularly important because ratings were reported by each subject tutor and there 
may be a bias in the wholist-analytic style of an individual who chooses to teach 
science which may impact on the ratings of their students.   
 
The findings relating to influence of cognitive style on science performance are 
mixed and perhaps that is to be expected since most of the methodologies are based 
on unipolar measures, which are likely to confuse ability with style differences.  
From this perspective Riding and Grimley‟s (1999) study comparing relative 
performance on traditional and multi media methods is likely to yield the most 
informative results. 
 
Roberts (2006) also considered subject performance, this time architecture rather 
than science.  He examined the performance of wholists and analytics at each stage 
of an undergraduate architectural course, hypothesising that wholists would perform 
better than analytics.  The longitudinal component of the study allowed performance 
to be compared at year one, two and three.  Roberts described the degree course as 
very structured in year one; students were introduced to architectural vocabulary and 
required to complete workbooks and exercises to prepare and assist them with their 
project design work.  As the course progressed through year two and three the 
structure diminished and greater freedom and exploration was allowed and indeed 
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
required.  Roberts anticipated that, since architectural design is an inherently 
uncertain process, wholists would perform better with the uncertainty and lack of 
structure whereas analytics would inappropriately impose structure on the subject 
matter to the detriment of their project design success. 
 
The results did not support the hypothesis that wholists would perform better than 
analytics; in fact, analytics performed significantly better than wholists in year one 
but by year three there was no significant difference in rank performance.   Roberts 
replicated these results with a second cohort of students see figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Longitudinal Percentile rank performance of by cognitive style: 
Cohort 1 (Reproduced with permission, Roberts, 2006) 
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Figure 2.2: Longitudinal Percentile rank performance of by cognitive style: 
Cohort 2 (Reproduced with permission, Roberts, 2006) 
 
In cohort one a significantly greater number of wholists dropped out of the course 
than analytics but this findings was not replicated in cohort two. 
 
This study does provide some support for the notion that analytics perform better 
than wholists during more structured learning tasks.  Whether these differences can 
be attributed to the structure of the learning material per se or to the need for 
convergent thinking is unclear.  The tasks in year one required assimilation of 
information to produce correct answers whereas in the latter years students are 
encouraged to apply divergent thinking to produce one of many possible solutions as 
the framework and structure of assessment diminishes. 
 
The above studies, that have addressed the effects of wholist-analytic style on subject 
performance, have found some significant differences in science performance.  
However these differences have been contradictory; Riding and Grimley (1999) 
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found that unitary styles demonstrated superior performance in science compared to 
complimentary styles but this finding contradicts those of Newton et. al. (1995) and 
Riding and Agrell (1997).   
 
Similarly, using traditional learning methods some researchers have demonstrated 
that analytics have superior performance in science (Riding and Grimley, 1999; 
Grimley et al. 2003); others have demonstrated superior performance in 
intermediates (Riding and Pearson, 1994); and still more have demonstrated superior 
performance in wholists (Riding and Agrell, 1997).   
 
Using a related design, Riding and Grimley‟s (1999) study provides some evidence 
that wholists perform better in science subjects using a multi media method and 
analytics perform better in science subjects using traditional instruction methods.  
They interpreted this difference in terms of the analytics having difficulty with the 
small viewing window afforded by the multi media methods.  This finding does 
relate to super-ordinate predictions but unfortunately has not been replicated. 
 
Roberts (2006) also found differences in the performance of wholists and analytics in 
the first year of an architectural course; the findings were replicated in a second 
cohort.  The results can be interpreted in terms of convergent and divergent style 
differences and therefore relate to subordinate predictions of validity. 
 
2.5 Wholist-analytic style and eye witness memory 
 
The next study effectively posed a super-ordinate and subordinate prediction.  
Emmet, Clifford and Gwyer (2003) examined the relationship between field 
independent-dependent and wholist-analytic styles and the efficacy of context 
reinstatement in improving eyewitness recall of staged events.  Since wholist-
analytic style and field independent-dependent style are related constructs they 
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should be similarly effected by the presence or absence of context reinstatement in 
eyewitness recall, therefore posing a subordinate prediction.  Further, Field 
independence-dependence is essentially measuring one end of the wholist-analytic 
dimension, that is, the ability to part process by disembedding a figure from its 
ground, therefore posing a super-ordinate prediction. 
 
Field independent-dependent style was assessed using the group embedded figures 
test (GEFT, Oltman, Raskin and Witman, 1971) and wholist-analytic style was 
assessed by the CSA.  In a sample of forty-four undergraduates, context 
reinstatement significantly improved free recall of eyewitness events but the 
beneficial effects of context reinstatement were significantly greater for field 
dependents than field independents.  These results were replicated in a second 
experiment using a different sample of seventy-nine students.  For cued recall, 
context reinstatement had no effect and field independents out performed field 
dependents.  In the second experiment, field independents did perform better than 
field dependents for cued recall but the results did not reach significance. 
 
In view of these results and the conceptual similarity of the field independence-
dependence style and the wholist-analytic dimension, wholists were expected to 
show a relatively greater improvement in free recall than analysts when context is 
reinstated.  Analytics were also expected to out perform wholists in cued recall 
situations.  However, the results revealed that there was no significant interaction 
between wholist-analytic style and context reinstatement on free recall and no 
significant effect of wholist-analytic style on cued recall performance.   
 
The failure of wholist-analytic style to interact with context reinstatement in the 
same manner as field independent-dependent style led Emmett et al. (2003) to 
suggest that “the CSA and the GEFT do not have a set-inclusion relation and that 
whatever lies as a difference between the two tests may contain the essential element 
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in mediating context reinstatement susceptibility and memorial performance.” 
(Emmett et al., 2003, p.1506).   
 
2.6 Wholist-analytic style and local-global processing  
 
The study, which appears to have most directly tested a super-ordinate prediction by 
assessing the ability of wholists and analytics to employ part and whole processing, 
is Peterson and Deary (2006).  They explore the performance of wholists and 
analytics on the Wholist-Analytic Inspection Time task (WAIT).  The WAIT 
employs Navon-type stimuli (Navon, 1977), which present a number constructed by 
letters, or a letter constructed by numbers, see Figure 2.3.  Participants were 
instructed to „look global‟ or „look local‟ prior to each trial and each participants 
WAIT style score is a ratio of their accuracy on global items to local items over 320 
time limited trials. 
 
Peterson and Deary found no significant relationship between the wholist-analytic 
style measures on the E-CSA and the WAIT (r = .158).  It should be noted, however, 
that the WAIT is a newly constructed test and in this study Peterson, Deary and 
Austin‟s (2003) extended version of the CSA was used rather than Riding‟s 
unmodified version. 
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Figure 2.3: Example of Wholist-Analytic Inspection Time (WAIT) task stimuli 
(Reproduced with permission, Peterson and Deary, 2006) 
 
2.7 Wholist-analytic style and EEG asymmetries 
 
Some limited electroencephalogram evidence has been provided linking wholist-
analytic style differences with asymmetries in alpha wave activity during the 
completion of cognitive tasks (Riding, Glass, Butler and Pleydell-Pearce, 1997; 
Glass and Riding, 1999).  This small-scale study, consisting of fifteen volunteers, 
nine males and six females, is the only one that has compared style differences, as 
measured by Riding‟s CSA, with EEG recordings.  Riding et. al.‟s (1997) paper 
reported the findings of the alpha rhythm recordings and Glass and Riding‟s (1999) 
paper reported the theta, delta and beta rhythm recordings for the same participants. 
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Figure 2.4: Electrode positions (Riding et. al., 1997; Glass and Riding, 1999) 
 
Fifteen electrodes were used in the positions shown in Figure 2.4.  Five over the 
frontal lobe, two in frontal polar positions (F7, FZ, F8, FP1, FP2); three positioned 
centrally posterior to the frontal lobe (C3, CZ, C4); four in the temporal lobe area 
(T3, T4, T5, T6); one in the Midline, parietal region (PZ); and two in the occipital 
lobe (O1, O2). 
 
Participants were presented with words and required to press a button whenever the 
words represented a fruit or a vegetable whilst their EEG output was recorded.  This 
is a semantic task, which is reminiscent of the verbal trials in the CSA.  There were 
five task conditions of increasing difficulty ranging from words displayed one at a 
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time for half a second to pairs of words being presented for a tenth of a second.  No 
task performance measures were recorded. 
 
This exploratory study had no clear predictions relating to the location of the alpha 
asymmetries other than they expected wholists and analytics to have significantly 
different levels of alpha in some locations and that the differences were unlikely to 
be straightforward hemispheric asymmetries. 
 
They found that wholists had higher mean alpha output at all locations; these were 
significantly higher at all electrode sites except FP1, FP2 and T4.  Means and 
standard deviations for alpha output are provided in Table 2.5.   
 
Baseline alpha readings with eyes open or closed were not taken so the alpha levels 
cannot show phasic change.  However, it would be unlikely that analytics have 
significantly lower baseline alpha levels at rest.  Therefore, the implication is that 
greater alpha suppression occurred at all locations during the tasks for analytics.   
 
The greatest alpha suppression for both wholists and analytics was at T4, in fact the 
top seven areas, which indicate the greatest suppression, for both wholists and 
analytics mainly occurred in the lateral sites in the frontal and temporal lobes and the 
least suppression in the paramedial sites in the parietal lobes, occipital lobes and in 
the midline sites.  This makes sense since working memory and the production area 
for speech are processed in the frontal lobe and the understanding of verbal 
information and the naming and categorising of visual stimuli is processed in the 
temporal lobe. 
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Table 2.5: Alpha level means and standard deviations at all locations by wholist-
analytic style 
 
Electrode position Mean Alpha Output Standard deviation 
Wholist Analytic Wholist Analytic 
FP1 1893 1324 791 557 
FP2 1818 1291 634 584 
F7* 1319 650 752 183 
F8* 1189 614 596 251 
FZ* 2276 1115 1082 423 
C3* 2031 525 1206 253 
C4* 2014 933 903 345 
CZ* 2856 1296 1342 542 
T3* 1682 525 1599 253 
T4 1002 508 721 271 
T5* 1996 637 1322 238 
T6* 1904 572 1348 265 
PZ* 5272 1045 1045 309 
O1* 3854 1236 2464 526 
O2* 3763 1088 2331 493 
 
* P < 0.05 
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Table 2.6: Electrode locations from greatest alpha suppression to least 
suppression for wholists and analytics 
 
Wholist Analytic 
Location Alpha Location Alpha 
T4 (L) 1002 T4 (L) 508 
F8 (L) 1189 T3 (L) 525 
F7 (L) 1319 C3 (PM) 525 
T3 (L) 1682 T6 (L) 572 
FP2 (PM) 1818 F8 (L)  614 
FP1 (PM) 1893 T5 (L) 637 
T6 (L) 1904 F7 (L) 650 
 
T5 (L) 1996 C4 (PM) 933 
C4 (PM) 2014 PZ (M) 1045 
C3 (PM) 2031 O2 (PM) 1088 
FZ (M) 2276 FZ (M) 1115 
CZ (M) 2856 O1 (PM) 1236 
O2 (PM)  3763 FP2 (PM) 1291 
O1 (PM) 3854 CZ (M)  1296 
PZ (M) 5272 FP1 (PM) 1324 
 
(L) – lateral sites, (M) – midline sites, (PM) – Paramedial sites 
 
Phasic changes in the form of decreasing alpha levels, or suppression is associated 
with greater performance (Klimesch, 1999).  The lower alpha levels produced by 
analytics may have been associated with greater accuracy; this interpretation was 
acknowledged by Riding et. al. (1997).  Since task accuracy was not measured this 
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cannot be explored.  What Riding and colleagues failed to consider was that greater 
alpha suppression might also indicate greater attention (Shaw, 1996).  Klimesch 
(1999) stated that „lower alpha‟ de-synchronisation between 6-10 Hz relates to non-
task, non-stimulus factors, which can be best considered as attention, stating “It is 
topographically widespread over the entire scalp and probably reflects general task 
demands and attentional processes” (Klimesch, 1999, p. 183) 
 
Given the widespread difference in the alpha levels across all locations it seems the 
analytics were devoting more attentional processes to the task at hand.  The findings 
also revealed a significant, within subjects, effect of task with alpha levels decreasing 
as the tasks became more difficult which was apparent for wholists but not for 
analytics.  This suggests that wholists devoted more attention as the tasks became 
more difficult; the trend was apparent for analytics but far less pronounced. 
 
The higher alpha band between 10 and 12 Hz is thought to reflect sensory-semantic 
processing and de-synchronisation is topographically restricted (Klimesch, 1999).  
Riding et. al‟s., (1999) study used an alpha range of 8-13 Hz and made no distinction 
between upper and lower alpha bands so they are likely to have confused attentional 
processes with semantic processing.  In the light of this, widespread differences 
across the scalp will be interpreted as attentional differences but topographically 
restricted differences will be interpreted as task related.   
 
Riding et. al.‟s main finding was that there seems to be an anterior-posterior 
asymmetry between wholists and analytics, stating that “wholists do relatively least 
processing at posterior regions (over occipital, visual cortex) and analytics most.” 
(Riding et. al., 1997, p. 227)  They interpreted this as support for the notion that 
“analytic processing may be located in the higher level visual systems”(Riding, Glass 
and Douglas, 1993:  Ungerleider and Mishkin, 1982, Riding et. al., 1997, p. 227).   
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However, this interpretation of the findings implies a double dissociation between 
style and anterior-posterior processing which is rather misleading, whilst wholists do 
demonstrate the least processing at posterior areas in comparison to other areas, 
analytics do not do the most processing in posterior areas compared to other areas; it 
would be more accurate to suggest that the analytics demonstrated widespread 
suppression across all areas of the scalp with little difference between anterior and 
posterior positions whereas the wholists demonstrated less processing in the posterior 
areas; wholist alphas were significantly higher in Pz than Fz and CZ and significantly 
higher in O1/O2 than in C3/C4 and FP1/FP2. 
 
Whilst Glass and Riding (1999) offered an explanation for the difference in alpha 
levels between the analytics and wholists in the occipital regions they failed to offer 
an explanation for the differing levels of activity in the posterior parietal lobe; stating  
“the characteristic of analytics that their posterior parietal lobes …are more active in 
the solution of verbal-analytic tasks than the parietal lobes of wholists…[was] 
unexpected”(Glass and Riding, 1999, p. 36).   
 
This cannot easily be explained in terms of part-whole processing differences; 
however, this can be neatly explained by the role of error monitoring which can be 
associated with reflective style.   
 
Greater alpha suppression and theta power at Pz is linked with error response 
processing (Cohen, Elger and Ranganath, 2006).  Glass and Riding (1999) 
considered the widespread cortical activation of the analytics to indicate greater 
arousal which also is consistent with the notion that reflective style is characterised 
by a motivation to be accurate and an anxiety which motivates the individual to 
avoid errors. 
 
The error-checking hypothesis outlined above predicts that theta power would be 
higher at Pz for analytics than wholists.  Theta and alpha power tend to work in 
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opposite directions so during phasic change theta will increase and alpha will 
decrease with increasing performance and that theta will decrease and alpha will 
increase with decreasing performance (Klimesch, 1999).   
 
Glass and Riding (1999) findings suggest that wholists actually had higher theta 
output at all midline sites including Pz, which is contrary to the error-checking 
hypothesis suggested here and also contrary to the expectation that alpha and theta 
have a reciprocal and opposite relationship (Klimesch, 1999). 
 
However, Glass and Riding characterise theta output as 3 to 7.9 Hz which overlaps 
with the lower alpha range 6 to 10 hz suggested by Klimesch‟s (1999) review.  
Therefore the lower theta power in analytics reported here might be a result of 
inadequate banding and an artefact of the analytics having increased lower alpha 
suppression, which represents greater arousal and attention. 
 
The EEG evidence outlined above is often given undue weighting with regard to its 
support for the validity of the wholist-analytic dimension.  The study revealed three 
interesting findings: 1) Analytics demonstrated greater alpha suppression that 
wholists in all areas; 2) Wholists demonstrated least alpha suppression at the midline 
parietal region compared to the midline frontal and central regions; 3) Wholists 
demonstrated least alpha suppression in the paramedial occipital regions than in the 
paramedial frontal and central regions 
 
These findings suggest that the wholist-analytic dimension does discriminate 
between those labelled as wholists and those labelled as analytics and therefore 
provides some validation that the dimension is sensitive to something.  This 
exploratory study made no super-ordinate or subordinate predictions and could not 
easily interpret the findings in a way that supported the predictive validity of the 
wholist-analytic dimension. 
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Glass and Riding (1999) had difficulty interpreting the first two findings in terms of 
wholist-analytic characteristics and interpreted the third finding as evidence that 
analytic processing may be located in the higher visual systems.  However, the 
findings may be more easily interpreted by considering differences in reflective-
impulsive style characteristics.   
 
The greater arousal and/or attention, which was evident in the analytics from the 
widespread alpha suppression across the scalp and the greater activation of higher 
visual areas and areas associated with response error monitoring are indicative of 
reflective characteristics which focus on task accuracy. 
 
2.8 Wholist-analytic style and motor skills 
 
The literature on motor skills has very little bearing on the predictive validity of the 
wholist-analytic dimension but it does serve to highlight the pitfalls of generating 
post hoc interpretations as a result of inductive research with no theoretical 
underpinnings.  
 
Pargam (1993) reviewed the small body of styles literature on motor skill and sports 
performance and concluded that there was little evidence of a relationship.  However, 
since then, two studies have been reported which propose a link between motor skill 
and style.   
 
Riding and Al-Salih (2000) tested participants on the CSA and found that wholists 
were more accurate at throwing a ball, this effect had not been predicted and their 
post hoc interpretation amounted to the statement “Presumably accurate throwing 
requires the ability to analyse” (Riding and Al-Salih, 2000, p. 29).   
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Opposing findings were reported by, Keller and Ripoll (2001; 2004) who tested 
participants using the matching familiar figures test (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert 
and Phillips, 1964) and found that reflective individuals were more accurate at hitting 
a ball with a tennis racquet.  Reflective participants were also more accurate at 
catching a ball (Keller and Ripoll, 2004). 
 
These findings do not pertain to super-ordinate predictions relating to part-whole 
processing differences and to the limited extent that they pertain to subordinate 
predictions, which relate to other styles in the wholist-analytic family, they do not 
support the prediction that tasks that favour wholists would be expected to favour 
impulsive individuals. 
 
2.9 Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
The research presented here represents commonly cited studies in support of the 
validity of the wholist-analytic dimension.  However, on closer inspection they fail to 
adequately demonstrate predictive validity.   
 
The central characteristics of wholist-analytic style, defined by Riding (1994) and 
summarised in Table 2.1, have not been adequately demonstrated.  In particular there 
is no evidence that wholists see a situation as a whole, can obtain an overall 
perspective, form balanced views and have difficulty separating a situation into its 
parts; and no evidence that analytics see a situation as a collection of parts, are good 
at detecting similarities and differences, will focus on one or two aspects to the 
exclusion of others or are likely to form extreme views or attitudes.  In the only study 
that directly assessed the tendency of wholists and analytics to process globally or 
locally, there was no relationship between wholist-analytic style and local-global 
processing (Peterson and Deary, 2006).  Wholist-analytic style also failed to interact 
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with context reinstatement in eyewitness memory in the same way as field 
dependent-independent style did (Emmet et al., 2003). 
 
There is some support that analytics perform better than wholists in structured 
learning situations, which is evident from their greater success in a level one 
architecture course; but the suggestion that analytics may inappropriately impose 
order in unstructured situations was not supported by their performance in the third 
year of their architecture course (Roberts, 2006).   
 
There is also very little evidence to suggest that wholists need help imposing 
structure in unstructured situations or that they benefit from such help since there is 
no consistent evidence linking wholist-analytic style with learning performance when 
the structure of learning material has been manipulated.  Riding and Sadler-Smith 
found no significant interaction effect of structure and wholist-analytic style when 
manipulating either small step versus large step or presence or absence of an advance 
organiser.  Douglas and Riding (1993) did find that the presence of a title benefited 
wholists rather than analytics but this was not replicated by Riding and Al-Sanabani 
(1998) who found no significant interaction between the use of sections with 
headings and wholist-analytic style.   
 
Riding and Sadler-Smith (1992) found evidence to suggest that complimentary styles 
benefited from a small step structure but unitary styles did not, but again this was not 
replicated by Riding and Al-Sanabani (1998) who found no interaction between 
wholist-analytic style, verbal-imager style and the use of sections with headings. 
 
In addition, the effect of style on performance in relatively more structured subjects 
such as science has been equivocal (Newton et al., 1995; Riding and Agrell, 1997; 
Riding and Grimley, 1999; Riding and Pearson, 1994; Riding et al., 2003) 
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In fact the whole notion of structural preferences is ill defined and rather 
contradictory Riding (1994, p.10) suggested that wholists “will not habitually take a 
structured approach” and “may need help imposing structure in unstructured 
situations” which implies that increased structure will benefit wholists.  Compare this 
to Ridings (1994, p. 10) suggestion that analytics “take a structured approach to 
learning” and “will prefer information that is set out in a clearly organised way” 
which also implies that increased structure will benefit analytics.  When considered 
from this perspective, it seems illogical to predict differences in performance 
between wholists and analytics when the structure of material is manipulated.  
 
On a more positive note, there is some evidence that the wholist-analytic dimension 
discriminates between interpersonal and impersonal styles, which are characteristic 
of other global-analytic styles constructs and therefore support subordinate predictive 
validity.  
 
Sadler-Smith and Riding (1999) found two effects of wholist-analytic style on 
instructional preferences; wholists had a stronger preference than analytics for 
collaborative methods like role play and also a stronger preference for non-print 
based media like overhead transparencies and power points.   
 
Sadler-smith and Riding (1999) interpreted the preference for collaborative methods 
as relating to interpersonal differences, for instance wholists are more gregarious and 
socially dependent (Riding, 1991).  This could also explain the preference for non-
print based media given the interpersonal interaction that is associated with the use of 
overhead transparencies and PowerPoint slides.  Sadler-smith and Riding (1999) 
explained the wholists preference for non-print based media in terms of such 
materials being image based and non-linear but it seems misleading to suggest that 
PowerPoint slides and overhead transparencies are non-linear and they frequently 
consist of verbal material. 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps the most convincing support for the wholist-analytic dimension is the EEG 
data (Riding et al., 1997; Glass and Riding, 1999) which demonstrated that analytics 
had more widespread and greater activation across the scalp during a semantic verbal 
task than the wholists and the wholists registered more activity in the anterior areas, 
the frontal and central parts of the scalp, than the posterior areas, the parietal and 
occipital lobes.  The EEG data suggests a physiological basis for the differences 
between wholists and analytics but it does not validate the notion that wholists are 
whole processors and analytics are part processors.  
 
Further, the EEG data only pertains to predictive validity in so much as a difference 
in brain activity is expected and to-date this has not been replicated.  Understandably, 
the EEG studies are inductive and the data difficult to interpret, however, the 
differences in alpha levels can be more easily interpreted in terms of individual 
differences in reflective-impulsive style characteristics than by explanations 
employing whole or part processing differences. 
 
Predictive validity of the wholist-analytic dimension has not been adequately 
established.  There is no convincing evidence in support of super-ordinate 
predictions, which relate to the central characteristics of wholist-analytic style but 
there is some evidence supporting the validity with which it predicts subordinate 
characteristics, particularly interpersonal differences.  The link between wholist-
analytic style and interpersonal differences is an interesting one for two main 
reasons.   
 
Firstly, it echoes a distinction that has been drawn independently from a number of 
other styles, most notably; field independent-dependent style (Witkin, 1950) and 
convergent-divergent style (Hudson, 1967).  The evidence for this recurring 
distinction and the implications of association between interpersonal differences and 
global-analytic processing styles is discussed in appendix one. 
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Secondly, and perhaps more importantly in the context of the current discussion of 
validity, the common distinction between interpersonal and impersonal styles 
provides a link between field independent-dependent style, convergent-divergent 
style and wholist-analytic style which supports Riding‟s unidimensional view of 
global-analytic style.  This unitary perspective is fundamental to the construct 
validity of the wholist-analytic dimension but despite a strong theoretical basis and 
widespread agreement (Miller, 1987; Riding and Cheema, 1991; Allinson and Hayes, 
1996; Ehrman and Leaver, 2003), to-date there is limited evidence to demonstrate the 
link between the global-analytic styles.  The lack of an evidential link and the doubts, 
which this raises over the construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension, is 
discussed in Chapter three. 
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Chapter 3:  Construct Validity of the Wholist-Analytic Dimension 
 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) conception of wholist-analytic style was based on the 
notion that the global-analytic styles identified in the literature were actually 
measuring different aspects of a super-ordinate, wholist-analytic dimension.  This 
conception of style represents a unitary or unidimensional perspective of global-
analytic style differences; the unitary perspective is widely held (Miller, 1987; 
Riding and Cheema, 1991, Allinson and Hayes, 1996; Ehrman and Leaver, 2003).   
 
The unitary perspective predicts that similar conceptions of global-analytic styles 
will be related to each other. At the analytic pole: individuals will be reflective in 
their approach to situational uncertainty and will focus on ensuring accuracy; they 
will have a preference towards convergent thinking tasks; they will demonstrate 
superior disembedding skills associated with field independence; they will take a 
serialist approach and will distort the boundaries between groups and categories. At 
the wholist pole: individuals will be impulsive in uncertain situations; they will excel 
at divergent thinking relative to convergent thinking tasks; they will demonstrate 
inferior disembedding skills associated with field dependence; the will take a holist 
approach to processing and will blur the boundaries between groups and categories. 
 
The construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension is dependent on there being 
a correlation between the styles in the wholist-analytic family.  Riding and Cheema 
(1991) reviewed and presented the available evidence linking the five principal styles 
together; they acknowledged that no correlational evidence existed to suggest a 
relationship between holist-serialist style and leveller-sharpener style but this was 
owing to a dearth of studies.  Riding and Cheema (1991) did, however provide a 
56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
body of evidence linking convergent-divergent style and reflective-impulsive style 
with field independent-dependent style.   
 
This chapter re-examines the studies presented in Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) 
review which considered the relationships between the principle style labels; the 
chapter also compares the factor analytic studies which provide support for the 
unitary perspective and examines the limited research which has addressed this issue 
since Riding and Cheema‟s review.  
 
It will be argued that Riding and Cheema‟s model of style has a strong theoretical 
background but there is very little empirical evidence on which to base their wholist-
analytic construct and to date relationships between the styles in the wholist-analytic 
family have not been satisfactorily demonstrated. 
 
In particular, it will be demonstrated that the studies cited by Riding and Cheema 
(1991), which provided the only convincing empirical evidence of unidimensional 
style by demonstrating an association between reflective-impulsive style (Kagan, 
1965) and field independent-dependent style (Witkin, 1950) may have been a result 
of a methodological limitation associated with the Childrens‟ Embedded Figures Test 
(CEFT, Karp and Konstadt, 1971).  
 
The CEFT is a version of the embedded figures test, which was adapted for use with 
young children to test their field independent-dependent style; unfortunately the 
amendments to the CEFT changed the basis of the measurement from measuring the 
speed to achieving correct solutions, to measuring the accuracy of the first response.  
This adaptation rendered the test very sensitive to reflective-impulsive style, which 
may explain the consistent relationship between reflective-impulsive style and field-
independent dependent style when the CEFT is used as a measure of field 
independence.  
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3.2 The unitary perspective 
 
The unitary perspective is a widely held view; three theorists have proposed similar 
super-ordinate, global-analytic dimensions (Miller, 1987; Riding, 1991; Allinson and 
Hayes, 1996) and have integrated the sub-ordinate styles in comparable ways (Riding 
and Cheema, 1991; Miller, 1987; Allinson and Hayes, 1996). 
 
3.2.1 The wholist-analytic dimension (Riding and Cheema, 1991) 
 
Riding and Cheema (1991) reviewed five principal style labels and judged them 
“likely to be correlates of the same single cognitive style, which may be termed the 
wholist-analytic dimension” (Riding and Cheema, 1991, p.205).  The styles were 
vertically integrated as follows: 
 
Table 3.1: Integration of Wholist-analytic Styles (Riding and Cheema, 1991) 
Wholists Analytics  
Holists Serialists Pask (1972) 
Levellers Sharpeners Holzman and Klein (1954) 
Divergers Convergers Hudson (1967) 
Impulsive Reflective Kagan et al, (1964) 
Field dependence Field independence Witkin (1950) 
 
This approach to integrating the styles is similar to that of Miller‟s (1987) holist-
analytic dimension, and Allinson and Hayes‟s (1996) analytic-intuitive dimension, 
and demonstrates the widely held view that Holists, Divergers, Impulsives and Field 
dependents belong at the global pole and that Analytic, Convergent Reflective, Field 
independents belong at the analytic pole. 
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3.2.2 The analytic-holist dimension (Miller, 1987) 
 
Miller‟s (1987) model vertically integrated the styles beneath a super ordinate 
analytic-holistic dimension whilst horizontally connecting them to different aspects 
of cognitive processing.  The major difference between Miller‟s analytic-holistic 
dimension and Riding and Cheema‟s wholist-analytic dimension is the inclusion of 
verbal-visual style.  Riding and Cheema consider verbal-visual style as independent 
of wholist-analytic style.  However, there is considerable agreement between Miller 
(1987) and Riding and Cheema (1991) with regard to the inclusion of field 
independent-dependent style, convergent-divergent style and serial-holist style 
within the super-ordinate constructs, see Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Integration of Holistic-Analytic Styles (Miller 1991) 
Analytic Style Holistic Style 
Analytic Holistic 
Field Independence Field dependence 
Verbal/analytic Visual/analogue 
Conceptual differentiation Conceptual holism 
Convergence Divergence 
Serial Holistic 
Tight Loose 
Actuarial Intuitive 
 
Whilst Miller‟s (1987) theory of analytic-holist style is similar to Riding and 
Cheema‟s (1991) conception, unlike Riding (1991), Miller did not provide a means 
to measure analytic-holist style. 
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3.2.3 The analytic-intuitive dimension (Allinson and Hayes, 1996) 
 
Allinson and Hayes‟s (1996) conception of style did not provide a theoretical model 
of style like those of Miller (1987) and Riding (1991); the analytic-intuitive 
dimension evolved from a factor analyses in the pursuit of a self report measure of 
style.  
 
Action - analysis 
Active - passive 
Adaptor - innovator 
Cautious - risk taking 
Clarity - ambiguity 
Cognitive complexity – cognitive simplicity 
Field dependent – field independent 
Impulsive – reflective 
Personal – impersonal 
Rational – intuitive 
Rigour – less attention to detail 
Risk taking – caution 
Scanning – focussing 
Sensing – intuition 
Serialist – holist 
Splitter – lumper 
Systematic – intuitive 
Tolerance – intolerance for incongruous or unrealistic experience 
 
Figure 3.1: Eighteen style constructs used to create the CSI instrument 
(Personal communication with C. Allinson, July 2005). 
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Hayes and Allinson (1994) reviewed the cognitive styles literature and identified 
twenty-nine global-analytic styles; they generated four or five statements for each of 
the twenty-nine styles creating a list of one hundred and twenty nine statements.  
These were administered to two hundred and ninety one people and their responses 
were subjected to factor analysis.   
 
Thirty-eight statements loaded sufficiently highly on a single factor, which they 
labelled analytic-intuitive style; these statements formed the self-report measure, 
which is known as the Cognitive Styles Index (CSI, Allinson and Hayes, 1996).  The 
statements, which comprise the CSI, were derived from the eighteen styles listed in 
Figure 3.1 (personal communication with C. Allinson, July 2005). 
 
The trend towards the integration of style constructs and the unitary perspective of 
style has a strong theoretical foundation but there is very little empirical evidence to 
support Riding and Cheema‟s claim that the global-analytic styles are correlates of a 
single dimension. 
 
3.3 Evidence for the unitary perspective 
 
3.3.1 Holist-serialist and Leveller-Sharpener dimensions 
 
Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) review reported, “no empirical evidence exists linking 
the holist-serialist dimension with other styles of the wholist-analytic family” 
(Riding and Cheema, 1991. p.204).   However, in Allinson and Hayes (1996) factor 
analysis, holist-serialist statements did load sufficiently highly with reflective-
impulsive style statements and field-independent dependent style statements on the 
analytic-intuitive factor.  
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Similarly, there were no studies linking leveller-sharpener style to other styles in the 
wholist-analytic family, however, Riding and Dyer (1983) provided factor analytic 
evidence that leveller-sharpener style did load highly on the same factor as field 
independence-dependence. 
 
Riding and Dyer‟s (1983) factor analysis assessed the performance of one hundred 
and fifty, twelve year olds on three global-analytic styles: reflective-impulsive style, 
field-independent-dependent style and leveller-sharpener style; and also assessed 
them on Betts Imagery Control (Betts, 1909, cited in Riding and Dyer, 1983) and the 
Junior Eysenck Personality Inventory.  Leveller-sharpener style was measured by the 
schematising test (Holzman and Klein, 1954); field independence was measured by 
the group embedded figures test (GEFT, Oltman et al., 1971) and reflective style was 
measured by the matching familiar figures test (MFFT, Kagan et al., 1964). 
 
Leveller-sharpener style loaded highly on factor one with field independence-
dependence; reflective-impulsive style also loaded moderately on the same factor.  
However, this finding was not replicated in Allinson and Hayes‟s (1996) factor 
analysis; in their study, leveller-sharpener style did not load sufficiently with field 
independent-dependent style and reflective-impulsive style to be included in the 
analytic-intuitive factor. 
 
3.3.2 Convergent-Divergent dimension 
 
Convergent and divergent thinking measures were not included in Riding and Dyer‟s 
(1983) factor analytic study and they did not load sufficiently to be included in 
Allinson and Hayes‟s (1996) analytic-intuitive factor.  Surprisingly, all the empirical 
evidence reported by Riding and Cheema (1991) demonstrated a link with field 
independence and divergent thinking, which is in opposition to their theory.  They 
reported a number of studies linking divergent thinking with field independence 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Bloomberg, 1971; 1976; Noppe and Gallagher, 1977; Spotts and Mackler; 1967).   
For example; Spotts and Mackler (1967) found some limited evidence that field 
independent individuals, as measured by the EFT, performed better than field 
dependent individuals on tests of ideational fluency, flexibility, originality and 
elaboration.   
 
Riding and Cheema (1991) do not acknowledge this contradiction that on the one 
hand they proposed that convergent individuals should be at the analytic pole with 
field independent individuals; and that divergent individuals should be at the wholist 
pole with field dependent individuals, see Table 3.1; whilst also reporting evidence 
that indicates the opposite, that field independents are more divergent.  
 
It is also worth noting that, on closer inspection, the Bloomberg (1971) study, 
reported by Riding and Cheema as supporting a link between divergent thinking and 
field independence, actually reported no significant relationship between their 
measures of creativity and field independence.  The intention here is not necessarily 
to point out the error but to highlight the fact that the Bloomberg study used the Rod 
and Frame test as the measure of field independent-dependent style, not the 
embedded figures test.  It may be that the relationship reported between divergent 
thinking and field independence, by the studies that employed the EFT, was 
mediated by ability rather than style. The EFT has been widely criticised as being a 
measure of fluid ability rather than style (Cronbach, 1970; Cronbach and Snow, 
1981; Grigorenko and Sternberg, 1995; Sternberg and Grogorenko, 1997). 
 
More recently Bahar and Hansell (1999) found a weak relationship between field 
independence and divergent style, which approached significance.  Again, the EFT 
was used as the measure of field independence but in addition to this, the test used to 
assess divergent thinking in Bahar and Hansell‟s study required participants to 
produce a finite number of possible answers, which would have rendered the test a 
measure of ability rather than style.   
63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hudson (1967) demonstrated that when completing the object uses test, a test of 
divergent thinking, the instructions could be manipulated to assess ability or style.    
When the standard instructions are used, which require participants to produce as 
many uses for the objects as possible; only 7% of participants generated a minimum 
of 25 responses.  However, when the instructions were manipulated by requesting 
participants to produce at least 25 uses for the objects, 65% were able to do so.   
 
In summary, there is no evidence linking convergent thinking with field independent, 
reflective, serialist or sharpener styles and no evidence linking divergent thinking 
with field dependent, impulsive, holist or leveller styles.  The only styles that do 
consistently demonstrate a relationship are field independent-dependent style and 
reflective-impulsive style.   
 
3.3.3 Field independent-dependent style and reflective-impulsive style  
 
Messer‟s 1976 review of reflective-impulsive style, as reported by Riding and 
Cheema (1991), and Riding and Cheema‟s own 1991 review uncovered a handful of 
studies in the early 1970s which directly compared Field independence-dependence 
with reflective-impulsive style (Banta, 1970; Campbell and Douglas, 1972; Keogh 
and Donlon, 1972; Massari and Massari, 1973; Schleifer and Douglas, 1973; 
Massari, 1975; and Neimark, 1975).   The purpose of revisiting these studies is to 
examine the method which measured field independent-dependent style: either the 
Rod and Frame test (RFT); Embedded Figures Test (EFT); Group Embedded Figures 
Test (GEFT); or the Childrens‟ Embedded Figures Test (CEFT).   
 
It will be argued that the CEFT is sensitive to reflective-impulsive style and therefore 
correlations between the CEFT and the matching familiar figures test (MFFT) do not 
necessarily support the unitary perspective of style. Three additional studies which 
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were not reported in Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) review can be added to this list: 
Mumbauer and Miller, 1970; Cohen, Weiss and Minde (1972) and Glynn and Stoner 
(1987); and one more recent study published since their review, Jamieson (1992). 
 
The relationship between reflective-impulsive style and field independent-
dependent style when the CEFT is employed as a measure of field independent-
dependent style 
 
Campbell and Douglas (1972) assessed the field independent–dependent style and 
reflective-impulsive style of sixty boys, twenty aged six years old; twenty aged eight 
years old; and twenty aged ten years old, using the CEFT and the MFFT.  Field 
independence significantly correlated with increased MFFT latencies (r = 0.25) and 
greater MFFT accuracy (r = 0.45).  Campbell and Douglas also used the median split 
method to identify twenty reflective boys and twenty impulsive boys; they found that 
the reflective group were significantly more field independent that the impulsive 
group. 
 
Massari (1975) tested one hundred and fourteen, first and third grade children on the 
CEFT and the MFFT.   The median split method was used to classify participants as 
reflective or impulsive based on their latency to first response and number of errors 
on the MFFT.  Reflective children were significantly more field independent than 
impulsive children.   
 
Banta (1970) during the course of developing the Cincinatti Autonomy Test Battery 
(CATB) revised the MFFT and the CEFT for use with lower class pre-school 
children.  His versions of the MFFT and the CEFT were labelled the Early Childhood 
MFFT (EC-MFFT) and the Early Childhood EFT (EC-EFT).  The stimuli were less 
demanding, the written verbal instructions were reduced and there was no time limits 
placed on the tasks or latencies recorded. He found that the EC-MFFT correlated 
with the EC-EFT (r = .49) and with the CEFT (r = .27). 
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Massari and Massari (1973) assessed seventy three, three to five year olds (thirty 
four males and thirty nine females) using the EC-EFT and the EC-MFFT (Banta, 
1970)).  The EC-MFFT scored the number of errors to correct solution and the 
latency to first response and the EC-EFT scored the number of correct solutions and 
the latency to correct response.  Latency to first response on the EC-MFFT and 
latency to correct response on the EC-EFT significantly correlated (r = 0.39 and 0.46, 
respectively for boys and girls); the number of errors made before achieving the 
correct solution on the EC-MFFT and the number of correct solutions on the EC-EFT 
correlated (r = -0.45 and –0.46 for boys and girls).   
 
Schleifer and Douglas (1973) undertook two studies. The first used twenty-nine 
children from a middle class background, aged six or seven years old.  Field 
independent –dependent and reflective-impulsive style was measured using the 
CEFT and the MFFT; correlations between the CEFT and the MFFT were not 
reported but the children classified as „High Level‟ respondents in a test of moral 
judgement were significantly more field independent and had longer latencies to first 
response on the MFFT but were not significantly more accurate.   
 
The second study used thirty-five middle class children aged three to six years and 
thirty-seven children from low-income families aged three to six years; style was 
measured using the EC-EFT and the EC-MFFT.  In both samples reflective style 
correlated with field independence (r = 0.62).   
 
Mumbauer and Miller (1970) administered the CEFT and the MFFT to sixty-four 
children aged between four years eight months to five years eight months.  Accuracy 
on the CEFT and the MFFT correlated (r = 0.56) and latencies to first response on 
the CEFT and the MFFT correlated (r = 0.43).  
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It is clear from this group of studies that when the CEFT is used to measure field 
independent-dependent style, the relationship between reflective-impulsive style and 
field independent-dependent style has been consistently reported with reflective 
individuals being more field independent. Only one study that employed the CEFT 
reported a non-significant correlation of 0.35 between accuracy on the CEFT and 
latency on the MFFT (Glynn and Stoner, 1987). 
 
The relationship between reflective-impulsive style and field independent-
dependent style when the CEFT is not employed as a measure of field independent-
dependent style  
 
Keogh and Donlon (1972) tested twenty-seven boys with severe learning disorders 
aged between eight and fourteen years and twenty-five boys with mild to moderate 
learning difficulties aged nine to thirteen years.  The boys‟ styles were assessed using 
the Portable Rod and Frame Test (PRFT) (Gerard, 1969) and the MFFT.  The severe 
learning disordered group were significantly more impulsive than the mild to 
moderate group, based on MFFT errors and latency scores, but the groups did not 
significantly differ on field independent-dependent style.   
 
In the mild to moderate learning disordered group reflective-impulsive style was not 
significantly related to field independent-dependent style; in the severe learning 
disordered group field independent-dependent style was not related to MFFT 
latencies but was significantly related to number of errors.  However, in the mild to 
moderate group, errors and latencies on the MFFT significantly correlated (r = -0.64) 
suggesting that longer reflection times led to greater accuracy to first response and 
errors were a result of a lack of reflection; in the severe learning disordered group 
error scores did not significantly correlate with latency to first response suggesting 
that reflective-impulsive style was not mediating accuracy.   
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Neimark (1975) administered the EFT and the MFFT to eighty-four, third to sixth 
grade children (forty-four males and forty females) and found that EFT scores 
correlated with MFFT accuracy (r = .46) but not with MFFT latency (r = -.19). 
 
Cohen et al. (1972) administered the EFT and the MFFT to forty adolescent boys, 
comparing twenty participants previously diagnosed as hyperactive with twenty 
control participants.  Hyperactives were more impulsive, with shorter MFFT 
latencies and less accuracy and more field dependent than the control group.   
Correlation statistics between EFT and MFFT measures were not reported. 
 
More recently, Jamieson (1992) measured the style of forty-six adult students 
studying English as a second language, using the GEFT and the MFFT; she found no 
significant relationship between reflective-impulsive style and field independence-
dependence. 
 
In summary, the relationship between reflective-impulsive style and field 
independent-dependent style has not been satisfactorily demonstrated by the 
collection of studies that have employed the EFT, the GEFT or the PRFT despite the 
fact that a consistent relationship has been demonstrated when the CEFT has been 
used. This can be explained by the different methodology used in the CEFT. 
 
The CEFT (Karp and Konstadt, 1971) was based on the first child friendly version of 
the EFT, the CHEF, developed by Goodenough and Eagle (1963).  To make the task 
more enjoyable for children, each complex figure is presented as a large jigsaw; 
several of the pieces have knobs attached to them.  The children are shown a simple 
form and asked to pull out the piece of the jigsaw, which matches it; only one piece 
matches the simple form.  To make the task fun and to ensure that the children 
perceive the figure as a whole, the jigsaw represents a meaningful figure rather than 
the abstract shapes used in the original EFT.   
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The most important difference in the CEFT, in terms of construct validity, is that 
instead of scoring the latency to production of the correct response as in the EFT, the 
scoring is based on the latency to the first response, regardless of accuracy.  This 
adaptation was introduced to reduce the childrens‟ feeling of failure but it 
fundamentally changes the basis of the measurement.  By creating a situation with 
response uncertainty, providing a fixed set of alternatives and measuring the speed of 
the first response, the method is the same as that used by Kagan to measure 
reflective-impulsive style in the MFFT.   
 
Therefore, the consistent relationship between reflective-impulsive style and field 
independent-dependent style that has been demonstrated between studies, which 
have employed the CEFT as the measure of field independent-dependent style, may 
be mediated by the CEFT‟s sensitivity to reflective-impulsive style and not because 
of a genuine relationship between the style constructs.  This is because both of the 
style measures are recording latencies to first response in situations of uncertainty 
when a series of alternative responses are presented. 
 
3.4 Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) review identified five principal style constructs which 
they subsumed under the super-ordinate wholist-analytic dimension: holist-serialist 
style; leveller-sharpener style; convergent-divergent style; reflective-impulsive style; 
and, field independent-dependent style.  The construct validity of the wholist-
analytic dimension dictates that the five principal style labels should correlate with 
each other. 
 
There is, however, no empirical evidence that holist-serialist style correlates with any 
of the other principal style labels.  There is no independent evidence that leveller-
sharpener correlates with any of the principal style labels; it did load on the same 
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factor as field-independent style and reflective-impulsive style in Riding and Dyer‟s 
(1983) factor analytic study but this was not replicated by Allinson and Hayes 
(1996).    
 
There is no evidence that convergent-divergent style correlates with any of the styles, 
with the exception of field independence-dependence.  However, curiously the 
studies, which have suggested a link with field independent-dependent style, have 
found a correlation in the opposite direction to that predicted by proponents of 
unitary style (Miller, 1987; Riding and Cheema, 1991; Ehrman and Leaver, 2003).  
In each case the field dependent pole has been linked with convergent thinking and 
the field independent pole with divergent thinking (Bahar and Hansell, 1999; 
Bloomberg, 1976; Noppe and Gallagher, 1977; Spotts and Mackler; 1967). 
 
The only two principal styles that have demonstrated a consistent relationship are 
reflective-impulsive style and field independent-dependent style.  These two styles 
loaded on the same factor in both Riding and Dyer‟s (1983) and Allinson and Hayes 
(1996) factor analytic studies.  In addition, there are ten correlational studies that 
have considered the relationship between these two styles and seven of them reported 
a relationship between field independence and reflective style. 
 
However on closer inspection, six of the seven studies, which have reported an 
association between reflective style and field independence, have used the CEFT as a 
measure of field independent-independent style.  The CEFT is a revised measure of 
the EFT that was adapted for use with children.  It has been argued here that the 
adaptations reduced the validity of the CEFT and made it sensitive to reflective-
impulsive style.  The result was that both the CEFT and the MFFT measured the 
latency to the first response, in a situation of uncertainty in which a respondent was 
forced to chose from a number of response options. Therefore, correlations between 
the CEFT and the MFFT may be a result of them both measuring reflective-
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impulsive style, rather than evidence for an association between field independent-
dependent style and reflective-impulsive style. 
 
The above casts doubt over the only consistent evidence, which has been provided 
for the unitary perspective and therefore, further weakens the unitary perspective of 
global-analytic style. On a more positive note, the other common variable amongst 
the CEFT studies is their use of young children; the relationship between styles may 
be more readily apparent in very young children. 
 
The unitary perspective rests on the assumption that global-analytic constructs 
should inter-correlate however, since Riding and Cheema‟s (1991) review and 
consolidation of the style literature, very little has been done to test this assumption.  
Riding (2005) and Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003) have recommended that a 
selection of style measurements should be compared to assess their relationship; 
therefore this thesis will assess four measures of global-analytic style with the aim of 
testing the unitary assumption.  Two super-ordinate measures of style will be 
assessed, wholist-analytic style (Riding, 1991) and analytic-intuitive style (Allinson 
and Hayes, 1996); and two principal style measures will be assessed, reflective-
impulsive style (Kagan et al. 1964) and convergent-divergent style (Hudson, 1967), 
see Chapter eleven and twelve.   
 
Since there is no standardised measure of convergent-divergent style, a new measure 
will be constructed and validated, see Chapter seven.  Additionally, a computer 
presented replication of the matching familiar figures test will be constructed to 
measure reflective-impulsive style, see Chapter eight.  
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Chapter 4: Methodological limitations of the wholist-analytic ratio 
 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
A serious shortcoming of the wholist-analytic dimension is that it has not 
successfully demonstrated that it differentiates between individuals based on their 
tendency to part or whole process.  In chapter two it was demonstrated that studies 
which manipulate the structure of learning material in a way that is predicted to 
affect part and whole processors have been inconclusive and a comparison between 
the wholist-analytic dimension and Navon type tasks requiring local or global 
processing failed to demonstrate a relationship. 
 
The central concept of wholist-analytic style is that it should discriminate between 
individuals who organise information in wholes or in parts (Riding, 1991).  This 
chapter will argue that the wholist-analytic dimension is sensitive to aspects of 
global-analytic style, but does not constitute a valid measure of peoples‟ ability to 
part or whole process. 
 
There are a number of methodological limitations with the assessment of the wholist-
analytic dimension, which leads to two confounding variables, which reduce its 
validity.   The first limitation is that the wholist-analytic ratio is confounded by 
individual differences in reflective-impulsive style.  The second limitation is a 
possible asymmetry in the wholist-analytic ratio such that the wholists are assessed 
on their ability to part process relative to their ability to whole process; but the 
analytics are assessed on the efficacy of a part processing strategy in a part-
processing task relative to a whole processing task.  
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4.2 Sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to reflective-impulsive style  
 
There is a fundamental methodological limitation with the way the wholist-analytic 
style ratio is calculated, which confounds the measurement of part-whole processing 
with individual differences in reflective-impulsive style.  This confounding factor is 
the lack of counterbalancing of the wholist-analytic subtests. 
 
Riding‟s (1991) Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA) consists of 3 subtests; the first 
assesses the verbal-imager dimension; and, the second and third assess the wholist-
analytic dimension. Wholist-analytic style is determined by the relative time that 
individuals take to complete the second subtest in comparison to the third subtest.  
The second subtest consists of a series of matching figure tasks which requires the 
respondent to decide if two complex geometric figures are the same or different.  The 
third subtest consists of a series of embedded figure tasks in which the individual has 
to decide if a given simple geometric shape is contained within a more complex 
geometric figure.   
 
The matching figures task is assumed to favour whole processing and the embedded 
figures task is assumed to favour analytic processing; therefore, those who complete 
the matching figures subtest relatively faster than they complete the embedded 
figures subtest will be labelled as wholists and vice versa for analytics, and the 
relative speed of processing each subtest is expressed as a style ratio.  
 
Importantly, the order of presentation of the matching figures and embedded figures 
subtests is not counterbalanced.  Counterbalancing is standard practice when 
employing repeated measures and there is no methodological or theoretical basis to 
explain the absence of such measures in the CSA.  It will be demonstrated that this 
limitation has reduced the validity of the ratio method as a measure of the wholist-
analytic dimension by confounding the wholist-analytic ratio with reflective-
impulsive style.   
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4.2.1 Reflective-Impulsive style and order effects 
 
Reflective styles are characterised by people who focus on accuracy rather than 
speed of response, whereas, impulsive people tend to focus on speed to the detriment 
of accuracy (Kagan et al., 1964).  Nietfeld and Bosma (2003) demonstrated that 
reflective and impulsive characteristics are moderately stable across verbal, 
mathematic and spatial tasks and are stable across tasks when accuracy is 
emphasised (accurate response condition), when speed is emphasised (fast response 
condition) and when neither speed nor accuracy is emphasised (normal response 
condition). 
 
Nietfeld and Bosma used a sample of fifty-nine undergraduates and found that 
reflectives produced the slowest and most accurate mean responses across the three 
response conditions (normal, fast and accurate) and the impulsives were the fastest 
and the least accurate; the differences between reflectives and impulsives were all 
significant.  The „Normals‟, those who were neither reflective nor impulsive, showed 
the greatest flexibility, they were significantly more accurate than the impulsives in 
the accurate and fast conditions but not significantly slower and they were 
significantly faster than the reflectives in the accurate and fast conditions but not 
significantly less accurate.  The lowest accuracy figures and the shortest latencies for 
all style groups were in the fast condition.   
 
Their findings revealed an order effect: the reflective, normal and impulsive groups 
were slowest during the first subtest (the normal condition); faster during the second 
subtest (the accurate condition); and fastest during the third and final subtest (the fast 
condition).   
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There was significant interaction between the response conditions and the style 
groups for latency.  Whilst all the style groups had a tendency to increase their speed 
of processing across the response conditions, the reflective participants increased 
disproportionately, reducing the processing gap between reflective and impulsives, 
see Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Style group means across response conditions (Reproduced with 
permission from Nietfeld and Bosma, 2003) 
 
In the normal condition, reflective mean latencies were 379.30 ms slower than the 
impulsives with an effect size of 2.59; in the accurate condition, reflective mean 
latencies were 294.13 ms slower (d = 1.89); and in the fast condition mean latencies 
were only 149.75 ms slower (d = 1.06).  This suggests that the reflective participants 
began very slowly when approaching the novel task but as the uncertainty 
surrounding the task diminished, reflective behaviour diminished.  This reflective 
tendency, when combined with the lack of counterbalancing of the wholist-analytic 
subtests, has serious implications for the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio. 
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4.3 The implications of reflective characteristics and order effects on the 
wholist-analytic ratio 
 
In the context of the CSA, this means that the wholist-analytic ratio is measuring 
reflective-impulsive style not part-whole processing style; or at the very least is 
measuring both.  This confounding variable is a result of the order of presentation of 
the matching figures tasks and the embedded figures tasks.  The matching figures 
subtest is always presented first, followed by the embedded figures subtest; therefore 
people with reflective styles will respond more slowly to the matching figure items 
and increase their speed as they progress through the embedded figure items.  This 
means that reflective people will respond more slowly to the matching figure section 
relative to the embedded figure section and will therefore be labelled as analytic, see 
Figure 4.2.  This means that individuals may be labelled as analytic because they 
have a reflective style and not because they have a preferred part processing style.   
 
The sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to differences in reflective-impulsive 
style is likely to exaggerate individual differences between wholist and analytic 
participants in a way that is consistent with Riding‟s theoretical assumptions because 
analytics are predicted to have both a part processing preference and a reflective 
style.  Therefore, individuals with an analytic style and a reflective style will be 
slower on the wholist items because they are part processors and because they are 
approaching early test items with caution, see Figure 4.2, and this will amplify the 
wholist-analytic ratio. 
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Figure 4.2: The effect of part processing preferences and reflective style on the 
wholist-analytic ratio 
 
It should be possible to expose the effect of reflective-impulsive style by 
manipulating the order in which the subtests are presented. It follows that when the 
matching figures task is presented first, reflective individuals will achieve more 
analytic ratios; and, when the embedded figures task is presented first, reflective 
individuals will achieve more wholist ratios.   
 
In addition to the sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to reflective-impulsive 
style, the second limitation of the wholist-analytic ratio relates to an asymmetry in 
the way part processing is compared to whole processing in analytics and wholists.  
The wholist-analytic subtests do not consistently measure the relative ability to 
perform part and whole processing. 
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4.4 An asymmetry in the wholist-analytic ratio 
 
The wholist-analytic dimension is based on the assumption that wholists will perform 
better (i.e. respond relatively quicker) to matching figures tasks and analytics will 
perform better (i.e. respond relatively quicker) to embedded figures tasks.  This is 
because their preferred processing style is most suited to the respective task 
demands.  However, Riding (1991; 1998; 2005) does not explicitly state why the 
wholists or analysts are slower to respond to tasks, which do not compliment their 
preferred style.  There are two possible explanations: 
 
Either, they are slower because they are being forced into using a style, which is not 
their preferred style; or, they are slower because they continue to use their preferred 
style even when such a strategy is less efficient for the task at hand?  
 
The implication of Riding‟s design is that the matching figures task requires whole 
processing and the embedded figure task requires part processing.  If this is correct 
then the ratio of response times to the wholist and analytic items is measuring an 
individual‟s speed of whole processing the matching figure items versus the speed of 
part processing the embedded figure items.  Therefore, in this scenario there is 
symmetry in the way the processing of wholists and analytics is being compared by 
the ratio; wholists are those who are faster at whole processing and slower at part 
processing and analytics are those who are faster at part processing and slower at 
whole processing.   
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Table 4.1: Symmetry in processing 
 
  
Strategy employed by a 
Wholist Individual 
 
Strategy employed by an 
Analytic Individual 
 
Matching Figure 
Tasks 
 
Whole processing 
 
Whole processing 
 
 
Embedded Figure 
Tasks 
 
Part processing 
 
Part processing 
 
 
 
However, in practice either a part or a whole processing strategy may be used to 
complete the matching figure task but only a part processing strategy can be used to 
complete the embedded figure task. 
 
4.4.1 Strategy choice and the matching figure task 
 
The matching figure task may be processed using a whole processing strategy or a 
part processing strategy.  Whole processing would involve treating each figure as a 
whole and assessing the degree of similarity between gestalts, see Figure 4.3; and a 
part processing approach would involve attending to each simple shape within the 
first complex figure and assessing the similarity with each of the shapes within the 
second complex figure, see Figure 4.4.   
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Figure 4.3: Matching figures - whole processing strategy 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Matching figures - part processing strategy 
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When completing matching figures tasks a whole processing strategy will be more 
efficient than a part processing strategy.  However, unlike the matching figures task, 
the embedded figures tasks can only be approached using one processing style. 
 
4.4.2 Strategy choice and the embedded figures task 
 
The very nature of the embedded figure task requires that a part processing strategy 
must be used and rules out the option of using a whole processing strategy, see figure 
4.5.   
 
 
Figure 4.5: Embedded figures – part processing strategy 
 
4.4.3 Effect of strategy choice on the wholist-analytic ratio 
 
Since the matching figures tasks can be completed using part processing or whole 
processing but the embedded figures tasks can only be completed using part 
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processing, this would lead to an asymmetry in the nature of the processing being 
calculated by the wholist-analytic ratio.  The asymmetry is illustrated in the 
following scenario:   
 
An individual has the ability to use both whole and part processing strategy, but will 
employ their style preference if the task allows. Therefore, a part processor will use 
part processing to complete both tasks because it is their preferred style whereas the 
whole processors will use whole processing for the matching figures task but will be 
forced to use part processing for the embedded figures task, see Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: Asymmetry in processing 
 
  
Strategy employed by a 
Wholist Individual 
 
Strategy employed by an 
Analytic Individual 
 
Matching Figure 
Tasks 
 
Whole processing 
 
Part processing 
 
 
Embedded Figure 
Tasks 
 
Part processing 
 
Part processing 
 
     
 
Therefore, in this scenario there is an asymmetry in the way the processing of 
wholists and analytics is being compared by the ratio; wholists are those who are 
faster at whole processing and slower at part processing; and, analytics are those who 
are faster at embedded figures items than matching figure items because part 
processing is a more efficient strategy for embedded figures tasks. 
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If the postulated asymmetry exists, the wholist-analytic ratio will still be sensitive to 
processing differences between wholist and analytic individuals but the ratios being 
compared cannot be assumed to be measuring directly comparable differences.  It 
should be possible to expose these differences by manipulating the number of 
constituent parts in the complex figures, which form the basis of the wholist-analytic 
tasks.  It follows that when part processing is employed, processing times should get 
longer when more parts have to be processed.   
 
4.5 Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter has proposed two methodological limitations of the wholist-analytic 
ratio that raise doubts over its validity.  The first limitation, and perhaps the most 
serious, is the sensitivity of the ratio to reflective-impulsive style differences.  It has 
been proposed that reflective individuals will be labelled as analytic based on their 
reflective characteristics rather than because they have a preference for part 
processing.  The wholist-analytic ratio is confounded in this way because of the order 
effects, which result from a lack of counterbalancing of the matching figures and 
embedded figures subtests. 
 
The second limitation concerns the use of part and whole processing strategies for 
completion of the matching figures and embedded figures tasks.  It has been argued 
that either strategy may be used to complete the matching figure tasks but only a part 
processing strategy can be used to complete the embedded figure tasks.  When this is 
combined with the notion that respondents will habitually choose their preferred style 
of processing where possible, it sets up an asymmetry in the strategies used by 
analytics and wholists. 
 
Part processors will employ part processing for both tasks but will be relatively 
slower at the matching figures task because it is less suited to a part processing 
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strategy; part processors will therefore be labelled as analytics because of a strategy-
task mismatch.  Whereas, whole processors will employ whole processing for the 
matching figures task and part processing for the embedded figures task; they will be 
slower at the embedded figures task because they are slower at part processing; 
whole processors will therefore be labelled as wholist because of their relative ability 
to whole or part process.  
 
In order to demonstrate the sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to individual 
differences in reflective-impulsive style and to examine the proposed asymmetry in 
the nature of part and whole processing differences in the wholist-analytic ratio, a 
new measure of wholist-analytic style, the Wholist-Analytic Style (WAS) Analysis, 
has been developed which represents a partial replication of the wholist-analytic 
subtests of the CSA.  The measure is designed as a tool to expose the limitations of 
the wholist-analytic ratio not as an alternative measure.  The construction and 
methodology of the WAS analysis is described in full in Chapter six. 
 
Two versions of the wholist-analytic styles analysis (WAS analysis) have been 
developed; one version, the WAS–WA presents the matching figures subtest and the 
embedded figures subtest in the same order as it is presented in the CSA; the other 
version, the WAS-AW, reverses the order of subtest presentation.  A comparison of 
the ratios produced by each version of the WAS analysis will expose the effects of 
reflective-impulsive style on the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
The limitations of the wholist-analytic dimension outlined in this chapter lead to 
reduced validity of the wholist-analytic ratio; however; the confounding effects of 
reflective-impulsive style can also explain the low temporal reliability of the wholist-
analytic dimension which has been widely reported in the literature (Parkinson, 
Mullally and Redmond, 2004; Peterson, Deary and Austin, 2003; Rezaei and Katz, 
2004; Cook, 2008).  A review of the reliability and an explanation of low reliability 
will be discussed in Chapter five.  
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Chapter 5: An explanation for the low reliability of the wholist-
analytic dimension 
 
5.1 Chapter introduction 
 
The wholist-analytic dimension in its present form has low test-retest reliability 
(Peterson et al., 2003; Parkinson et al., 2004; Rezaei and Katz, 2004; Cook, 2008).  
Parkinson et al., (2004) administered the CSA to fifty-one students with a two-week 
test retest interval, reporting a correlation of 0.33 for the wholist-analytic ratio.  They 
also administered the CSA to a further sample of twenty-seven students, over a 
twenty three-month interval, producing a correlation of 0.34.  Cook (2008) tested 
eighty-nine medical residents and students, with an average test-retest interval of 18 
months, producing a correlation of 0.30. Rezaei and Katz (2004) used test retest 
intervals of one week and one month and varied the emphasis of accuracy over speed 
producing reliability coefficients of 0.42, 0.45 and 0.55.   
 
Modified forms of the CSA have also demonstrated low temporal reliability for the 
wholist-analytic dimension with coefficients of 0.30 and 0.31 using a one-week 
interval (Peterson et al., 2003a). Better temporal reliability figures (r = 0.53) were 
achieved by combining a replica and a parallel form of the CSA to create an 
extended eighty-item test (Peterson et al., 2003a).   
 
An atypically high test-retest reliability correlation of r = .71 was produced by 
Waring and Evans (2003); however, their sample was very small consisting of 18 
people and all were trained in the theory and application of cognitive style in the 
intervening test period which introduced the effect of demand characteristics. 
 
Riding (2003) concedes that the reliability of the CSA should be examined but has 
argued that whilst reliability is convenient and desirable, it is validity, not reliability, 
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which is the most important quality in any measurement.  In support of this view 
Riding describes a situation, using the example of the startle test, in which a measure 
can be valid but not reliable.   
 
It is, of course, theoretically possible for a measure to be valid without having 
temporal reliability, however, in such a situation the least that should be expected is a 
theoretical or methodological explanation for the lack of stability.   To use Ridings 
example of the startle test, the startle effect will clearly diminish if the test is 
administered on subsequent occasions because the startle test by its nature requires 
naivety.  However, Riding provides no theoretical reason why wholist-analytic ratios 
should not remain stable across testing sessions, after all cognitive styles are 
theorised to be stable characteristics (Riding, 1991).   
 
Peterson et al. (2003) and Rezai and Katz (2004) have made some effort to improve 
the temporal reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension by increasing the number 
of test items, varying the test retest intervals and modifying the test instructions but 
neither have provided a satisfactory explanation for the lack of temporal reliability. 
 
This chapter offers an explanation for the low temporal reliability, which is based on 
the validity problems outlined in the previous chapter.  In particular, the postulated 
sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to reflective-impulsive style predicts that 
participants with a reflective style will produce lower, more wholist ratios at the 
second sitting of the CSA because the task does not involve the uncertainty 
associated with the first sitting.  This sensitivity to reflective-impulsive style will 
have the effect of lowering the test-retest reliability correlations of the wholist-
analytic dimension. 
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5.2 Temporal reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension 
 
Peterson et al. (2003) produced replica (CSA-A) and parallel versions (CSA-B) of 
the CSA.  This approach was used because Ridings CSA is not open to analysis of 
internal stability, but the use of a modified version of the CSA in this way has 
received criticism; Riding (2003) and Redmond, Parkinson and Mullally (2007) have 
argued that reliability studies should employ unmodified versions of the test they 
purport to study and that Peterson‟s version of the CSA is significantly different to 
the original.  Peterson, Deary and Austin (2007) argued that the CSA-A is a replica 
version of the CSA, which employs the same methodology and stimuli and therefore 
does not differ in any meaningful way.  Riding has also criticised the one week test 
retest interval employed in Peterson‟s study; this does appear to be very short and it 
seems likely that participants will be primed for the words and associations used in 
the verbal-imagery items.  It seems less likely that the short interval would influence 
the subsequent processing of the figural items in the wholist-analytic sections and 
Peterson et al‟s reliability statistics (0.30 and 0.31) were consistent with those found 
by Cook (2008) with an interval of 18 months (r = 0.30) and Parkinson et al. (2004) 
with intervals of two weeks and twenty-three months (r = 0.33 and 0.34), both Cook 
and Parkinson et al. used unmodified versions of the CSA. 
 
Peterson et al (2003) produced improved reliability figures (r = 0.53) when the 
responses to the CSA-A and the CSA-B were combined to become the C-CSA.  This 
was a post hoc manipulation so the reliability ratio derived from the C-CSA was 
based on repeated exposure to the wholist-analytic order of subtest presentation.  
Respondents completed twenty matching figures tasks followed by twenty embedded 
figures tasks (CSA-A) then they had a 5 minute break followed by another twenty 
matching figures tasks and twenty embedded figures tasks (CSA-B).  Presentation 
order of the CSA-A and CSA-B was counterbalanced but the order in which 
matching figure and embedded figure trials was not.   
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The highest reliability figures have been reported by Rezaei and Katz (2004), they 
used an unmodified version of the CSA on three student samples.  Sample „one‟ 
consisted of seventy-three randomly selected high school students, using a test-retest 
interval of one week.  Sample two and three consisted of thirty-six and forty-five 
volunteer students, respectively, using a test-retest interval of one month.  The 
standardised written instructions also varied such that accuracy was emphasised in 
samples one and two, whereas, overall speed of response was emphasised in sample 
three.  The lowest coefficient was obtained when a one-week interval was used (r = 
0.42), this improved as the interval increased to one month (r = 0.45) and improved 
further when reaction time was emphasised (r = 0.55).   
 
Unfortunately it is not clear whether Rezaei and Katz‟s correlation coefficients are 
based on the stability of the wholist-analytic ratios or the consistency with which 
individuals were labelled as wholist, intermediate or analytic.  In the absence of a 
statement to the contrary it will be assumed that the statistics are based on the 
relationship between ratios.  However, it is worth noting that Peterson et al‟s 
coefficients increased from 0.30 to 0.34 for the CSA-A when labels were used and 
Parkinson et al‟s coefficients increased from 0.33 to 0.45 and from 0.34 to 0.54 when 
correlations were based on allocation of labels rather than ratios.  Conversely, test-
retest reliability dropped from 0.31 to 0.23 for the CSA-B and from 0.53 to 0.38 for 
the C-CSA when labels were used. 
 
Whether Rezaei and Katz‟s correlations are based on ratios or labels, they still report 
an improvement in temporal reliability when speed is emphasised.  Rezaei and Katz 
offer no explanation for the effect of manipulating the test instructions.    
 
The current thesis offers an explanation for the low temporal reliability of the 
wholist-analytic dimension (Peterson et al, 2003a; Parkinson et al, 2004; Rezaei and 
Katz, 2004; Cook, 2008) and explains why repeating the exposure to the wholist and 
analytic subtests will lead to better stability (Peterson et al., 2003a) and why the 
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stability improves when the instructions are manipulated to emphasise speed (Rezaei 
and Katz, 2004).   These findings can all be accounted for by considering the 
sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to reflective-impulsive style that was 
theorised in the previous chapter. 
 
5.2.1 The diminishing effect of reflective style on temporal reliability   
 
The sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to individual differences in reflective-
impulsive style, which was theorised in Chapter four, will diminish with subsequent 
test sessions.  This is because the characteristic tendency of reflective individuals to 
be slow and cautious during early test items is based on their attempts to ensure 
accuracy in situations of uncertainty.  In the second test, prior experience of the trials 
leads to reduced uncertainty and a diminished effect of reflective style.  The 
diminishing effect of reflective style will reduce the stability of the ratios between 
the test and retest sessions.   
 
In Riding‟s CSA and Petersons CSA-A and CSA-B, which present the matching 
figure trials first followed by the embedded figure trials; participants with a reflective 
style and participants with a part processing style will be slowest during the matching 
figure test items at the first test session and will therefore produce analytic ratios.  
Since part processing styles and reflective styles are assumed to be related (Riding 
and Cheema, 1991), reflective-part processors will produce inflated analytic ratios at 
the first test session owing to the influence of their part processing style and their 
reflective style.   
 
At the second test session the effect of reflective style will diminish, part processors 
will still produce analytic ratios but the ratios will not be inflated by concomitant 
reflective style characteristics.  Therefore, those who were labelled as analytic at the 
first session because of their complimentary reflective and part processing style will 
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produce lower wholist-analytic ratios at the retest session because the retest ratio will 
be based on their part processing style and not on their reflective style.    
 
It is hypothesised that by reversing the order of the subtests this effect could be 
further illustrated.  If the embedded figures subtest were presented first, reflective 
individuals will be slower at the embedded figures tasks because these tasks appear 
at the beginning of the test and part processors will be slower at the matching figures 
items because these items are more suited to whole processing.  Consequently, the 
concomitant tendency to be both reflective and a part processor are in conflict. 
 
This means that many of the participants labelled as wholists at the first sitting are 
actually reflective individuals who were relatively slower at the embedded figure 
items than the matching figure items because the embedded figures trials were 
presented earlier in the test, and not because of differences in whole or part 
processing tendencies.  The influence of reflective style will again diminish at the 
retest session and the reflective individuals, who had previously been labelled as 
wholist, will produce more analytic ratios because their concomitant part processing 
style is no longer in conflict with their reflective style. 
 
Therefore it is hypothesised that when the matching figure subtest is presented first, 
the diminishing effect of reflective style will cause analytic individuals to produce 
lower analytic ratios at retest.  Whereas, if the embedded figure subtest were 
presented first, the diminishing effect of reflective style will have a greater impact on 
stability because reflective individuals will swing from producing wholist ratios to 
producing analytic ratios. 
 
This theory can also account for the relatively higher temporal reliability of 
Petersons C-CSA.  This extended eighty-item test presents the wholist and analytic 
subtests twice by combining the replica form CSA-A and the parallel form CSA-B.  
If a respondent completes the CSA-A first and then after a 5 minute break completes 
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the CSA-B then the CSA-A is likely to be influenced by reflective style as described 
above and this effect will be diminished in CSA-B because the response uncertainty 
has diminished.  This could account for the lack of relationship reported by Peterson 
between the CSA-A and the CSA-B (r = 0.07).  When the two modified forms of the 
CSA are combined to form the C-CSA, the combined measure is less influenced by 
the effect of reflective style at the first test session and will therefore produce 
improved correlations at retest. 
 
This theory explains the reported lack of test retest reliability of the wholist-analytic 
dimension and modified versions of the CSA such as the CSA-A and the CSA-B.  It 
has accounted for the improvement reported in the stability of the C-CSA and can 
also account for the improvements in stability reported by Rezaei and Katz (2004) 
when speed was emphasised. 
 
5.2.2 Improvement in stability when speed is emphasised 
 
Rezaei and Katz (2004) reported the highest test-retest reliability when speed was 
emphasised at the outset of the CSA.  This verbal instruction to focus on speed is 
likely to temper the standardised computer presented instructions at the beginning of 
the wholist subtest that state “work carefully to ensure accuracy”. 
 
The CSA‟s instructions, which encourage caution and accuracy, will reinforce 
reflective tendencies to carefully consider each response to ensure accuracy.  The 
additional verbal instructions, which emphasise speed, which were introduced by 
Rezaei and Katz, will to some extent reduce reflective tendencies and speed up their 
rate of responding.     
 
In effect, Rezaei and Katz reduced the influence of reflective style at the first test 
session, which increased the consistency of response at retest thereby improving the 
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temporal reliability.  Any changes to the CSA, or modified versions of the CSA, 
which reduce the influence of reflective-impulsive style would be expected to 
produce higher test-retest reliability coefficients.   
 
5.2.3 Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
In this chapter it has been hypothesised that the theory of diminished reflection 
proposed in Chapter four explains the lack of stability, which has been reported in 
the literature.  It predicts the low temporal reliability of any measure of wholist-
analytic dimension that fails to counterbalance the matching figure and embedded 
figure subtests.   The theory has also provided an explanation for the improved 
temporal reliability achieved by Peterson et al.‟s (2003) C-CSA and Rezai and Katz 
(2004).  In each case the modifications to the methodology of the CSA served to 
reduce the influence of reflective style at the first subtest, thereby increasing the 
stability between test and re-test. 
 
The effect of diminished reflection on temporal reliability will be examined in 
Chapter ten by performing test-re-test studies on both versions of the newly 
constructed WAS Analysis, which have been previously discussed in Chapter four 
and developed and validated in Chapter six.   
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Chapter 6: Construction, Development and Validation of the 
Wholist-Analytic Style (WAS) Analysis 
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
The Wholist-Analytic Style Analysis, or WAS Analysis, is based on the wholist-
analytic dimension of the CSA and measures the ratio of the median speed of 
processing matching figure tasks to the median speed of processing embedded figure 
tasks.  Matching figure items require participants to identify whether two complex 
figures are the same or different and the embedded figure items require participants 
to identify whether a simple shape is embedded within a complex figure.  Wholists 
are those who respond relatively faster to matching figure tasks and analytics are 
those who respond relatively faster to the embedded figures tasks. 
 
The WAS analysis was designed and administered using E-prime (Psychology 
Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA); two version were designed in order to 
experimentally manipulate the order of the subtests, see 6.1.1.  As a matter of good 
practice, example items have been added to the beginning of each subtest, see 6.1.2; 
these were not used in the CSA but it will be argued that inclusion of these should 
reduce hesitancy and inaccuracy during early test items.  The instructions contained 
within the WAS analyses were a partial replication of those used in Ridings wholist-
analytic subtests with the exception of instructions relating to speed and accuracy.   
 
The WAS Analyses correct a bias which exists in Riding‟s CSA which encouraged 
caution during the matching figures tasks but not during the embedded figures tasks, 
see 6.1.3; empirical evidence suggests that performance on the wholist-analytic 
dimension is sensitive to changes in the emphasis on speed versus accuracy (Rezaei 
and Katz, 2004) and those with reflect-impulsive styles may be most affected by the 
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presence of instruction bias relating to speed and accuracy (Nietfeld and Bosma, 
2003). 
 
Finally, WAS analyses have manipulated the number of simple geometric shapes 
which are used in the construction of the complex figures utilised in the matching 
figure tasks and the embedded figure tasks.  The complex figures either consists of 
three simple shapes, which preserve the number of shapes used in Riding‟s CSA 
(1991) and Peterson et al.‟s C-CSA (2003) and Peterson and Deary‟s E-CSA (2006); 
or they consist of five simple shapes.   
 
The increased numbers of parts which make up the whole figure are theorised to 
increase the response latencies of individuals using part processing but will not affect 
the individuals employing whole processing, see 6.1.4.  The manipulation of the 
three and five-part figures is designed to expose the nature of processing being 
employed by the analytics and the wholists during matching familiar figures tasks. 
  
6.1.1 Counterbalancing the wholist-analytic subtests 
  
There are two versions of the WAS analysis; each version differs only in respect to 
the order in which the matching figure subtest and the embedded figure subtest are 
presented.  The first version, which is referred to as the WAS-WA, presents the 
matching figure subtest first, followed by the embedded figures subtest, thereby 
preserving the presentation order of Riding‟s CSA (1991) and Peterson‟s extended 
CSA (C-CSA, Peterson et al., 2003; E-CSA, Peterson and Deary, 2006).  The second 
version, which is referred to as the WAS-AW, presents the embedded figures test 
first, thereby reversing the order of the CSA, the C-CSA and the E-CSA.  
 
The two versions of the WAS Analysis will expose the interaction between the 
influence of reflective-impulsive style and the order effects created by the lack of 
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counterbalancing of the wholist-analytic subtests.  Chapter four argued that reflective 
individuals begin more slowly during early test items, in response to the novelty and 
uncertainty and in an effort to ensure accuracy.  Therefore, Reflective individuals 
should produce higher, more analytic ratios, when the matching figures tasks are 
presented first; and, lower, more wholist ratios, when the embedded figures tasks are 
presented first. 
 
6.1.2 Practice items 
 
It is good practice for any psychometric test to have example items prior to the 
commencement of the trials.  This is even more important when the trials are 
measured on speed and accuracy of processing.  In the context of the CSA it is 
doubly important because any hesitancy in the early test items will influence the 
wholist-analytic ratio.  In the light of this, the WAS Analyses include four practice 
items prior to each subtest, two of the items are examples of complex figures 
containing three simple shapes and two are examples of complex figures containing 
five simple shapes.  One of each of the three and five part examples requires a „yes‟ 
response and the one of each requires a „no‟ response.  Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the 
instructions presented prior to the practice items in the embedded figure subtests and 
the matching figure subtest, respectively. 
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This test is very easy to do and is presented in two sections.
In this section you will be presented with two shapes.
You will be asked if one is contained in the other.
The shapes you are comparing will always be presented
the same way up.
To each task you have to respond 'YES' or 'NO'.
Press the RED key for YES and the BLUE key for NO
TRY SOME EXAMPLES FIRST
PRESS SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE  
  
Figure 6.1: WAS analysis – Embedded figure practice instructions 
  
 
 
Figure 6.2: WAS Analysis – Matching Figure Practice Instructions 
The next section is also very easy.
In this section you will be presented with two shapes.
You will be asked whether they are the same.
The shapes you are comparing will always be presented
the same way up.
To each task you have to respond 'YES' or 'NO'as before.
Press the RED key for YES and the BLUE key for NO
TRY SOME EXAMPLES FIRST
PRESS SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE
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6.1.3 Instruction bias 
 
Where appropriate the WAS analyses have replicated the instructions used in the 
CSA.  However, the CSA encourages caution and a focus on accuracy at the 
beginning of the wholist-analytic subtest but not at the beginning of the analytic 
subtest.  Figure 6.3 shows the instructions presented in the CSA prior to the matching 
figure subtest; note that the instructions state, “Work carefully so that your answers 
are correct”.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: CSA – Matching figure subtest Instructions 
 
Compare this to the instructions provided prior to the embedded figures tasks, which 
make no reference to caution or accuracy, see Figure 6.4 
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Figure 6.4: CSA – Embedded Figure Subtest instructions 
 
The bias towards emphasising caution in the early matching figure items and not 
emphasising caution in the latter embedded figure items is likely to encourage 
respondents to produce slower median latencies to the matching figure tasks in 
comparison to the embedded figures tasks which will inflate the their wholist-
analytic ratios, making them appear more analytic.   
 
This bias has been corrected in the WAS Analyses and replaced with consistent 
instructions which emphasise accuracy and speed across both subtests.  The 
instructions in Figure 6.5 appear after the practice items in each section and are 
identical for both subtests.  
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Well done!
Ready for the real test?
Please respond as quickly and accurately as you can to each item
PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO BEGIN
 
 
Figure 6.5: Pace and Accuracy Instructions 
 
6.1.4 Asymmetrical processing comparisons  
 
The WAS analyses have also been designed to empirically test the nature of 
processing used by analytic and wholists when completing the embedded figures 
tasks and the matching figures tasks.   
 
It has been argued, in Chapter four, that the embedded figures task can only be 
completed using part processing but that the matching figures task allows a choice of 
either whole or part processing; where such a choice exists it is anticipated that part 
processors and whole processors will habitually employ their preferred style.  As a 
result, there will be an asymmetry in the nature of processing being measured by the 
wholist-analytic ratio.  Wholists will be compared on their relative ability to use a 
part or whole processing strategy, since they will employ whole processing for the 
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matching figure items but will be forced to employ part processing for the embedded 
figure items.  However, analytics will be compared on the efficacy of a part 
processing strategy when applied to the matching figures task compared to an 
embedded figures task. 
 
In order to clarify the nature of processing employed during the tasks, the WAS 
analyses include a manipulation of the number of constituent shapes which make up 
the complex figures in the matching figures and embedded figures tasks.  Half of the 
complex geometric figures are constructed using three simple shapes and half are 
constructed using five simple shapes. 
 
It is expected, that the increased difficulty level, which will be associated with 
processing the five-part figures, will increase the processing latencies of five-part 
figures in comparison to 3-part figures but over and above this effect of increased 
complexity there is expected to be a differential effect on part processors over whole 
processors.  This is because part processing a five-part figure will take longer than 
part processing a three-part figure because every extra part that needs to be 
separately processed demands extra processing time.  However, whole processing a 
five-part complex figure should not take proportionately longer than processing a 
three-part figure because there is still one gestalt being compared with another.  
 
Part processors should be slowed down relatively more than the whole processors 
when faced with a matching task containing five-part figures in comparison to the 
same task with three-part figures.  It follows then that when the relative speed of 
processing five-part to three-part matching figure tasks is computed, those with a 
greater differential speed of processing can be assumed to be part processors and 
those with a smaller differential can be considered whole processors. 
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6.1.5 Part-Whole Processing Ratio 
 
Based on the rationale above the ratio of speed of processing five-part matching 
figures to speed of processing three-part matching figures will be computed and used 
as an index of part-whole processing which is free from the confounding influence of 
reflective style that reduces the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio.  Concurrent and 
differential validity of the part-whole ratio dictates that analytic individuals should 
produce lower ratios indicative of part processing and wholist individuals should 
produce higher ratios indicative of whole processing.  
 
To assess the construct validity of the part-whole ratio; a second ratio will be 
computed from the completion of the five-part embedded figures and three-part 
embedded figures tasks.  Since it has been argued that embedded figure tasks require 
part processing there should be no significant difference between the analytic and 
wholists participants on the ratios computed from the embedded figure subtest.  This 
is because all participants will be employing part processing and are therefore all 
similarly affected by an increase in the number of parts that require processing. 
 
The part-whole ratio is not proposed as a viable alternative to the wholist-analytic 
ratio; it is a tool designed to expose the asymmetry in the wholist-analytic ratio.  If 
the part-whole ratio successfully discriminates between analytic and wholist styles 
and its construct validity is demonstrated, as outlined above, then it confirms the 
existence of an asymmetry in the basis of the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
The part-whole ratio only continues to discriminate between analytic and wholist 
style whilst the asymmetry exists; the aim should be to eradicate the asymmetry to 
improve the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
This chapter first outlines the construction of the WAS analyses based on the 
rationale set out above and then presents two studies undertaken during the 
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development and validation of the WAS analysis.  Both studies assessed the 
psychometric properties of the WAS analysis; the first addressed the concurrent 
validity of the WAS analysis with the CSA and the second addressed the internal 
consistency of the WAS Analysis and the construct validity of the part whole ratio.  
 
6.2 Construction of the WAS Analysis 
 
The WAS Analysis has two subtests; the matching figures subtest and the embedded 
figures subtest.  There are forty matching figures tasks and forty embedded figures 
tasks and in each subtest, twenty items present complex figures that consist of three 
simple shapes and twenty present complex figures that consist of five simple shapes. 
Half of the test items require a „yes‟ response and half require a „no‟ response, these 
are counterbalanced across the matching figure and embedded figure subtests and 
across the manipulation of three and five-part figures.   
 
Riding‟s CSA (1991) used only complex figures with three constituent parts, and 
each subtest consisted of twenty matching figures and twenty embedded figure items, 
respectively.  The WAS analysis preserves the number of three-part figures to allow 
statistical comparisons and to highlight any systematic differences which may exist 
between ratios produced by more complex stimuli.  The WAS analysis, therefore, 
uses double the number of test items in the inclusion of five- part figures.  Despite 
this the WAS analysis is still of similar overall length to the CSA because the CSA 
includes a section to assess the verbaliser-imager dimension and it is the same length 
and Peterson et al‟s extended CSA (2003; 2006) 
 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show examples of a matching figure item and an embedded 
figure item from the WAS analysis, each featuring complex figures made up of three 
simple shapes.  Figures 6.8 and 6.9 show an example of a three-part complex figure 
compared to a five-part complex figure 
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YES NO
 
 
Figure 6.6: Example of a matching figure item 
 
YES NO
IS THIS
IS THIS CONTAINED WITHIN THIS
 
  
Figure 6.7: Example of an embedded figure Item 
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Figure 6.8: Three-part complex figure 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Five-part complex figure 
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6.2.1 Stimuli shapes and construction of complex figures 
 
A pool of seven simple shapes have been used to construct all of the complex 
figures, see figure 6.10, these shapes are the same as those used for the CSA.  To 
remain consistent with the CSA the simple shapes appear in large or small form and 
can be oriented up, down, left or right.  Each complex figure was constructed by first 
selecting the shape then the size and finally the orientation of each constituent part.  
Shape, size and orientation were selected randomly with replacement. 
 
 
Figure 6.10: Simple shapes used to construct complex figures 
 
6.3 Concurrent validity of the WAS Analysis 
 
The WAS analysis has been developed as a tool to test two hypotheses about the 
nature of processing being measured by the wholist-analytic dimension.  Whilst the 
WAS analysis differs in a number of ways to the wholist-analytic subtests of the 
CSA; the revisions should not fundamentally alter the basis of the wholist-analytic 
style calculation.  Therefore, the WAS analysis should demonstrate concurrent 
validity with the wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA, but only when subtest order 
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is preserved.  Only the WAS-WA version of the WAS Analysis is expected to have 
concurrent validity with the wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA because this is 
the version of the WAS Analysis which preserves the subtest presentation order of 
the CSA.  The WAS-AW has been hypothesised to produce lower ratios than the 
CSA because of the conflicting influence of reflective-impulsive style, see Chapter 
four, and therefore would not be expected to demonstrate concurrent validity with the 
CSA. 
 
Typically, to establish concurrent validity, correlations of r = 0.8 or above would be 
required (Kline, 2000), however, given the poor temporal reliability of the CSA 
correlations of r = 0.8 or would not be expected.    Chapter five demonstrated that the 
wholist-analytic dimension has poor test-retest reliability with correlations between 
0.30 and 0.34 (Peterson et al., 2003a; Parkinson et al., 2004; Rezaei and Katz, 2004; 
Cook, 2008); temporal reliability increased to 0.53 (Peterson et al., 2003a) and 0.55 
(Rezaei and Katz, 2004) when test length was doubled and speed was emphasised. 
Therefore, in the present study, a correlation between the WAS analysis and the 
wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA between r = 0.30 and r = 0.55 will be 
required in order to establish concurrent validity.   
 
6.3.1 Participants and Measurements 
 
Twelve undergraduates (two male, ten female) with a mean age of 23.17 years 
completed Riding‟s CSA (1991) and the WAS-WA version of the WAS analysis to 
assess concurrent validity.   
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6.3.2 Procedure 
 
All Participants were tested individually on the CSA and the WAS-WA in a quiet 
room in a relaxed environment.  Respondents sat the tests alone in a small room with 
the door shut to avoid audience effects (Grant and Dajee, 2003).  Completion of the 
CSA and the WAS analysis was counterbalanced such that half of the participants 
completed the CSA first followed by the WAS analysis and the other half completed 
the WAS analysis followed by the CSA.   
 
6.4 Results 
 
The overall speed of processing the eighty-item WAS-WA was 14.99 minutes 
compared to 6.85 minutes for the forty-item wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA 
(CSA-WA).  The increased completion times and the increased spread of scores 
appropriately reflect the increased number of items in the WAS-WA see Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Mean and spread of completion times for WAS-WA and CSA (in 
minutes) 
 
Measurement Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSA-WA 6.85 1.42 4.76 9.23 
WAS-WA 14.99 3.98 10.27 21.04 
 
 
There was no significant difference between the accuracy of the WAS-WA and the 
CSA-WA (t = .707, p = .519), see Table 6.2; this suggests that the increased level of 
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complexity, which has been introduced through the inclusion of five-part geometric 
figures in the WAS analysis, has not made the test significantly more difficult. 
 
Table 6.2: Mean and spread of % accuracy for WAS-WA and CSA 
 
Measurement Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSA-WA 92.6 4.27 85 100 
WAS-WA 90.6 4.56 84 95 
 
 
There was no significant difference between the ratios produced in the CSA-WA and 
the WAS-WA (t = -.665, p = .542) see Table 6.3.  The standard deviation and spread 
of scores were greater in the WAS-WA; this increased discriminatory power is likely 
to be an artefact of the increased number of test items. 
 
Table 6.3: Mean and spread of wholist-analytic ratio for WAS-WA and CSA 
 
Measurement Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CSA-WA 1.08 0.21 0.83 1.59 
WAS-WA 1.19 0.42 0.81 1.67 
 
 
A bivariate Pearson correlation revealed coefficients of r = .45 between the wholist-
analytic style ratio measured by the CSA and the wholist-analytic style ratio 
measured by the WAS analysis.   
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6.4.1 Discussion 
 
The response latencies produced by the WAS analysis are comparable to those on the 
wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA; this was demonstrated by the total 
completion times which are approximately double that of the CSA-WA.  This is 
consistent with the fact that the WAS analysis has double the number of items in 
each subtest than the CSA wholist-analytic dimension, therefore the total completion 
times would be expected to be proportionately increased.    
 
There was no significant difference in the accuracy or the ratios produced by the 
WAS-WA version of the WAS analysis and the wholist-analytic dimension of the 
CSA.  This suggests that the increased complexity associated with the inclusion of 
five-part figures has not had a detrimental effect on the accuracy of respondents.   
 
The WAS-WA demonstrated satisfactory concurrent validity of r = 0.45; which is 
within the range of r = 0.30 to r = 0.55 typically found for wholist-analytic 
dimension test-retest reliability figures (Peterson et al., 2003; Parkinson et al., 2004; 
Rezaei and Katz, 2004; Cook, 2008).  Given the lack of temporal reliability of the 
wholist-analytic dimension it would be unrealistic to expect concurrent validity to be 
achieved above the level of r = 0.55.   
 
The consistency suggests that despite the revisions to the number of test items and 
the complexity of the figures, when the subtest order is preserved, the basis of the 
wholist-analytic ratio remains the same and the theoretical underpinnings of the 
measure have not been fundamentally altered.  Therefore, findings relating to 
performance on the WAS-WA version of the WAS analysis can be generalised to the 
performance of the wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA. 
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6.5 Discriminatory power and internal consistency of the WAS Analysis and 
validation of the new part-whole ratio construct 
 
A second study was performed to further test the psychometric properties of the 
WAS analysis; in this study the discriminatory power of the WAS analysis was 
explored; the inter-item reliability and split half reliability was examined to test the 
internal consistency of the WAS analysis; and the construct validity of the new part-
whole ratio was assessed.  
 
6.5.1 Discriminatory power of the WAS analysis 
 
For any test to be valid it should have discriminatory power, defined as the “ability 
of a test to produce a spread of scores” (Kline, 2000, p. 30).  In the context of the 
wholist-analytic dimension it is also important that both of the subtests have 
discriminatory power to ensure that the ability of the wholist-analytic dimension to 
discriminate between whole processors and part processors does not rest entirely on 
individual differences in performance on the matching figure test or the embedded 
figures test.   
 
The wholist-analytic ratio should be a result of individual differences on both 
subtests to ensure that it is a bipolar measure of style as opposed to a unipolar 
measure of ability; indeed this is one of the main strengths of the measure according 
to Riding (Riding and Cheema, 1991; Riding, 1991).  As a bipolar measure the 
wholist-analytic ratio would discriminate between relative abilities to part and whole 
process; but as a unipolar measure it would either discriminate between good and bad 
part processors or good and bad whole processors depending on which subtest is at 
the route of the individual differences in the wholist-analytic ratio. 
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The theory of diminished refection proposed in Chapter four predicts that the early 
test items will have more power to discriminate between reflective and impulsive 
individuals and may therefore have a detrimental affect of the validity of the wholist-
analytic measure.  In this study, the median response latencies in each test quarter 
will be assessed for their power to discriminate between wholists and analytics. 
 
6.5.2 Internal consistency of the WAS analysis  
 
Inter-item and split half reliability figures are not available for the CSA so direct 
comparisons cannot be made, however, split half reliability figures have been 
reported for replica and parallel forms of the CSA and an extended version of the 
CSA which combines replica and parallel forms, split half reliability for the replica 
and parallel form of the CSA has been reported as r = 0.62 and 0.56, respectively, 
and split half reliability of the extended version has been reported as r = 0.69 
(Peterson et al. 2003).  The split half reliability of the WAS analysis will be assessed 
against the standard set by Peterson et al.‟s extended CSA because both are eighty 
item tests and longer tests are likely to produce increased variation and therefore 
higher correlations (Kline, 2000). 
 
6.5.3 Construct validity of the part-whole ratio 
 
The concept of the part-whole ratio is that individuals using a part processing 
strategy will take proportionately longer to process five-part complex figures than 
three part complex figures because each additional part in the complex figure will 
take extra processing time.  Conversely, individuals using a whole processing 
strategy will not take proportionally longer to complete a five-part to a three-part 
figure because each complex figure is being processed as a gestalt.  Since the 
matching figures task can be approached using a part or a whole processing strategy 
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then the part-whole ratio, which is based on the speed of processing three-part 
matching figure tasks to five-part matching figure tasks, should discriminate between 
those using a part processing approach and those using a whole processing approach. 
 
The construct validity of the part-whole ratio can be tested by two hypotheses: 1) 
Analytics should have significantly lower part-whole ratios than wholists, indicating 
that they are using part processing for the matching figure tasks whereas wholists are 
using whole processing. 2) There should be no significant difference between 
analytics and wholists on the three to five-part ratio computed from the embedded 
figure tasks; this is because both style groups should be employing part processing of 
the embedded figure tasks regardless of their style because the embedded figures task 
by its nature requires a part processing strategy.   
 
6.5.4 Participants and Measurements 
 
Forty-seven participants (eighteen male, twenty-nine female) with a mean age of 
22.45 years (SD 5.34 years) completed the WAS-WA to assess the internal 
consistency of the WAS Analysis and the construct validity of the part-whole ratio.  
All participants completed the WAS-WA whilst alone in a quiet room and in a 
relaxed environment. 
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6.6 Results 
6.6.1 Discriminatory Power of the wholist-analytic dimension 
 
Participant ratios on the WAS analysis were categorised into three equal groups and 
labelled wholist, intermediate and analytic.  The ratio classifications were compared 
with the guidelines provided in the CSA manual (Riding, 1991; 1998).  Table 6.4 
shows that there was a high degree of consistency between the ratio cut off points 
produced by the WAS-WA, and the CSA guidelines. 
 
Table 6.4: Comparison of style ratio cut off points of the WAS-WA and the 
CSA-WA 
 
Classification labels WAS Analysis CSA Guidelines 
N Ratio Ratio 
Wholist 15 ≤ 1.03 ≤ 1.02 
Intermediate 17 > 1.03 < 1.38 > 1.02 < 1.36 
Analytic 16 ≥ 1.38 ≥ 1.36 
 
 
Respondents produced a satisfactory spread of wholist-analytic ratios with a mean of 
1.24 and a standard deviation of 0.34.  A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that the 
ratios were approximately normally distributed (Z=0.85, p= .460) see Figure 6.11. 
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Figure 6.11: Histogram showing the distribution of the Wholist-Analytic Ratio 
 
In order to examine the discriminatory power of both subtests and to explore the 
theory of diminished reflection proposed in Chapter four, the discriminatory power 
of the wholist-analytic dimension was assessed across each test quarter.   Since the 
test has eighty items, the score for each quarter represents the mean response 
latencies of wholists, analytics and intermediates to each block of twenty trials.  In 
this study, the WAS-WA was used, which preserves the subtest order of the CSA, 
therefore, the first two test quarters were matching figure trials and the third and 
forth quarters were embedded figure trials. 
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It is clear from Figure 6.12 that group differences in the mean latencies in the first 
two test quarters discriminated more effectively between the wholist, analytic and 
intermediate style categories than mean latencies in the third and fourth quarters. 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Style group mean latencies for WAS Analysis test quarters. 
 
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of style on the mean latencies for 
the matching figure items in the first and second quarters of the WAS Analysis (F 
2,44 = 4.062, p = .024; F 2,44 = 8.112, p = .001).  Bonferroni post hoc tests 
confirmed that the analytics took significantly longer than wholists to process the 
first and second group of twenty matching figure items with means of 2363 ms for 
analytics and 1933 ms for wholists in the first quarter and means of 2068 ms and 
1436 ms in the second quarter.  Intermediates did not significantly differ from 
analytics or wholists in either quarter. 
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There was, however, no significant effect of style on the embedded figure items in 
the third and fourth quarters of the test (F 2,44 = .041, p = .960 and F 2,44 = .606, p 
= .550).  The style groups produced very similar mean latencies for the third quarter 
(analytics: 1892 ms, intermediates: 1857 ms and wholists: 1927 ms) and similar 
means for the last quarter  (analytics: 1663 ms, intermediates: 1775 ms and wholists: 
1535 ms). 
6.6.2 Inter-item consistency 
 
An item analysis based on speed of processing each of the eighty matching figure 
and embedded figure tasks produced a Cronbach Alpha of .98; alphas for the forty 
matching figure items and for the forty embedded figure items were .96 
 
A further item analysis of the forty matching figures and embedded figures with 
complex figure stimuli constructed from three simple shapes produced an alpha of 
.96 and the forty items with five-part complex figures was .95.  Alphas for three-part 
matching figures, five-part matching figures, three-part embedded figures and five-
part embedded figures were .94, .93, .92 and .91, respectively. 
6.6.3 Split half reliability 
 
Two wholist-analytic ratios were computed; one from the odd numbered matching 
figure and embedded figure items and the other from the even items.  The WAS 
analysis demonstrated a stable split half reliability of r = 0.68, see Figure 6.13. 
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Figure 6.13: Scatter gram of split half wholist-analytic ratios 
 
Split half reliabilities were reduced when they were based on five-part figures only (r 
= 0.43) and three-part figures only (r = 0.57) and reduced further when ratios were 
computed for five part figures by three part figures (r = 0.35 to 0.55).  
 
Split half reliabilities based on reaction time produced coefficients 0.95 for wholist 
items and 0.93 for analytic items.  The three and five part matching figure items 
produced split half reliabilities of 0.92 and 0.91, respectively, and the lowest 
reliabilities were produced by the three and five part embedded figure items, 0.85 
and 0.88, respectively. See Table 6.5 for a summary of all split half reliabilities for 
ratios and reaction times. 
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Table 6.5: Summary of all split half reliabilities for ratios and reaction times 
 
Split Half Reliabilities RT 
stability 
Ratio stability 
Wholist-Analytic Ratio  0.68 
Matching Figure Items 0.95  
Embedded Figure Items 0.93  
5- Part by 3- Part Wholist-Analytic Ratios  0.35; 0.40; 0.40; 055 
Three Part Matching Figure Items 0.92  
Three Part Embedded Figure Items 0.85  
Three Part Wholist-Analytic Ratio  0.57 
Five Part Matching Figure Items 0.91  
Five Part Embedded Figure Items 0.88  
Five Part Wholist-Analytic Ratio  0.43 
 
6.6.4 Construct validity of the part-whole ratio 
 
The analytic group produced a lower mean part-whole ratio than the wholists as 
expected (.755 to .808) but a t-test revealed that the difference was not significant (t 
= 1.360, p = .095, d = 0.53, N¹ = 15, N² = 12).  The results approached significance 
with a p value within the significance 10% level.   
 
However, a post hoc test of power performed by G*power demonstrated that for this 
small sample size with a moderate effect size of 0.53 there was insufficient power in 
the t-test (1-ß err probability = 38%) so there is the chance of a type 1 error.  To 
ensure adequate power 45 participants are needed in each group to achieve the 
minimum acceptable power level of 80%.  The construct validity of the part-whole 
ratio will be re-assessed in Chapter nine using the recommended sample size. 
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A t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between the EFT ratios with 
means of .904 for wholists and .924 for analytics (t = -.453, p = .327).  This time 
there is no risk of a type 1 error; the effect size is very small (d = 0.17) indicating 
little or no effect.  Power is very low (1-ß err probability = 11%) but to achieve a 
minimum acceptable power in the t-test of 80% with such a small effect size a 
sample of 818 participants would be required. 
 
6.7 Discussion 
 
6.7.1 Discriminatory power of the WAS analysis 
 
The WAS analysis had a satisfactory spread of ratio scores and a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test confirmed that ratios were approximately normally distributed; 
however, the mean latencies in the first and second test quarters had the power to 
discriminate between wholists and analytics but the third and forth quarters did not.  
This can be interpreted in three ways: 
 
1) The theory of diminished reflection, proposed in Chapter four, can account for the 
discriminatory power of the first two test quarters.  If this is the case then the 
wholist-analytic ratio does not measure differences in part and whole processing but 
instead discriminates between reflective-impulsive styles by measuring relative 
tendencies to approach early test items slowly with a degree of caution or to respond 
quickly with little or no reflection.   
 
2) In this study the first two quarters combined to form the matching figures subtest, 
therefore, it could be argued that the matching figures test had discriminatory power 
and the embedded figures test did not.  This would suggest that the wholist-analytic 
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ratio is a unipolar measure of individual differences in the ability to complete whole 
processing tasks. 
 
3) The asymmetry in the nature of the processing being measured by the wholist-
analytic ratio, which was proposed in Chapter four, suggests that all participants use 
part processing for the embedded figures tasks but that whole processors choose to 
whole process the matching figure tasks and part processors choose a part processing 
strategy.  When combined with the fact that only the matching figure tasks have 
discriminatory power this suggests that the wholist-analytic ratio is discriminating 
between the efficacy of a part processing strategy compared to a whole processing 
strategy when completing a task designed to favour whole processing.   
 
The three explanations above are not mutually exclusive and they all raise questions 
over the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio.  These questions will be addressed in 
Chapter nine, a comparison of the discriminative power of the WAS-WA and the 
WAS-AW will reveal whether the power relates to a reflective-impulsive style 
difference or a difference in part-whole processing. 
  
6.7.2 Concurrent validity of the WAS analysis 
 
The WAS Analysis took approximately twice as long to complete than the wholist-
analytic dimension of the CSA which reflects the fact that it has double the number 
of items; eighty items compared to forty.  There was no significant difference in the 
accuracy of the responses, which suggests that the increased complexity of the five-
part figures has not led to a significant increase in errors.  There was no significant 
difference in the ratios produced by the WAS analysis and the CSA and when split 
into three equal groups the ratio thresholds for wholist, intermediate and analytic 
styles on the WAS analysis were consistent with the guidelines published in the CSA 
manual (Riding, 1991; 1998). 
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Respondents wholist-analytic style as measured by the WAS analysis and the CSA 
demonstrated a moderate correlation of r = 0.44.  This demonstrates good concurrent 
validity in the context of the moderate test-retest coefficients reported in the 
literature for the CSA (r = 0.31 to 0.55).   
 
6.7.3 Internal consistency of the Wholist-Analytic Ratio 
 
The wholist-analytic ratio was internally consistent; producing a Pearson split half 
correlation of 0.68.  The split half reliability of three part and five part figures were 
lower at r = 0.57 and 0.43, respectively.  Stability of the WAS Analysis can not be 
compared to the CSA because it is not open to individual item analysis but the 
correlations are comparable to Petersons extended eighty item CSA (r = 0.69), the 
forty item replica form CSA  (r = 0.62) and the forty item parallel form CSA (r = 
0.56) (Peterson et al, 2003).   
 
The WAS analysis demonstrated excellent inter item reliability; Cronbach alphas 
ranged from 0.91 to 0.98 when item latencies were correlated.   
 
6.7.4 Construct Validity of the Part-Whole Ratio 
 
Construct validity could not be satisfactorily demonstrated for the part-whole ratio 
because of an inadequate sample size leading to insufficient statistical power.  
However, the ratio did show promise with a moderate effect size suggesting that the 
analytics were part processing the matching figures tasks and the wholists were 
whole processing.  Further, validation will be conducted in Chapter nine with a 
sufficiently large sample of at least ninety participants. 
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The initial findings relating to the part-whole ratio imply that there is an asymmetry 
in the nature of the processing being employed by the analytic and wholist 
respondents; suggesting that the analytics are part processing the matching figure 
items and the embedded figure items whereas the wholists are whole processing the 
matching figure items and part processing the embedded figure items.  
 
6.7.5 Conclusion 
 
 The discriminative power of the WAS analysis appears limited to the first two 
quarters of the test which in the WAS-WA version represents the matching figures 
subtest.  The problems with discriminatory power are consistent with the theories 
proposed in Chapter four, which suggest that the wholist-analytic ratio is sensitive to 
reflective-impulsive style and has an asymmetry in the nature of processing being 
measured.  In this respect, the CSA is hypothesised to share the same problems in 
discriminatory power.   The construct validity of the part-whole ratio was partially 
demonstrated but this will be readdressed more effectively in Chapter nine.  The 
WAS analysis demonstrated concurrent validity and internal stability with good split 
half reliability and excellent inter item stability and therefore has been shown to be 
valid for its purpose, that is to expose the limitations of the CSA outlined in Chapter 
four.  
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Chapter 7: 
Construction and Validation  
of the  
Convergent-Divergent Thinking Style Test 
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Chapter 7: Construction and validation of the Convergent-
Divergent Thinking Style Test 
 
7.1 Chapter Introduction  
 
The terms convergent and divergent thinking were proposed by Guilford in the early 
1950s (Guilford, 1956).  Convergent thinking is required to solve structured 
problems, which have one correct solution.  Divergent thinking is required when 
dealing with open-ended problems, in which the goal is to generate a number of 
novel solutions.  Liam Hudson (1967) adopted these terms and was the first to use 
them in a way, which is consistent with the current conception of cognitive style.  
Hudson described two types of clever schoolboy, the boy who excelled at IQ tests 
but was relatively weak at open-ended tests and the boy who excelled at open-ended 
tests but was weak at IQ tests; he labelled these types of boy as convergers and 
divergers, respectively. 
 
7.1.1 Conception of convergent-divergent style 
 
Over the course of five years Hudson tested one hundred to two hundred young boys 
every year from eight different schools, five public schools and two grammar 
schools.  His samples were unusually bright and were taken from schools within a 
one hundred mile radius of London (Hudson, 1967).   
 
His research began to yield results suggesting that arts specialists had biases towards 
verbal intelligence and the scientists had biases towards numerical or diagrammatic 
intelligence.  But more interesting than this, from a cognitive styles perspective, is a 
discrepancy that captured Hudson‟s attention; the IQ tests failed time and time again 
to identify really bright schoolboys who had demonstrated their talent in academic 
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success and/or extracurricular interests and achievements.  Hudson conceded that an 
individual with high IQ has greater „Intelligence‟ than an individual with a low IQ 
but in a sample of already high IQ individuals, IQ tests failed to adequately predict 
present or future success, he wrote: 
 
“It is amply proved that someone with an IQ of 170 is more likely to think well than 
someone whose IQ is 70.  And this holds true where the comparison is much closer – 
between IQs of say 100 and 130.  But the relation seems to break down when one is 
making comparisons between two people both of whom have IQs which are 
relatively high” (Hudson, 1967, p.43) 
 
Hudson suspected that what the IQ tests were failing to measure was the originality 
of the thinking demonstrated by some of the brightest boys.  Whilst he came to this 
hypothesis independently, the next stage of his research was heavily based on the 
work of Getzels and Jackson (1962) and his research was based on their tests and 
many of their specific techniques.  
 
Getzels and Jackson (1962) identified a „High IQ‟ group‟ who performed to a high 
standard on IQ tests but performed less well on what they termed „tests of creativity‟; 
and a „High Creative‟ group who did very well on creativity tests but relatively less 
well on IQ measures.  Hudson replaced these terms; labelling the high IQs as 
convergers and the high creatives as divergers because he objected to the misleading 
use of the term creativity; for the same reason he referred to the tests of creativity as 
open-ended tests.   
 
Getzels and Jackson used an equivalently large sample that was also unusually bright 
(mean IQ of 132, standard deviation 15) and drawn from an American private school.  
The main difference between the work of Getzels and Jackson and Hudson‟s own 
research is that they used a mix of boys and girls (292 and 241, respectively) whereas 
Hudson used predominantly all boys; and Hudson‟s schoolboys were a self selected 
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sample of arts and science students because in English public schools at that time 
boys were required to specialise early. 
 
Getzels and Jackson compared the scholastic achievement of the High IQ and High 
creative groups based on their mean numerical and verbal school achievement test 
scores.  They found that the High IQ group had significantly higher mean 
achievement test scores than the population mean but also that the High creative 
group did significantly better than the population on their verbal and numerical 
achievement tests.  By definition, the „high creatives‟ had lower IQ scores than the 
high IQ group and lower mean IQ than the population average, but despite the 23 
point difference in mean IQ, both groups performed significantly better than the 
population on standardised achievement tests.   
 
Similarly, Hudson compared the IQ scores of 375 boys tested between the ages of 15 
and 17 years with their later academic accomplishment at university.  He categorised 
their achievement into 4 levels: those who had become scholars and exhibitors at 
Oxford and Cambridge, those who were commoners at Oxford and Cambridge, those 
who attended other universities and those who did not go to university.  He also 
banded the IQ scores collected in the sixth form into 5 groups (A, B, C, D and E) 
with „A‟ representing the highest scoring 20% through to „E‟ representing the lowest 
20%.  Hudson found that there was no significant difference in the IQ classifications 
between the future scholars and their less successful university counterparts, the only 
group who differed from the others were those who did not attend university; Hudson 
writes: 
 
“If scholarships and exhibitions had been awarded to members of my present sample 
on the basis of IQ alone, 15 or 16 would have gone to boys who actually won 
scholarships and exhibitions, 14 or 15 would have been given to Oxford and 
Cambridge commoners, 21 or 22 to boys who went to other Universities, and 10 or 
11 to boys who went to no University at all.  In other words we would have given 
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scholarships to only a quarter of those who received them, in fact: only a handful 
more than one would have expected by chance.”(Hudson, 1967, p.178) 
 
These findings suggest that whilst IQ scores may predict the achievement of a subset 
of the population they fail to predict the past, present or future academic success of 
those individuals who show relatively superior cognitive functioning on open-ended 
tests. 
 
7.1.2 Measuring convergent-divergent style  
 
Hudson (1967) and Getzels and Jackson (1962) classified their convergent or High 
IQ groups and their divergent or high creativity groups in a similar fashion.  Hudson 
uses the AH5 (Alice Heim 5 Test, cited in Hudson, 1967) to measure IQ and two 
open ended tests; the object uses and meaning of words test.  Getzel and Jackson 
used existing IQ records which provided scores based on the Binet, Henmon-Nelson 
and a handful of WISC scores, all were standardised to Binet IQs.  These were 
compared with combined creativity scores from five tests; uses for things, word 
association, hidden shapes, fables and make-up problems. 
 
Hudson used the AH5 as a measure of IQ and compared this with the performance on 
two open ended tests; the object uses test and the meaning of words test.  He 
classified his boys as convergers and divergers based on their relative performance 
on the IQ test and the open ended tests. 
 
Hudson replicated Getzels and Jackson‟s „uses for things‟ test changing it‟s name to 
the „uses of objects‟ test; it is essentially the same test with two of the items changed.  
The test required respondents to produce as many uses as they can for 5 everyday 
objects.  Getzels and Jackson compiled their test based on two similar tasks used by 
Guildford (1956) in the factor analytic studies of the structure of intellect.  The test is 
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administered without a time limit but Hudson recommended 15 minutes as ample 
completion time. 
 
Hudson‟s „meaning for words‟ test was also replicated from Getzels and Jackson‟s 
word association test, Hudson changed the name because he felt it was misleading.  
The test requires respondents to produce as many definitions for a list of ten words as 
they can, for instance „sack‟ may refer to a bag that contains potatoes or coal, or it 
could refer to the act of relieving someone of their employment.  
 
There is no standardised test to measure convergent-divergent thinking style but the 
convention is to use a combination of open-ended test items, which require the 
generation of multiple responses, with closed test items, which require the 
convergence on one correct answer.  Recent examples of convergent-divergent style 
measurements used in the literature have been based on Getzel and Jacksons (1962) 
and Hudsons (1967) original work (e.g. Bahar and Hansell, 1999; Runco, 2007; 
Nielson, Pickett and Simonton, 2008).  Verbal convergent tasks such as those used in 
intelligence tests are commonly used to measure convergent thinking, an example of 
a commonly used convergent task is „remote associates‟ in which respondents are 
presented with three target words and the task is to identify one word which is related 
to the other three.  The most commonly used measures of divergent thinking are the 
object uses test, in which the task is to generate uses for given objects, and attribute 
tasks, in which the task is to generate words or objects which share a given attribute 
(Nielson et al., 2008).  Table 7.1 provides an example for each of the types of task. 
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Table 7.1: Convergent and Divergent task examples 
 
 
Task type 
 
Example Item 
 
Remote associates 
What word are all three of these words related to? - 
Pool, Tennis, Turn 
 
Object uses 
List as many uses for a paperclip as you can think 
of 
 
Attribute tasks 
List as many things words beginning with the letter 
T 
 
 
7.1.3 Construction of a convergent-divergent thinking test 
 
Since the object uses test and the attribute test have been the most consistently 
employed measures of divergent thinking they have been selected again for use in the 
current study. The consequence test has also been chosen as a third measure of 
divergent thinking (Wilson, Guildford and Christensen, 1953; Torrance, 1974).  The 
consequence test poses the question „What would happen if the Earth lost it‟s 
gravity‟ and respondents are required to generate the possible consequences of such 
an event; Hudson used similar opened tests to assess the qualitative differences in 
convergers and divergers responses.  He avoided using such tests in the convergent-
divergent style calculation because of the problems inherent in quantifying 
responses.  Therefore, in the current study only the ideational fluency of alternative 
consequences will be measured not the quality.   
 
The attribution task selected for this study involved generating words that begin with 
a particular letter.  This verbal task is similar in nature to Hudson‟s (1967) meaning 
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of words task but its increased simplicity makes it less likely to measure ability and 
experience.  
 
The divergent thinking test is, therefore, in three sections; the first section consisted 
of two out of five items from the „object uses test‟, the full five items have not been 
included to avoid the divergent test becoming overly long; the second section was the 
consequence task; and, the third section presented the word generation task. 
 
A selection of verbal intelligence test items (Daughtrey, 1993) have been used to 
assess convergent thinking; the relative performance of individuals on the convergent 
and divergent thinking tests will determine their convergent-divergent cognitive 
style.  However, there is no standard method of assessing relative performance when 
employing open-ended tests.   
 
7.1.4 Assessing relative performance on Convergent and Divergent tasks 
 
Convergent-divergent style is assessed by the relative performance of individuals on 
open and closed tests.  It is therefore necessary that scores on both tests be 
standardised to enable direct comparisons; this is more difficult to achieve with an 
open-ended test because there is no theoretical maximum score. 
 
Hudson (1967) standardised his respondents scores on the IQ test and their fluency 
scores on the open ended tests by allocating points in the following proportions 
1:2:4:2:1.  The first 10% are awarded -2, the next 20% get -1, and the middle 40% 
get 0, the next 10% get 1, and the final 20% get 2.  Points awarded for IQ proportions 
are reversed and the mean of the two open ended tests is contrasted with the IQ score 
yielding differential scores ranging from -4 which is extremely convergent to +4 
which is extremely divergent.   
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One of the limitations with this method is that it restricts the variability of scores, 
reducing discriminatory power.  Al-Naeme (1991) used an alternative method; he 
placed an upper limit on the divergent fluency responses, which was equivalent to 
the maximum score on the convergent test.   
 
Al-Naeme (1991) devised a series of six subtests to assess convergent-divergent 
style, based on Getzels and Jacksons (1962) and Hudsons (1967) original works.  
The scoring of the convergent-divergent tests imposed a restriction on the number of 
allowable responses to divergent items; for example students were asked to draw up 
to five different pictures to relate to the idea of a given word.  However, Hudson 
(1967) has demonstrated that when the number of responses is specified it becomes a 
measure of ability rather than typical response.   
 
Hudson (1967) demonstrated the distinction between ability and divergent style by 
manipulating the instructions given to participants taking part in the object uses test.  
When instructions required respondents to produce at least 25 uses, 65% were able to 
do so.  However, using the standard instructions, which require participants to 
produce as many uses as possible, only 7% generated a minimum of 25 responses.  
This suggests that the object uses test is a measure of typical performance or style 
rather than ability.  
 
Therefore, when asked to produce as many responses as they can, convergent 
individuals reveal a tendency to offer fewer responses to open ended tests but when 
instructed to provide a specific number of responses they are as capable as the 
divergent individuals in producing sufficient responses. 
 
A more practical and valid alternative would be to standardise both sets of scores by 
converting them to z scores.  Therefore, in the present study z scores on the 
convergent tests were contrasted with z scores based on the fluency of responses to 
open ended tests.  The standardised convergent scores was deducted from the 
135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
standardised divergent scores producing positive scores which indicate relatively 
better performance on the divergent task and negative scores which indicate 
relatively better performance on the convergent task. 
 
7.1.5 Categorising Convergers and Divergers 
 
Hudson (1967) labelled the lowest 30% of participants „convergers‟, the mid 40% 
„all rounders‟ and the top 30% „divergers‟.  Whilst this implies a typology, Hudson 
clearly saw the convergent-divergent dimension as a continuum since at times he 
distinguished between extreme convergers (lowest scoring 10%) and mild convergers 
(remaining 20%) and between extreme divergers (top scoring 10%) and mild 
divergers (remaining 20%).  He also employed correlation methods using the full 
spectrum of standardised scores -4 to +4. 
 
The same category proportions have therefore been applied to the standardised z 
score comparisons used here, with the lowest 30%, mid 40% and highest 30% being 
labelled convergent, all rounder and divergent, respectively. 
 
This chapter outlines the development and validation of the convergent-divergent 
style measure; three studies will be described which assessed the discriminatory 
power and construct validity of the new measure which resulted in a series of 
revisions to the convergent-divergent style test. 
 
7.2 Discriminatory Power of the convergent-divergent style measure 
 
In order for the convergent-divergent measure to demonstrate satisfactory power to 
discriminate between convergent and divergent thinkers, each section of the test 
should produce an approximately normal distribution of scores.  Moderate 
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correlations are also expected between the sections of the convergent thinking tests 
and divergent thinking tests to demonstrate internal consistency. 
 
7.2.1 Design and Participants 
 
Seventy-eight psychology undergraduates took part; forty participants (thirteen male, 
twenty-five female, two not stated), with a mean age of 23.52 years (Standard 
deviation 1.6 years), completed the convergent thinking test ; and, thirty-eight 
participants (eight male, thirty female), with a mean age of 20.62 years (Standard 
deviation 0.74 years), completed the divergent thinking test.   
 
7.2.2 Measurements: The convergent and divergent thinking tests 
 
The convergent thinking test has three section, the items are taken from Daughtrey‟s 
(1993) collection of verbal reasoning test papers.  The first section requires 
connections to be made between words, based on category judgements, and contains 
seven items.  The second section involves identifying and following patterns to 
complete a word pair, this section contains eight items.  The third section involves 
breaking a code and using it to translate five words.  The test instructions and 
examples of test items from each section are shown in Figure 7.1.  
Daughtrey (1993) imposed a fifty-minute time limit for her one hundred-item test; 
therefore a ten-minute limit was applied to this twenty-item test.  Each item was 
awarded two points producing possible scores ranging from zero to forty.   
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Section 1:  There is a connection between the three words on the outside of the 
brackets and TWO of the words inside the brackets. Underline the two words. 
Here is an example: 
 
QUEEN    LADY    MOTHER  (king   lord   aunt   prince   princess) 
 
Section 2:  Write in the brackets the word needed to complete the third pair of 
words.  This pair follows the same pattern as the first two pairs of words.  Here 
is an example: 
 
Heir  her: baby bay: pain (pan) 
 
Section 3:  Here are five words: 
  
PEAR  TRAP  RATE  TEAR  PART 
 
Below these five words have been written in code but not necessarily in the same 
order.  The same code has been used for all the words.  Write in the brackets the 
word which stands for each of the code words: 
 
                @  * /  ?  ( ___________ ) 
                /  ? * @     ( ___________ ) 
                 !  ? * @         ( ___________ ) 
                 / @ *   !    ( ___________ ) 
                  !  * @   /  ( ___________ ) 
 
Figure 7.1: Examples of convergent thinking test items for each of the three 
sections 
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The divergent test is also in three sections; section one consists of two of the items 
from Hudson‟s (1967) object uses test; section two consists of a consequence task 
which poses the question “What would be the results if everyone suddenly lost the 
sense of balance and were unable to stay in an upright position?”; and, section three 
is an attribute task in which words must be generated which begin with the letter „T‟, 
see figure 7.2.  Fluency is measured by awarding one point for every response 
generated and a ten-minute time limit is imposed on the test.  There is no theoretical 
maximum score. 
 
Section 1:  
 
Below are two everyday objects.  Think of as many different uses as you can 
for each: 
 
A barrel  
A paper clip 
 
Section 2:  
 
Consider the following question and list as many reactions as possible: 
 
“What would be the results if everyone suddenly lost the sense of balance and 
were unable to stay in an upright position?” 
 
Section 3:  
 
List as many words as you can think of beginning with the letter T. 
 
Figure 7.2: Divergent test items 
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7.2.3 Results and Discussion 
 
Discriminatory power of the convergent thinking test 
 
The theoretical maximum scores for section one, two and three are fourteen, sixteen 
and ten, respectively.  Measures of central tendency and dispersion were calculated 
to examine the distribution of scores across each test section (see Table 7.2). 
 
Table 7.2: Measures of dispersion and central tendency for participants’ scores 
on convergent test sections. 
 
 Section 1: 
Category 
Judgements 
Section 2: 
Word pair 
patterns 
Section 3: 
Word codes 
Mean 10.75 6.05 7.15 
Median 13.00 6.00 10.00 
Standard deviation 4.28 4.74 4.32 
Range 13 16 10 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 1.676 .972 2.501 
Significance level  .007 .302 .000 
 
 
Section one scores fell significantly outside normal distribution (Z=1.676, P=0.007).  
Whilst a full range of scores was obtained, 42.5% of participants scored the 
theoretical maximum of fourteen.  The median of thirteen is the most representative 
measure of central tendency and is almost double the theoretical mean of seven.   
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Section two scores were approximately normally distributed (Z = .972, P = 0.302).  
A full range of scores was obtained.  The mean and median are most representative 
of the central tendency since 55% of participants scored 6 or below, which is below 
the theoretical mean of eight.   
 
Section three scores fell significantly outside normal distribution (Z = 2.501, P < 
.001).  Whilst the range indicates a full spread of scores, the reality is that 25% 
scored zero and 65% scored the theoretical maximum of ten.  The remaining 10% 
represents just four people achieving a score other than the theoretical maximum or 
minimum. 
 
Section two scores significantly correlated with section one scores (r = .30, P = .030).  
Section three scores did not significantly correlate with either section one scores 
(.188, P=0.123) or section two scores (r = .303, P = .290).  However, the lack of 
variance in scores on section three will have reduced the sensitivity to correlation 
measures.  
 
The most satisfactory approximation to normal distribution is achieved when 
sections one and two are combined and section three scores are omitted (Z = .601, P 
= 0.863), see Figure 7.3.    
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Figure 7.3: Histogram with normal distribution curve showing the frequency of 
participants combined scores on section 1 and 2 
 
 
Divergent Thinking Test 
 
The divergent test was in three sections and each section was scored on the number 
of responses generated.  Each response was awarded one point and there were no 
theoretical mean or maximum scores.   A problem arose during the scoring of section 
two, the consequence test, due to the variability in the nature of participant 
responses.  The responses generally represented a brief scenario rather than lists of 
discrete consequences and the responses were very limited in terms of the number of 
consequences generated.   As a result, section two has not been included in the 
analysis and will be omitted from future versions of the divergent test.  The 
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distribution of participant scores for the remaining sections have been analysed and 
summary statistics are shown in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3: Measures of dispersion and central tendency for participants’ 
divergent test scores 
 
 Section 1: 
Object Uses 
Test 
Section 3: 
Word generation 
task 
Total 
 
Mean 7.79 27.39 35.18 
Median 7.50 28.50  37.50 
Mode 3.00 19.00  40.00 
Standard deviation 4.05 11.07 13.02 
Range 15 52 63 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z .728 .625 .711 
Significance level .664 .830 .693 
 
 
Scores for section one and section three were approximately normally distributed (Z 
= .728 and .625, respectively).  Participants generated a greater number of responses 
to the word generation task than to the object uses task; means of 7.79 and 27.39, 
respectively, see Figures 7.4 and 7.5. 
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Figure 7.4: Distribution of scores on section one – The Object Uses task 
 
Figure 7.5: Distribution of scores on section three – The Word Generation task 
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The scores were slightly skewed to the left for section one scores, indicating that 
participants found it harder to generate object uses than to generate word beginning 
with „T‟.   
 
When sections one and two were combined, the total divergent scores were also 
approximately normally distributed (Z = .711, P = .693).  Scores in section one 
correlated with scores in section two (r = .34, p < 0.05).   
 
7.2.4 Conclusion 
 
An analysis of the convergent test revealed that section one scores produced some 
ceiling effects but when combined with section two, produced scores that were 
approximately normally distributed. Both sections correlated with each other 
demonstrating internal consistency across tasks. Section three acted like a one item 
test and lacked discriminatory power, this is because in general participants either 
cracked the code and then correctly deciphered all of the words or they failed to 
crack the code and were therefore unable to decipher any of the words.  Section three 
will be omitted from future versions of the convergent thinking test. 
 
Section two of the divergent thinking test section two, the consequence test, was 
omitted from the analysis owing to problems with the classification of responses and 
the lack of variation in the number of responses generated.  The divergent test 
therefore consisted of two sections, the object uses test and the word generation task, 
which were both approximately normally distributed and correlated with each other 
demonstrating internal consistency across tasks.   
 
The next phase in the development and validation of a convergent-divergent style 
measure tested the discriminatory power of the revised convergent and divergent 
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tests, outlined above, in relation to each other and also addressed the notion of 
construct validity. 
 
7.3 Discriminatory power and construct validity of the convergent-divergent 
style measure 
 
In this study, all participants completed the revised convergent test and the revised 
divergent test; and, their relative performance was assessed in terms of the power of 
the divergent test to discriminate high or low convergent thinking and the power of 
the convergent test to discriminate high or low divergent thinking. 
 
The construct validity of the convergent and divergent tests was also assessed in two 
ways: performance of the convergent-divergent thinking test was compared to scores 
on the Cognitive Styles Index (CSI, Allinson and Hayes, 1996); and the power of the 
tests to discriminate between those who produce original responses and those who 
produce common responses on the divergent tests was examined 
 
As a member of the wholist-analytic style family (Riding and Cheema, 1991), 
convergent-divergent style should be associated with scores on the CSI.  The CSI is a 
self-report measure that assesses the super-ordinate style analytic-intuitive.  The CSI 
was chosen because it represents a similar super-ordinate conception as Riding‟s 
wholist-analytic dimension but it has been judged as one of the most reliable and 
valid global-analytic style measures (Coffield et al., 2004).   
 
Participant position on the convergent-divergent style dimension was expected to 
discriminate between analytic and intuitive scores on the CSI. Convergers are 
expected to be more analytic and divergers to be more intuitive (Miller, 1987; Riding 
and Cheema, 1991).    
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The construct validity of the convergent-divergent dimension further predicts that 
those who are more fluent on open-ended tests are also likely to produce more 
original responses.  Hudson (1967) found that divergers were three times more likely 
than convergers to produce a rare response on the object uses test, that is, a response 
produced by only 1% of the sample or less (p<0.001, N=248), and twice as likely to 
produce unusual responses, that is, those produced by less than 10% of the sample 
but more than 1% (p<0.005, N=248). 
 
7.3.1 Design and participants 
 
Fifty-six psychology undergraduates (nineteen male, thirty-seven female), with a 
mean age of 23.62 years (Standard deviation 7.358 years), completed the revised 
convergent and divergent thinking tests.  Thirty-nine out of fifty-six (nine male, 
thirty female) also completed the CSI instrument (Allinson and Hayes, 1996).  
 
Participants completed the CSI instrument first, followed by the timed convergent-
divergent tests. Presentation of the convergent and divergent tests was 
counterbalanced and a 7.5-minute time limit was imposed on each test.   
 
7.3.2 Measurements:  
 
Convergent and Divergent thinking tests 
 
The revised convergent thinking test was constructed using two subtests taken from 
Daughtrey‟s (1993) collection of verbal reasoning test papers.  The first section 
required connections to be made between words, based on category judgements, and 
contained 7 items; the second section required the identification and use of patterns 
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to complete a word pair, this section contained eight items, see Figure 7.6.  The items 
used were not the same as in the previous study but were matched for difficulty level.  
 
Daughtrey (1993) imposed a fifty-minute time limit per one hundred-item test; 
therefore, a limit of seven and a half minutes was applied to this fifteen-item test.  
Each item was awarded two points producing possible scores ranging from zero to 
thirty.  
 
Section 1:  
 
There is a connection between the three words on the outside of the brackets 
and TWO of the words inside the brackets. Underline the two words. Here is 
an example: 
 
Giraffe Monkey Elephant  (Pig Hen Cheetah Dog Lion) 
 
Section 2:  
 
Write in the brackets the word needed to complete the third pair of words.  
This pair follows the same pattern as the first two pairs of words.  Here is an 
example: 
 
Laden, Lead: Baker, Beak: Pater ,(Peat ) 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Examples of convergent thinking test items in each section 
 
The divergent thinking test was constructed using two out of five items from the 
„object uses test‟, the objects were different from those used in the previous study; 
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and an attribute task requiring participants to generate words beginning with „W‟, 
again the attribute „W‟ was different to the „T‟ used in the previous study, see Figure 
7.7.   
 
A time restriction of 7.5 minutes was imposed in which to produce as many 
responses as possible.  Fluency was measured by awarding one point for each given 
response, with higher scores indicating greater fluency and, therefore, relatively more 
divergent thinking.   
 
 
Section 1:  
 
Below are two everyday objects.  Think of as many different uses as you can 
for each: 
 
A blanket  
A brick 
 
Section 2:  
 
List as many words as you can think of beginning with the letter W. 
 
Figure 7.7: Divergent test items 
  
Cognitive Styles Index (CSI) 
 
The Cognitive Styles Index (CSI) (Allinson and Hayes 1996) is a thirty-eight item 
self-report instrument, to which respondents must indicate a true, uncertain or false 
response.  The test identifies an individual‟s cognitive style as being either analyst or 
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intuitive.  The term intuitive is used to describe an individual who makes judgements 
based on feelings and who adopts a global approach to processing information, 
whereas the term analytic describes an individual who makes judgements based on 
reason, and who focuses on specific detail when processing information.  
 
Twenty-one statements relate to the analytic pole and seventeen relate to the intuitive 
pole; true, uncertain and false responses are given 0, 1 or 2 points, respectively, and 
scores are reversed for intuitive items.  The CSI has a theoretical minimum of zero 
and a theoretical maximum score of seventy-six, with a mean of thirty-eight.  Lower 
scores indicate a more analytic cognitive style and higher scores indicate a more 
intuitive style. 
The psychometric properties of this instrument are documented in Allinson and 
Hayes (1996).  From a sample of 1000 participants, they reported a mean score of 
38.5 and scores were normally distributed.  Test-retest reliability of the instrument is 
also sound (r = 0.90, p <0.001) taken for a subgroup of the whole sample of 1000, 
and mean scores of 34.60 (SD = 11.94) and 35.40 (SD = 12.10) indicate no 
significant changes over time (t = 0.82, p > 0.05).  Finally, internal consistency 
scores measured by Cronbach‟s alpha taken from seven independent samples range 
from 0.84 to 0.92.   
 
7.3.3 Results 
 
Discriminatory Power of the convergent tests 
 
The distribution of participant scores on the convergent and divergent tests were 
analysed to assess the discriminatory power of the tests.   
 
The convergent test is in two sections; the first section requires connections to be 
made between words, based on category judgements, and contains seven items; and, 
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the second section requires the identification and use of patterns to complete a word 
pair, this section contains eight items.  Each correct answer is awarded two points. 
 
The mean score for section one was 8.66, slightly above the theoretical mean of 
seven; however, mean for section two was 13.61, which was closer to the theoretical 
maximum.  Standard deviation for both was very similar; means of 4.98 and 4.55, 
respectively, see Table 7.4. 
 
A one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z test revealed that participant scores fell 
significantly outside normal distribution for convergent section one (Z = 1.726, p = 
.005); and, for convergent section two (Z = 2.663, p < .001).  Participant scores were 
skewed to the right, see Figures 7.8 and 7.9. 
 
 
Table 7.4: Mean and distribution of convergent test scores 
 
 Section 1: 
Category Judgements 
Section 2: 
Word pair patterns 
Total: 
Mean 8.66 13.61 22.30 
Median 11.00 16.00 24.50 
Standard dev. 4.98 4.55 7.42 
Range 14 16 26 
Kol.-Smirnov Z 1.726 2.663 1.428 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .001 .034 
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Figure 7.8: Scores for convergent section one - Category Judgements 
 
Figure 7.8 shows a distribution skewed to the right; 27 participants (48.21%) scored 
in the highest 25%, scoring 12 or above. 17 participants (30.36%) scored in the 
lowest 25% scoring 4 and below.  The remaining 12 participants (21.43%) scored 
within the intermediate 50% range of scores.    
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Figure 7.9: Scores for convergent section two – Word pair patterns 
 
Figure 7.9 shows that the word pair tasks in section two was subject to floor effects; 
34 participants (60.71%) scored the theoretical maximum of 16.  This does not 
replicate the findings in the previous study, in which word pair task scores showed 
normal distribution.   
 
When the convergent section scores were combined, see Figure 7.10, thirty 
participants (53.57%) scored in the highest 25% (scores ranging from 29-30), four 
participants (7.14%) in the lowest 25% (range 4-18) and the rest in the intermediate 
50% range of scores.   
 
The limited distribution of scores on both sections suggests that the majority of 
participants performed well on the convergent test, indicating that these tasks did not 
present sufficient challenge to produce a normal distribution of scores.   
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Figure 7.10: Participants overall convergent scores 
 
A Pearson correlation revealed a weak positive correlation between scores on 
convergent section one and two (.199), this correlation is not significant (p=.141).  
The lack of variation in section one scores may account for the lack of a relationship 
between the convergent test sections. 
 
Discriminatory Power of the divergent tests 
 
Fluency of response to the divergent test was measured by awarding one point for 
each given response; higher scores indicate more responses generated and therefore 
greater ideational fluency.  A series of one sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z tests 
revealed satisfactory Z scores for measures of fluency for sections one and two (Z = 
.758, p = 613; Z = 1.100, p = .161, respectively) and overall divergent scores (Z = 
1.1156, p = .138).  Therefore, participants‟ scores were approximately normally 
distributed see Figures 7.11 and 7.12.  
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Figure 7.11: Distribution of ideational fluency scores on Section 1: Object uses 
Test  
 
Figure 7.12: Distribution of ideational fluency scores on Section 2: Word 
Generation Task 
25.0020.0015.0010.005.000.00
Fluency: Object Uses Test
15
12
9
6
3
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
60.0050.0040.0030.0020.0010.00
Fluency: Word Generation
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
F
re
q
u
e
n
c
y
155 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fluency scores on section one, the object uses test, showed a significant, positive 
correlation with fluency on section two, the word generation task (.233, p=.042), and 
both sections correlated with the fluency total score (.540 and .945, respectively, 
p<.001).  The low correlation between the divergent test sections is a concern; it is 
possible that vocabulary level and experience rather than divergent thinking mediates 
ideational fluency on the word generation task.   
 
7.3.4 Construct validity of the convergent-divergent thinking style measure 
 
Construct validity was assessed in two ways: first the ability of the convergent-
divergent style measure to predict analytic-intuitive styles; and, second the ability of 
the convergent-divergent style measure to discriminate between original and 
common responses to open-ended test items. 
 
Convergent-Divergent Style and Analytic-Intuitive Style 
 
In keeping with the unitary perspective of global-analytic style, the construct validity 
of convergent-divergent style dictates that convergers should produce more analytic 
scores on the CSI and divergers should produce more intuitive scores. 
 
Convergent-divergent style was first categorised by assessing relative performance 
on the divergent and convergent thinking tests.  Performance was standardised by 
computing z scores for the convergent and divergent tests.  Participant‟s position on 
the convergent-divergent dimension was calculated by subtracting the convergent 
score from the divergent score; therefore, negative scores indicate relatively more 
convergent thinking and positive scores indicate relatively more divergent thinking.  
The lowest 30% were labelled „convergers‟, the mid 40% as „all rounders‟ and the 
highest 30% as „divergers‟.   
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Owing to the questions raised by the low correlations between the divergent sections 
and between the convergent sections, style categories were calculated based on all 
combinations of the divergent and convergent subtests.   
 
Table 7.5: Basis of convergent-divergent style calculations 
 
 
Basis of Convergent-Divergent style 
categorisation 
 
Convergers  
 
Divergers 
 
Divergent Test 
 
Convergent Test 
 
N 
 
Mean  
 
N 
 
Mean  
Object Uses  Category Judgements  15 -22.5 14 27.38 
Object Uses  Word Pair Patterns 14 -24.33 13 21.5 
Word Generation  Category Judgements 19 -25.33 18 10.87 
Word Generation  Word Pair Patterns 18 -27.17 18 5 
 
 
A series of Bonferroni corrected t-tests (one for each of the above style calculations) 
was performed to examine the effect of convergent-divergent style on CSI scores.  
Divergers were expected to be more intuitive and convergers more analytic. 
 
Table 7.6 shows that when the object uses test is used as the basis for divergent 
thinking there is no significant difference between the CSI scores of convergers and 
divergers (effect sizes of 0.08 and 0.09); these findings remain the same when 
category judgements are used as the basis for convergent thinking (t = .182, p = .857) 
and when word pair patterns are used (t = .195. .847). 
 
Contrary to expectations, when the style calculation is based on the word generation 
task, divergers are more analytic.  This difference is approaching significance (p = 
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0.71 and 0.72, 2 tailed) with moderately large effect sizes (0.76 and 0.77) and 
remains consistent whether category judgements or word pairs are used as the basis 
for convergent thinking. 
 
Table 7.6: Effect of Convergent-Divergent style on CSI scores 
 
 
Basis of Convergent-Divergent style 
categorisation 
 
CSI Score: 
 
Divergent Test 
 
Convergent Test 
 
T-value 
 
P-level 
 
Effect 
size 
Object Uses  Category Judgements  0.182 .857 0.08 
Object Uses  Word Pair Patterns  0.195 .847 0.09 
Word Generation  Category Judgements  1.894 .071 0.76 
Word Generation  Word Pair Patterns 1.890 .072 0.77 
 
2 tailed ( p <0.05; corrected to p < .013; p < 0.10, corrected top <  0.03) 
 
These findings suggest that individuals who are less fluent on the object uses test 
may spend more time on the relatively easier task of generating words which begin 
with „W‟.  This would explain the lack of correlation between the divergent subtests 
and explain why individuals who are more fluent on the word generation task are 
actually more analytic.  The word generation task may also be influenced by verbal 
fluency and vocabulary experience.  
 
Mediation of performance by task may also affect the convergent subtests.  The word 
category task in section one draws on prior knowledge and experience whereas the 
word pair patterns in section two do not.  There is some limited support for this 
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interpretation.  Those who score in the highest 50% on the category judgement task 
produced a more intuitive CSI score than those in the lowest 50%; whereas, those 
who scored in the highest 50% on the word pair pattern task produced a more 
analytic CSI score than the lower 50%; see Figures 7.13 and 7.14.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.13: Effect of High and Low Convergent Section one scores on CSI 
scores 
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Figure 7.14: Effect of High and Low Convergent Section 2 scores on CSI scores 
 
7.3.5 Convergent-Divergent Style and Originality of responses 
 
Originality was measured by coding the frequency of each response in the sample 
and calculating the mean frequency of the 3 most original responses in the object 
uses test and the mean of the 10 most original responses to the word generation task.  
The minimum number of responses dictated the number of responses from which the 
mean was calculated across the sample.  The mean of all responses was not used 
since originality would be confounded by fluent production of common responses.  
 
The coding of responses was inevitably a subjective process; judgements were 
required as to how responses would be categorised based on frequency.  For 
example, in the word generation task responses were grouped based on the word 
stem, i.e. want (frequency 25 of 1661), wanted (7 of 1661) and wanting (3 of 1661) 
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were considered to be the same word and given a combined frequency of 35.  
Without this grouping method „wanting‟ would have been considered an extremely 
original response, which would not accurately reflect the data,  
 
Coding the responses for the object uses test was less straightforward but equally 
necessary.  Table 7.7 shows a sample of the uses that have been given for a blanket 
which have been grouped under two usage categories, decoration and fire blanket, 
and each given a frequency of 12.   
 
24 categories were identified for uses for a brick and a further 20 responses were 
unique, e.g. „paint it gold and sell it to someone who thinks its gold‟; the most 
common uses for a brick were „building construction‟ with a frequency of 103 out of 
313 responses, and „throwing/smashing‟ with a frequency of 32/313.   
 
25 categories were identified for uses for blanket and a further 7 were unique, e.g. 
„name for Michael Jackson‟s son‟; the most common uses for a blanket were 
„warmth‟ with a frequency of 52 in 312 and „cover things‟ with a frequency of 35 in 
312.   
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Table 7.7: Sample of responses and example groupings for ‘uses for a blanket’ 
 
 
Decoration 
 
Fire blanket 
 
“decoration” “fire blanket” 
“wall hanging” “putting out fire” 
“picture for walls” 
 
“put under door to stop smoke getting in in a 
fire” 
“decoration” “covering a person during a fire” 
“decoration” “fire blanket” 
“cut up into interesting designs” “fire safety” 
“decorate furniture” “fire blanket” 
“decoration” “wet it and throw over someone on fire” 
“a paint forum” “putting out fire” 
“sculpture” “cover fire” 
“displays” “extinguish fire” 
“artwork” “save people” 
 
 
A series of t-tests, Bonferroni corrected (one for each of the convergent-divergent 
style calculations) was performed to examine the effect of convergent-divergent style 
on the originality of responses to the open ended tests.  Divergers were expected to 
be more original and than convergers, see Table 7.8. 
 
The t-tests revealed that when the object uses subtest is used as the basis for the style 
calculation, divergers produce more original responses on the object uses test but not 
on the word generation task, with large effect sizes of 1.10 and 1.02.  
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Table 7.8: The effect of Convergent-Divergent style on originality of responses 
 
Basis of style categorisation Originality: 
Object uses 
Originality: 
Word Generation 
t p d t p d 
Object Uses and Category 
Judgements 
 
2.439 
 
.022 
 
1.10 
 
0.345 
 
.733 
 
0.13 
Object Uses and Word Pair 
Patterns 
 
2.249 
 
0.34 
 
1.02 
 
0.656 
 
.518 
 
0.25 
Word generation and Category 
Judgements 
 
1.290 
 
.205 
 
0.47 
 
4.491 
 
<.001 
 
1.62 
Word generation and Word Pair 
Patterns 
 
0.385 
 
.703 
 
0.12 
 
5.253 
 
<.001 
 
1.88 
 
2 tailed (Bonferroni correction: p <0.05 corrected to p < .013; p < 0.1, corrected to <  0.03) 
 
Conversely, when the basis of the calculation is the word generation task, divergers 
generate more original words but do not suggest more original uses for objects, again 
with large effect sizes of 1.62 and 1.88.   
 
Those who produce more words on the generation task are likely to produce more 
original words by virtue of the fact that they have a longer list; this may also reflect 
verbal fluency and vocabulary rather than divergent fluency.   
 
7.3.6 Discussion 
 
The results suggest that the convergent-divergent thinking tests need further revision 
to increase the difficulty level and to examine the difference in the nature of the 
tasks. 
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The convergent subtests lacked discriminative power; the tests need to be more 
challenging.  In addition to this, participant scores on each convergent subtest did not 
correlate; the absence of a relationship may be due to the lack of variation in scores, 
however, it may also be that the nature of processing required differs between the 
two subtests.   
 
Convergent section one required word category judgements that relied on prior 
knowledge and experience; whereas, convergent section two involved identifying a 
pattern to produce a new word.  Section two does not rely on prior knowledge and 
experiences; all the elements required to achieve the correct answers are provided.  
Therefore, the nature of the task in section two may represent a more pure test of 
convergent or analytic thinking. 
 
The divergent subtests have sufficient discriminative power but the weak relationship 
between them also suggests that performance on each is mediated by something 
other than divergent thinking.  The object uses test may represent a more valid 
measure of convergent-divergent style, particularly when a time limit is placed on 
completion.  In this context convergers spend relatively less time on the object uses 
task and more time on the word generation task producing inconsistent results.  
Support for this interpretation was the fact that greater fluency and originality on the 
word generation task was linked with more analytic scores on the CSI.  One solution 
would be to remove restrictions on completion time but this is undesirable since the 
limit is designed to be consistent with time limits on the convergent tests to ensure 
naivety during counterbalancing procedures.   
 
The convergent-divergent tests should be adapted such that the convergent tasks are 
more difficult.  A distinction should be drawn between convergent items, which may 
be mediated by prior knowledge or verbal ability and those task which are self 
contained, providing all the information needed to solve the tasks without the need 
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for prior knowledge.  The divergent task will consist only of the object uses test; but 
the full 5 item test will be used rather than the shortened two item version used thus 
far. 
 
7.4 Construction and Validity of the revised Convergent and divergent 
thinking tests 
 
Based on the recommendations, which emerged from the previous study the 
convergent tests were revised to present a greater challenge to participants and the 
possible mediating influence of prior knowledge and experience was controlled by 
designed two categories of convergent task.  
 
Two convergent tests were constructed; the „verbal convergent test‟ (VCT) and the 
„non verbal convergent test‟ (NVCT).  The VCT contains verbal items, which may 
be mediated by prior knowledge and experience such as exposure to books and 
vocabulary experience.  The NVCT consists of maths and spatial problems, which do 
not rely of prior knowledge because all the components needed to answer the 
questions, are contained within the test.   Both convergent tests have been 
constructed from sections of the MENSA intelligence test (2004). 
 
The VCT is constructed using two subtests from the MENSA intelligence test 
(2004).  The first subtest has 16 items and requires identification of words from a list 
which are opposite or the same as target words, see Figure 7.15. 
 
The second subtest has 8 items, which required identification of word pairs which are 
related in the same way as the example word pair, see Figure 7.16.  Both words have 
to be underlined correctly to achieve the correct answer and demonstrate that the 
relationship has been identified; points are not awarded if only one of the correct 
words has been underlined. 
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Look at this list of words, each word has a number 
 
 1.  wide  6.    empty  11.   lazy 
 2.  end  7.    swell  12.   big 
 3.   fast  8.   over  13.   long 
 4.   find  9.    like  14.   good 
 5.  right  10. grand  15. deep 
 
„Quick‟ means the SAME as „fast‟, which is word No. 3, so we put: 
 
 quick means the SAME as word No. 3   
 
„Small‟ means the OPPOSITE of „big‟, which is word No. 12, so we put: 
 
 small means the OPPOSITE of word No. 12   
 
 
Figure 7.15: Verbal convergent test - Example of a word meaning task 
 
Look at this: 
 
hat, head  (face, hand, foot, dress, mouth, shoe) 
 
A hat is worn on the head, and a shoe is worn on the foot, so „shoe‟ and „foot‟ 
are underlined. 
 
 
Figure 7.16: Verbal convergent test – Example of a word relationship task 
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The NVCT is also constructed using two subtests from the MENSA test.  The first 
subtest has 12 items and each presents a series of numbers which are in a logical 
order with one number in the series missing; the task is to complete the series by 
inserting the correct number, see Figure 7.17. 
 
 
Look at these numbers: 
 
3, 5, 7, …, 11, 13, 15. 
 
There is a gap where the number is left out. 
It is 9, so the numbers should be: 
 
 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. 
 
Now these: 
 
64, 32, 16, …, 4, 2, 1. 
 
The number left out is 8, 
So the numbers should be: 
 
64, 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1. 
 
Figure 7.17: Non-verbal convergent test- Example of missing numbers task 
 
The second subtest has 10 items, each involves following instructions to identify a 
target letter in a letter square, see Figure 7.18. 
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Here is a letter square: 
 
   R   J   N   Y   K 
   G   E   P   U   B 
   M   Q   F   T   S 
   O   A   H   C   V 
   X    L   D   W  Z 
 
See how the letters are arranged.  Thus P comes after E.  C is just below T.  S is 
between B and V.  Now answer the following: 
 
What letter comes just above the letter just after H?  ____ 
 
What letter comes just before the letter just above the 
letter between Q and T?      ____ 
 
 
 
Figure 7.18: Non-verbal convergent test – Example of Letter square task 
 
Each correct answer from the VCT and the NVCT is awarded one point; the VCT 
has a theoretical maximum of 24 and a mean of 12 and the NVCT has a theoretical 
maximum of 22 and a mean of 11.  On both tests the items become increasingly more 
difficult as the test progresses. Each test has a 7.5-minute time limit.  
 
The divergent test consists of the full 5 item Object Uses Test with a 15-minute time 
restriction, see Figure 7.19. 
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Below are five everyday objects.  Think of as many different uses as you can 
for each: 
 
A barrel 
A paper clip 
A tin of boot polish 
A brick 
A blanket 
 
 
 Figure 7.19: Object Uses Test 
 
The discriminatory powers of the newly revised tests were again examined and the 
construct validity of the convergent-divergent measure was considered in light of its 
ability to discriminate analytic-intuitive styles on the CSI. 
 
7.4.1 Design and Participants 
 
111 participants (36 male, 74 female, 1 not stated) completed the CSI, the verbal 
convergent test (VCT), the non-verbal convergent test (NVCT) and the object uses 
test.  The samples mean age was 22.33 years with a standard deviation of 7.28 years 
(males = 22.69 yrs, s.d. 8.27 yrs; females = 22.15 yrs, s.d. 6.80 yrs).  All participants 
completed the CSI first.  Completion of the convergent and divergent tests was 
counterbalanced. 
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7.4.2 Results and discussion 
 
Discriminative power of the convergent-divergent test 
 
The distribution of scores on the convergent and divergent tests are summarised in 
Table 7.9. 
 
Table 7.9: Distribution of Convergent and Divergent Scores 
 
 
Test  
 
Mean 
 
S. D. 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
Kol.-Smirnov  
Z P 
Verbal 
Convergent Test 
18.75  3.31 10 24 1.098 .179 
Non-Verbal 
Convergent Test 
14.66 3.75 5 22 1.077  .197 
Divergent Test 18.79 5.68 8 40 1.059 .212 
 
 
The convergent scores were approximately normally distributed; the tests were 
sufficiently difficult to produce a satisfactory range of scores, see Figures 7.20 and 
8.21; however, the verbal convergent test was slightly skewed to the right with mean 
scores of 18.75, which is better than the theoretical mean of 12.  
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Figure 7.20: Distribution of Verbal Convergent Test Scores 
 
Figure 7.21: Distribution of Non-Verbal Convergent Test Scores  
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The mean divergent score was 18.79; this is comparable to Hudson‟s (1967) sample 
mean of 16-17.  The divergent test scores are approximately normally distributed see 
Figure 7.22. 
 
Figure 7.22: Distribution of Divergent Test Scores 
 
The divergent data was compared with Hudson‟s (1967) own data which was heavily 
skewed with a tail of high scores which reached up to the 50s, The current sample 
achieved maximum scores of 40 and an improved distribution, this may be because 
of the time limit imposed on the object uses test. 
 
Internal Consistency of the convergent-divergent test 
 
Performance on the verbal convergent test correlated with performance on the non-
verbal convergent test (r = 0.56, p <. 001). 
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Participants were categorised as Converger, all rounder or Diverger based on their 
divergent score with their VCT score and based on their Divergent score and their 
NVCT.  The consistency of the style categorisations was assessed, see Table 7.10. 
 
Table 7.10: Comparison of style categories based on the VCT and the NVCT 
 
Divergent test with Non-
Verbal Convergent Test 
Divergent test with Verbal Convergent Test 
Convergers All rounders Divergers 
Convergers 26 8 2 
All rounders  13 19 12 
Divergers 2 6 23 
 
 
The observed frequencies of the style labels are significantly greater than those 
expected by chance (X² = 49.143, p < 0.001).  There is a consistent relationship 
between the convergent-divergent style labels produced when the divergent test plus 
the VCT is the basis of the classification and when the divergent test and the NVCT 
is the basis (r = 0.62) 
 
The consistency increased when the convergent tests are combined and the style 
classifications are based on the divergent test plus the VCT and the NVCT. The 
correlation between the combined measure and the measures which employ the VCT 
or the NVCT are r = 0.78 and r = 0.87, respectively. 
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Table 7.11: Consistency of convergent-divergent style labels when the VCT and 
the NVCT combined 
 
Divergent test with 
VCT plus NVCT 
Divergent with NVCT Divergent with VCT 
C
o
n
v
er
g
er
 
A
ll
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o
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n
d
er
 
D
iv
er
g
e
r
 
C
o
n
v
er
g
er
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o
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n
d
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D
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Converger 30 3 0 29 3 1 
All Rounder 6 36 3 12 25 8 
Diverger 0 5 28 0 5 28 
 
 
Construct Validity: Convergent-Divergent Style and Analytic-Intuitive Style 
  
Participants were classified as analytic, intermediate or intuitive by creating two 
equal cut points in the CSI scores, see Table 7.12.   
 
Table 7.12: CSI Classification by sex and age 
 
CSI Label Age Sex (N) CSI Score 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Male Female Min Max Mean 
Analytic 22.73 5.35 11 26 47 68 54.62 
Intermediate 23.37 8.74 13 24 37 46 41.74 
Intuitive 21.41 7.91 10 27 11 36 28.41 
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A one-way ANOVA was used to assess the effect of Analytic-Intuitive style on the 
convergent and divergent thinking tests.  There was no significant effect of style on 
any of the tests indicating that there is no overall difference in ability on divergent or 
convergent type tasks between analytics, intermediates and intuitives. 
 
Table 7.13: Effect of Analytic-Intuitive style on convergent and divergent 
thinking tests 
 
CSI Label Divergent 
Fluency 
Verbal 
Convergent Test 
Non-Verbal 
Convergent Test 
Mean S.d. Mean S.d. Mean S.d. 
Analytic 19.00 6.27 19.14 3.01 14.84 4.53 
Intermediate 17.65 5.71 18.34 3.79 14.34 3.39 
Intuitive 19.89 5.05 18.92 3.13 15.05 3.38 
 
 
However, in the previous study one of the findings, which approached significance, 
suggested that participants who scored in the highest 50% on convergent tasks that 
do not rely prior knowledge and vocabulary experience also produce more analytic 
scores on the CSI. 
 
This finding was replicated here; the highest scoring 50% on the non-verbal 
convergent test were more analytic than the lowest scoring 50%, means of 40.00 and 
43.24, respectively.  This finding approached significance (t = -1.452, df = 110, p = 
.075).  The effect size was small (0.27).  There was no significant difference between 
the CSI scores of high and low performers on the verbal convergent test. 
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Figure 7.23; Effect of high and low Non-Verbal Convergent Test Scores on CSI 
scores 
 
The unitary perspective of global-analytic style suggests that convergent individuals 
should be more analytic than divergent individuals.  
 
Convergent-Divergent Style was assessed by subtracting the standardised 
performance on the convergent thinking tests from the standardised performance on 
the divergent thinking test.  High scores on the convergent-divergent measure 
indicate divergent style and lower scores indicate convergent style. 
 
Next, a one-way ANOVA was used to assess the effect of Analytic-Intuitive Style on 
convergent-divergent style scores.  The Intuitives produced a higher mean 
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convergent-divergent score indicating a more divergent style, however, this effect 
was not statistically significant (F 2, 108 = 0.448, p = .640) 
 
 
Figure 7.24: Effect of Analytic-Intuitive style on convergent-divergent style 
 
7.4.3 Discussion 
 
The verbal and non-verbal convergent tests had discriminative power, suggesting that 
they are now sufficiently challenging to present a useful spread of scores and they 
have demonstrated internal consistency.  The divergent test has also demonstrated a 
good spread of scores which are comparable to those produced by Hudson‟s (1967) 
original research. 
 
177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When the convergent tests were combined with performance on the object uses test 
they provided a valid basis for assessing convergent-divergent style.  The 
convergent–divergent style classifications have demonstrated internal consistency 
across the verbal and non-verbal forms of the convergent test. 
 
The inclusion of verbal, knowledge based items and non-verbal, knowledge free 
items will allow experimental control over the possible mediating influence of prior 
knowledge and experience.  However, it is acknowledged that even the non-verbal 
test items have a substantial verbal component in the form of the verbal instructions, 
and the mathematical sequence tasks and letter square items have been presented in 
verbal format.  The reliance on verbal presentation of tasks may well affect the 
performance of respondents with language based disorders however since 
convergent-divergent style is assessed by an individuals relative performance on 
convergent and divergent tasks, which all rely heavily on verbal presentation, 
difficulties with verbal content should be controlled for. 
 
This concludes the development and validation phase of the convergent-divergent 
style measure; the measure will be employed in Chapter eleven to assess the 
construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension by addressing the assumption 
that styles in the wholist-analytic family should correlate with each other. 
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Chapter 8:  Construction and validation of the computer based 
Matching Familiar Figures Test 
 
8.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
In a series of studies reported in the early sixties Jerome Kagan searched for the 
determinants of analytic versus global processing preferences such as those described 
by Witkin (Kagan et al., 1964).  Kagan and colleagues noted links with analytic 
processing and longer response times, which led them to propose the reflective-
impulsive style dimension.  They considered reflective-impulsive style to be a more 
fundamental process and one of the determinants of the production of analytic 
concepts.   
     
Kagan, Moss and Sigel (1963) tested school aged children on their performance on 
the Conceptual style test (CST).  The CST presents three pictures and the respondent 
is required to choose two, which go together and state why.  There is no right or 
wrong answer; respondents are scored based on the types of concepts used to link 
two of the stimuli, which may be analytical, relational or inferential-categorical.  For 
instance if the pictures are of two shirts, one striped and one plain, and a zebra, one 
child may group the two shirts together, employing an inferential-categorical 
classification based on the fact that they are both items of clothing; another child 
may group the zebra and the striped shirt, employing an analytical classification 
based on an attribute of the stimuli, in this case the stripes.  In another example, the 
three pictures could be a watch, a man and a ruler; an analytical pairing may be „the 
numbers on the watch and the ruler‟ whereas a relational pairing may be „the man 
wears the watch‟.   
 
Kagan et al. (1964) found that some children showed a preference for providing 
analytical classifications that is, grouping stimuli based on their component parts 
180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rather than by category or functional relationship; and that a tendency to produce 
analytical pairings was associated with a tendency for slower conceptual decision-
making.  The tendency to produce analytic concepts in the CST was also related to 
faster solution times on the Hidden Figures Test (HFT).  The hidden figures test is 
conceptually very similar to the embedded figures test (EFT), particularly the 
childrens‟ EFT and these results unsurprisingly provide a link between the tendency 
to analyse a visual array into its component parts and the ability to disembed a figure 
from a complex background.   
 
Additionally, boys who produced more analytic concepts on the CST respond with a 
lower number of incorrect choices on the HFT than low analytic boys, even when 
boys were matched for their solution times on the HFT, therefore, controlling for 
disembedding ability.  The findings suggested that analytic boys had a greater 
disembedding ability and were better at inhibiting incorrect responses. 
 
Next Kagan and his team examined the possibility of increasing the production of 
analytic concepts on the CST and increasing accuracy of the first responses to the 
delayed recall test (DRT) and the HFT by encouraging participants to respond more 
slowly.  It was the results of this study, which resulted in the proposition of a 
reflective-impulsive style variable and led to the design of the matching familiar 
figures test (MFFT).   
 
Kagan found that when participants were instructed to respond as quickly as they 
could, they produced fewer analytic concepts on the CST and more incorrect 
responses on the DRT and the HFT; conversely when they were instructed to take 
their time and think about their answer they produced more analytic concepts in the 
CST and were more often correct on the first response in the DRT and the HFT.  The 
Wechsler intelligence scales for children (WISC) vocabulary scores were not 
affected by slow or fast instruction set.  Further, response times were significantly 
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longer in the slow instruction condition as would be expected and were independent 
of WISC vocabulary scores in both instruction conditions.  
 
Kagan suggested that reflectivity-impulsivity and the tendency to analyse visual 
arrays are more fundamental processes and are the primary determinants of the 
production of analytic concepts.   Kagan and his team argued that the tendency to 
reflect over alternatives and the tendency to analyse visual arrays into component 
parts are independent processes but they both influence accuracy in perceptual 
recognition tasks. 
 
When faced with a timed test in which there are more items to answer than can be 
completed within the time limit, individuals will tend to approach such a test in a 
fairly consistent manner.  An individual with a reflective cognitive style would 
answer fewer items, taking more time to ensure accuracy.  An “impulsive” individual 
would answer more items to the detriment of accuracy.  The impulsivity-reflectivity 
construct appears to be relatively stable over time and tasks (Sternberg, 1997).   
 
The Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT) is the traditional measure of 
reflectivity-impulsivity.  The MFFT presents a complex figure and requires 
participants to select which, of six complex figures, is an identical match with the 
presented figure.  Reflective individuals are expected to have relatively longer 
response times with relatively fewer errors; impulsive individuals are expected to 
respond relatively quicker with relatively more errors.   The MFFT was designed to 
provide a level of complexity, which induces response uncertainty and presents a 
fixed set of response alternatives from which to choose.  The scoring is based on 
latency to first response and the number of incorrect responses offered.   
 
It is the response uncertainty and the scoring method which characterise the MFFT as 
a measure of reflection-impulsivity rather than the specific nature of the task stimuli; 
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however, Zelniker and Jeffrey (1979) have provided evidence that the task itself may 
favour local rather than global processors. 
 
Zelniker and Jeffery suggested that reflective individuals have a preference for local 
processing and impulsives for global processing; to test this hypothesis they modified 
the MFFT to include either meaningful figures or abstract figures, meaningful figures 
were predicted to encourage global processing.  They also manipulated global or 
local differences; In half of the trials, the differences between the matching figure 
stimuli were in the contours of the figure which favoured global processing and in 
the other half the differences were in the detail within the figure which favoured 
local or part processing.   
 
Zelniker and Jeffery‟s reflective group by definition had longer response latencies 
and a lower number of errors overall but the difference in error responses manifested 
from the local stimuli not the global stimuli.  This means that when the differences 
between the alternative figures was in the detail rather than the contours of the shape 
reflective individuals were more accurate than impulsives; but when the differences 
were in the contours, impulsives became significantly more accurate and reflectives 
became significantly less accurate leaving no significant difference in accuracy of 
performance on global stimuli. 
 
In addition to this, the meaningful stimuli but not the abstract stimuli resulted in 
longer response latencies to the local stimuli but not to the global stimuli.  The 
implication being that when the task requires local processing the meaningful stimuli 
which evokes global processing causes interference producing slower responses.  
Even more interestingly, a three-way interaction between style, task and meaning 
revealed that the meaningful figures slowed down the reflectives responses to local 
stimuli but not the impulsives.  This implies that the impulsives already have a 
tendency to process globally leaving them uninfluenced by the meaningful figures 
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whereas the reflectives tendency to use local processing was hampered by the 
influence of meaning and the global processing it evoked. 
 
Zelniker and Jeffery were concerned only with the characteristics associated with 
reflective-impulsive style but their findings appear to have wider implications for the 
validity of the MFFT.  If reflective individuals are characterised by a tendency to use 
local processing then the meaningful stimuli used in the MFF is likely to increase 
their response latencies and the predominance of local rather than global differences 
in the MFFT is likely to increase their accuracy.  Therefore the MFF may be 
confounded by measurements of local and global processing preferences because of 
the nature of the tasks employed. 
 
The MFFT has also been shown to have low internal stability, specifically relating to 
error scores (Ault, Mitchell and Hartman, 1976) and in response to such findings a 
revised version of the MFFT has been devised, the MFFT-20 which has 
demonstrated greater internal stability and much improved test-re-test reliability 
(Cairns and Cammock, 1978; Buela-Casal, Carretero-Dios, Santos-Roig and 
Burmudez, 2003); despite this, it is the original version of the MFFT which is 
generally employed in comparison studies not the psychometrically improved 
MFFT-20 (e.g. Riding and Dyer, 1983; Jamieson, 1992; Allinson and Hayes, 1996).  
Having said that, the original MFFT has provided normative data in relation to adult 
samples (Salkind, 1978) whereas the MFFT-20 seems most reliable when used with 
children between the age of six and twelve years; samples aged six and under or 
twelve and over have suffered from floor and ceiling effects, respectively (Carretero-
Dios, Macarena and Buela-Casal, 2008) 
 
The MFFT is designed to be administered individually by showing a series of twelve 
A4 size cards with a standard familiar figure and eight response options, one 
replicates the standard exactly and the others have small differences.  The participant 
must choose the correct match, if they make an incorrect choice they are told that the 
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response is incorrect and they should choose again.  The experimenter times the 
latency to first response with a stopwatch and records the number of incorrect 
choices made per trial.  Using a median split method, reflective individuals are those 
who have longer average response latencies but fewer incorrect responses; 
impulsives are those who have faster than average response times but produce more 
incorrect responses.  The remainder of the respondents are either fast and accurate or 
slow and inaccurate. 
 
A computer version of the MFFT was constructed to improve the precision of the 
timing of latencies and to allow group administration of the MFFT.  The present 
study outlines the construction and validation of the replica computer form of the 
MFFT.  
 
8.2 Method 
 
8.2.1 Participants 
 
70 participants (21 males, 49 females) with a mean age of 22.24 years (standard 
deviation 6.83 years) completed the computer MFFT in groups of between fifteen to 
twenty-eight people.  Participants were approached during a weekly workshop and 
received course credit for taking part. 
 
8.2.2 Construction of the computer based matching familiar figures test 
 
The test is a replica computer version of Kagans‟ „Matching Familiar Figures‟ test.  
Participants are required to try two practice items before completing the twelve trial 
items.  In each case participants are presented with a familiar figure and their task is 
to choose which figure matches it perfectly from a set of alternatives, there are six 
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alternatives in the practice items and eight in the trial items.  If the incorrect figure is 
selected then the participant must try again until the correct figure is selected.   
 
Latency to the first response on each trial and the number of attempts per trial were 
recorded.  The median participant reaction time was calculated and the total number 
of attempts per trial to achieve accuracy.  Allocation of style labels was based on the 
median split method, participants with the fastest reaction times and the highest 
number of attempts were labelled as impulsive and the slowest reaction times and the 
lowest number of attempts were labelled reflective.  Standardising the median 
latency and the number of errors into z scores produced a continuous reflective-
impulsive score; standardised error scores were reversed and added to standardised 
median latencies producing a scale in which high scores indicate reflective styles and 
low scores indicate impulsive styles. 
8.2.3 Stimuli 
Two practice trials were presented, the first featured a boat with six response 
alternatives and the second featured a cowboy.  The boat stimulus is shown in Figure 
8.1.  All stimuli are scanned copies of the original stimuli. 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Practice item one – Boat with six response alternatives 
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The twelve trial items presented a dog, a rose, a soldier, a graph, a baby, a lamp, a 
dress, a lion, a pair of glasses, a plane, a leaf and a bed.  An example of the first trial 
stimuli is shown in Figure 8.2. 
 
 
Figure 8.2: Trial item one – Dog with eight response alternatives 
 
8.2.4 Instructions 
 
Standardised computer presented instructions were employed; no verbal instruction 
was provided prior to the test.  On screen practice instructions are shown in Figure 
8.3, trial instructions are shown in Figure 8.4.  Participants were required to click the 
mouse over the figure, which they think represented a perfect match. Incorrect 
responses received onscreen feed back “ incorrect, try again” 
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You will be shown a picture of a familiar item and some pictures that look like it. 
 
You will have to click on the picture that is a perfect match. 
 
TRY A COUPLE OF EXAMPLES FIRST. 
 
CLICK TO PROCEED 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Practice instructions 
 
 
 
 
Ready to begin the test? 
 
These are a bit harder - you will see a picture on top and eight pictures on the bottom 
 
Click on the picture that is the perfect match 
 
CLICK TO BEGIN 
 
 
Figure 8.4: Trial instructions 
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8.3 Results  
8.3.1 Discriminatory power 
 
Accuracy scores were normally distributed (z = .819, p = .514) with a minimum 
score of 13 indicating a near perfect score and a maximum score of 48 suggesting 
that some participants regularly clicked on four of the eight figures before happening 
upon the correct answer reducing the odds of eventually making the right choice to 
50-50. See Figure 8.5.  Latencies were normally distributed (z = .949, p = .328). The 
normal range for responding was between 6 second and 35 seconds; there were 4 
extreme scores with responders taking on average close to a minute to make their 
choice (minimum and maximum median latencies, 5815ms and 54587ms, 
respectively).  See Figure 8.6. 
 
 
Figure 8.5: Distribution of number of responses to achieve accuracy 
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Figure 8.6: Distribution of median latencies to first response 
 
The median latencies to first response and the number of errors made on the 
matching familiar figures test were standardised as Z scores, standardised error 
scores were reversed and summed with standardised latency scores to produce a 
scale in which high scores represent reflective style and low scores represent 
impulsive style; fast-accurate and slow-inaccurate participants should achieve 
intermediate scores.  Reflective-impulsive scale scores were also normally 
distributed (z = .587, p = .881) see Figure 8.7. 
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Figure 8.7: Distribution of reflective-impulsive style scores 
 
8.3.2 Internal consistency 
 
A Pearson correlation showed that „latency to first response‟ and the „number of 
errors made before the correct answer was achieved‟ negatively correlated (r = -.485, 
p < .001, n = 70) demonstrating that the longer reflection times lead to greater 
accuracy. 
 
An inter item analysis produced Cronbach‟s alphas of .56 for accuracy and .91 for 
latencies.  Split half reliabilities based on odd and even trials produced correlations 
of r = .47 for accuracy and r = .83 for latency.   
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Split half reliability comparing reflective-impulsive scales calculated from odd and 
even trials produced correlations of r = .74. 
 
8.3.3 Reflective–impulsive style classifications 
 
Reflective and impulsive individuals were categorised using the double median split 
method.  35 participants were labelled as „Accurate‟ and 35 as „Inaccurate‟, scoring 
above or below a median of 25.5 responses over 12 trials.  35 participants were 
labelled „Slow‟ and 35 as „Fast‟, responding above and below the median latency of 
17905.50 milliseconds per trial.   
 
25 participants were both slow and accurate which characterised a reflective style 
and 25 participants were fast and inaccurate which characterised an impulsive style.   
 
Table 8.1: Classification of reflective - impulsive style 
 
Labels N Latency to first  
response (ms) 
Total no. 
of responses 
Median Min Max Median Min Maxi 
Reflective 25 242754 17934 54587 20 13 25 
Impulsive 25 11733 5815 17877 35 27 48 
Slow 10 24014 19223 28847 33 26 40 
Fast 10 12809 9645 17166 22 15 25 
 
 
There was no significant difference in mean age between the groups (F 3, 66 = .798, 
p = .500) and no significant difference in sex (χ2 = 2.857, df = 3, p = .414) 
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8.4 Discussion 
 
Accuracy and latency scores produced a satisfactory spread of scores which were 
approximately normally distributed.  The correlation between latency and accuracy 
scores was –0.49 indicating that longer reflection times were associated with greater 
accuracy.  The correlation was moderate and consistent with the adult norms 
produced by Salkind (1977), which were reported as –0.41 for males, -0.48 for 
females and -0.43 for the total sample, norms were based on 226 adults across 10 
studies. 
 
Internal consistency in the form of inter item consistency and split half reliability was 
high for latencies r = 0.91 and r = 0.83; but only moderate for errors, r = 0.56 and r = 
0.47.  The moderate consistency for errors is in keeping with the normative data and 
has been the subject of criticisms, which have led the MFFT to be considered 
unreliable.  However, the differing difficulty level of the stimuli would be expected 
to produce varying accuracy and when the latency and accuracy data are standardised 
and combined into a reflective-impulsive scale, the split half reliability of the scale is 
high, r = 0.74. 
 
 The MFFT has demonstrated satisfactory psychometric properties, which have been 
consistent with the available normative data.  Whilst there has been criticism of the 
measure as lacking internal consistency and being sensitive to local processing style, 
it is more suitable than the MFFT-20 when used with adults. 
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Chapter 9:  Testing the Validity of the Wholist-analytic Ratio  
 
9.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
The rationale outlined in Chapter four will be addressed in this chapter by testing a 
series of hypotheses, which collectively address the validity of the wholist-analytic 
ratio.  The wholist-analytic ratio purports to measure differences in part and whole 
processing styles, but the central thesis here has argued that the wholist-analytic ratio 
is confounded by order effects which makes it sensitive to individual differences in 
reflective-impulsive style and it creates an asymmetry in the nature of processing 
being measured which confounds measures of style with comparisons of strategy 
efficacy.  There are six hypotheses; the first three hypotheses stated in 10.1.1, 10.1.2 
and 10.1.3 address the influence of reflective style and the other three hypotheses, 
stated in 10.1.4, 10.1.5 and 10.1.6 address the asymmetry in processing styles. 
 
9.1.1 Mean wholist-analytic ratios will be significantly higher in the WAS-WA 
than the WAS-AW. 
 
The lack of counterbalancing of the matching figure and embedded figure subtests in 
the CSA and in modified forms of the CSA such as the CSA-A and the CSA-B 
(Peterson et al, 2003) and the WAS Analysis will lead to the wholist-analytic ratio 
being confounded by order effects.  This will be demonstrated using the WAS-WA 
and the WAS-AW; the WAS-WA presents the matching figure subtest first followed 
by the embedded figure subtest, thus preserving the presentation order of the CSA; 
the WAS-AW reverses the order of the subtests presenting the embedded figures 
subtest first followed by the matching figures subtest.  The order effects will create 
longer latencies during early test items; this will inflate the wholist-analytic ratio 
when the matching figures subtest is presented first and depress the ratio when the 
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embedded figures subtest is presented first.  Therefore the WAS-WA mean ratio is 
predicted to be higher than the WAS-AW mean ratio.   
9.1.2 Reflective individuals will produce significantly higher ratios than 
impulsive individuals when responding to the WAS-WA 
 
Reflective individuals are characterised by a tendency to be cautious in novel and 
uncertain situations, their tendency to reflect over alternate courses of action is based 
on a desire to be accurate.  Reflective participants will be slower than impulsive 
individuals when approaching early test items and their reflective behaviour will 
diminish as their uncertainty diminishes.  
 
 
Figure 9.1: Complimentary order effects on part processing styles and reflective 
styles 
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Therefore, when the matching figure subtest is presented first (e.g. in the CSA, CSA-
A, CSA-B and the WAS-WA) reflective individuals will produce higher, more 
analytic, ratios than the impulsive individuals.   
 
The construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension predicts that analytic 
participants, who are characterised as such because of their preference for part 
processing, will also have a reflective style.  This is because reflective-impulsive 
style is a member of the wholist-analytic „family‟ and is integrated within the super-
ordinate wholist-analytic dimension (Riding and Cheema, 1991).    
 
In the context of the CSA, the CSA-A, the CSA-B and the WAS-WA, which present 
the matching figures subtest first, this means that reflective and part processing styles 
complement each other leading to inflated analytic order ratios, see Figure 9.1.  Part 
processors will have longer response latencies to matching figure items compared to 
the embedded figure items because matching figure items are less suited to a part 
processing approach.  Reflective individuals will also have longer response latencies 
to matching figure items compared to the embedded figure items because matching 
figure items occur earlier in the test and reflectives are slower to respond to early test 
items.  
 
9.1.3 Reflective individuals will not produce significantly higher ratios than 
impulsive individuals when responding to the WAS-AW 
 
In the context of the WAS-AW the order effects will work in competing directions 
for part-whole processing styles and reflective-impulsive styles.  Part processors will 
have longer response latencies to matching figure items compared to the embedded 
figure items because matching figure items are less suited to a part processing 
approach.  However, reflective individuals will have longer response latencies to 
embedded figure items compared to the matching figure items because embedded 
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figure items occur earlier in the test and reflectives are slower to respond to early test 
items, see Figure 9.2. 
 
 
Figure 9.2: Competing order effects on part processing styles and reflective 
styles 
 
It follows that when the presentation order of the subtests are reversed, as they are in 
the WAS-AW, the tendency to be quicker at part processing tasks will be cancelled 
out by a concomitant reflective tendency to be slower in the first subtest. 
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9.1.4 Analytics will have significantly lower three-part to five-part matching 
figure ratios (part-whole ratios) than wholists 
 
In Chapter four, it was argued that a processing asymmetry exists in the nature of 
processing being compared, between part and whole processors, to produce the 
wholist-analytic ratio.  The embedded figures task can only be approached using part 
processing but the matching figures task can be approached using part processing or 
whole processing.    
 
Since individuals are expected to use their preferred style of processing where 
possible, part processors will employ the same strategy for both tasks whereas whole 
processors will employ whole processing for the matching figures task but will be 
forced to use part processing for the embedded figures task.  Therefore, for part 
processors, the wholist-analytic ratio compares the efficiency of part processing 
strategies across tasks whereas; for whole processors, the ratio compares their 
relative ability to use part or whole processing.   
 
To test the hypothesis that an asymmetry exists, the number of simple shapes within 
the complex geometric figures in the trial items have been manipulated.  The aim 
was to slow down the part processors relative to the whole processors by increasing 
the number of parts that need to be processed from three-parts to five-parts in half of 
the trial items.  The differential speed of processing the three-parts to five-part items 
has been expressed as a ratio to control for individual differences in overall 
processing speed. The three-part to five-part ratio derived from the matching figures 
task is termed the „matching figures ratio‟ (MFT ratio) or part-whole ratio‟.  
 
Individuals producing lower ratios have been slowed down relatively more, by the 
increase in constituent parts, than those producing higher ratios, suggesting the use of 
part processing rather than whole processing.   
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Support for the hypothesis “Analytics will have a significantly lower three-part to 
five-part matching figure ratio (part-whole ratio) than wholists” would suggest that 
analytic individuals were part processing the matching figure items whereas wholists 
were whole processing the matching figure items. 
 
9.1.5 There will be no significant difference between wholist and analytic 
individuals on their three-part to five-part embedded figure ratios 
 
The construct validity of the part-whole ratio derived from the matching figure items 
predicts that there should be no significant difference between analytics and wholists 
on the three-part to five-part ratio computed from the embedded figure items.  This is 
because the wholists and the analytics should both have employed part processing to 
complete the embedded figure items.  The fact that the wholists would be expected to 
be slower at part processing is irrelevant because the ratio calculation computes 
relative speed not overall speed.  The ratio derived from the three-part to five-part 
embedded figures tasks is termed the embedded figures ratio (EFT ratio)   
 
9.1.6 The increase complexity of the five part figures will lead to longer 
response latencies irrespective of wholist-analytic style; therefore, 
processing times for five-part figures should be greater than for three-
part figures. 
 
Finally, the increased complexity of the five part figures is likely to make the trials 
more difficult and naturally increase response latencies; whilst the degree of this 
increase has been hypothesised to discriminate between part and whole processors, 
all participants are expected to produce ratios of less than one, indicating that they 
took longer to process five-part figures than three-part figures. 
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9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Participants 
 
193 first and second year psychology undergraduates completed the Wholist-
Analytic Style (WAS) analysis.  Participants were approached during their weekly 
research methods workshops and received course credit for participating.  5 
participants produced results below the minimum accuracy requirement of 85%; 
these results were discarded leaving 188 participants.  Of these, 102 completed the 
embedded figures section first, (WAS-AW) and 86 completed the matching figures 
section first, (WAS-WA).  There was no significant difference between the age or 
sex of samples in each test condition (F1, 187 = .143, p = .706 and F1, 187 = .019, p 
= .891, respectively), see Table 9.1 for a breakdown. 
 
Table 9.1: Participant age and sex 
 
Test condition 
 
 
N 
 
Sex  
 
 
Mean Age 
 
SD 
 
WAS-AW 
 
102 
 
27M, 75F 
 
21.92 yrs 
 
6.23 yrs 
 
WAS-WA 
 
86 
 
22M, 64F 
 
22.27 yrs 
 
6.27 yrs 
 
Total 
 
188 
 
52M, 141F 
 
22.08 yrs 
 
6.23 yrs 
 
9.2.2  Measurements 
 
 The WAS analysis is a computer presented, eighty-item test based on the wholist-
analytic sections of the CSA.  It was constructed and administered using E-prime 
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(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA).  The test is in two sections, the 
matching figures section, which consists of forty matching figure items and the 
embedded figures section, which consists of forty embedded figure items.   The 
matching figure tasks present a pair of complex figures, which require a yes/no 
response to indicate whether the two figures are the same.  The embedded figure 
tasks present a simple shape and a complex geometric figure, which also require a 
yes/no response to indicate whether the simple shape is contained within the complex 
figure.  Respondents are required to complete four example items prior to each 
subtest. 
 
Two versions of the WAS analysis were used; the WAS-WA presents the matching 
figures subtest first followed by the embedded figures subtest which preserves the 
order in which subtests are presented in the CSA.  The WAS-AW reverses the order, 
presenting the embedded figures subtest first.   
 
„Yes‟ and „No‟ comparisons were counterbalanced within each section and all items 
were presented randomly without replacement.   Half of the complex figures in each 
section were constructed using three constituent parts, and half were constructed 
using five constituent parts.  A summary of the counterbalancing methods used in the 
WAS analysis are tabulated below in Table 9.2. 
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Table 9.2: Breakdown of counterbalancing measures 
 
Subtest 
 
Number 
of Trials 
Number of 3 or 5 
part figures  
Number of yes/no 
responses required 
 
 
Matching  
Figures 
 
 
40 
 
3 part 
 
20 
Yes 10 
No 10 
 
5 part 
 
20 
Yes 10 
No 10 
 
 
Embedded Figures 
 
 
40 
 
3 part 
 
20 
Yes 10 
No 10 
 
5 part 
 
20 
Yes 10 
No 10 
WAS Analysis 80  
 
9.2.3 Data Analysis 
 
Wholist-Analytic Style Calculation 
 
The wholist-analytic ratio was calculated by dividing the median response latency to 
items in the matching figures section by the median response latency to items in the 
embedded figures section.  A ratio of below one indicates that an individual 
responded relatively faster to the matching figure items, and a ratio of above one 
indicates that an individual responded relatively faster to the embedded figure items 
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Reflective–Impulsive Style Calculation 
 
Median latency for all WAS analysis trials and the number of errors was categorised 
as either high or low using the median split method for each variable.     
 
Those with median latencies greater than 1602.25 milliseconds and a total number of 
errors of 3 or less were categorised as reflective (N=67); those in the high speed and 
the low accuracy groups were labelled „impulsive‟ (N=56), the remaining 
participants were labelled „fast‟ if they had both high speed and high accuracy or 
„slow‟ if they had low speed with low accuracy (N = 35 and 30, respectively).  A 
sample breakdown of summary statistics is provided in Table 9.3. 
 
Table 9.3: Summary sample statistics by reflective-impulsive style classification 
 
Classification labels N Sex Age (years) 
M F Mean SD 
Reflective 64 20 44 22.39 6.43 
Impulsive 59 14 45 20.98 4.78 
Fast 40 10 30 20.88 4.17 
Slow 35 9 26 24.71 8.94 
 
 
There was no significant difference in sex across groups (x² = 1.017, p= .797) but 
there was a significant difference in age (F 3, 193 = 3.321, p=.021).  Tukey HSD 
post hoc tests revealed that there was no significant difference in age between the 
reflective, fast and impulsive groups, but the slow group were significantly older 
than the impulsive participants (p=0.30). 
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By definition the completion times for reflective and slow groups were significantly 
longer than the impulsive and fast groups (F 3,184= 74.070, p<.0001) but Tukey 
HSD comparisons revealed no significant differences in completion test times 
between the fast and the impulsive (p=.632) and between the slow and the reflective 
(p=.731).   
 
All differences between groups in mean accuracy were significant (F 3,187=140.232, 
p<.0001); naturally the reflective and fast groups should be more accurate than the 
slow and impulsive by the nature of the classification but in addition to that post hoc 
comparisons showed that the reflective are significantly more accurate than the fast 
(p=.037) and the slow are significantly more accurate than the impulsive (p=.004), 
indicating, perhaps unsurprisingly that time is a factor in accuracy. 
 
9.3 Results  
 
9.3.1 Mean wholist-analytic ratios will be significantly higher in the WAS-WA 
than the WAS-AW. 
 
To address the first hypothesis wholist-analytic ratios were calculated for each test 
version and are summarised in Table 9.4. 
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Table 9.4: Mean and spread of wholist-analytic ratios produced by test version 
 
 
Test 
Condition 
 
 
Mean Ratio 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Standard 
Error Mean 
 
Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Z 
 
WAS-AW 
 
 
0.99 
 
 
0.22 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
Z = 1.084, P = 0.19 
  
WAS-WA 
 
 
1.23 
 
 
0.32 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
Z = 0.951, P = 0.33 
  
A t-test revealed that the mean ratio was significantly lower for participants 
presented with the embedded-figures section first than for participants presented with 
the matching figures section first, means of 0.99 and 1.23 respectively (t = 6.117, df 
= 186, p < 0.001).  The mean difference represents a large effect size of (d = 0.92) 
and there is no overlap between the error bars based at 99.9% confidence intervals, 
(Figure 9.3).   
 
Figure 9.3: 99.9% Confidence limits and means for the wholist-analytic ratio by 
test version 
Order of presentation of the wholist and analytic sections
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The hypothesis was supported; when the embedded figures section was presented 
first, lower ratios were produced, with an expected population mean of between 0.92 
and 1.06.  When the matching figures section was presented first, higher ratios were 
produced, with an expected population mean of between 1.12 and 1.35.   
 
Participant scores were further analysed to illustrate the effect of subtest presentation 
order on wholist-analytic classifications.  The lowest 30%, mid 40% and highest 
30% of ratios obtained in the WAS-AW and the WAS-WA were labelled as wholist, 
intermediate and analytic, respectively.  The ratio cut-off points are illustrated in 
Table 9.5.  Riding‟s (1991) guidelines for classification are provided for comparison. 
 
Table 9.5: Classification of wholist-analytic style ratio 
 
Classification labels WAS-AW  
 
WAS-WA  CSA 
Guidelines 
N Ratio N Ratio Ratio 
 
Wholist 
 
35 
 
≤ 0.88 
 
28 
 
≤ 1.05 
 
≤ 1.02 
 
Intermediate 
 
40 
 
> 0.88 < 
1.05 
 
33 
 
> 1.05 < 
1.33 
 
> 1.02 < 1.36 
 
Analytic 
 
32 
 
≥ 1.05 
 
25 
 
≥ 1.33 
 
≥ 1.36 
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The basis of the difference in ratios between the WAS-WA and WAS_AW 
 
67.8% of the total sample had slower median reaction times to items in the first 
subtest than in the second subtest.  This has the effect of lowering the ratio when 
embedded figures items are presented first and inflating the ratio when matching 
figures items are presented first.   
 
It appears that the speed at which participants approach the first subtest effectively 
discriminates between wholist-analytic ratios but the speed at which participants 
complete the second subtest does not, see Figures 9.4 and 9.5. 
 
A multivariate ANOVA was performed on the WAS-WA response latencies; 
wholist-analytic style was the between subjects factor with three levels, wholist, 
intermediate and analytic; test quarter was the within subjects factor with four levels, 
first, second, third and fourth quarter.  There was a significant effect of style (F 2, 90 
= 4.397, p = .016), Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that analytics had longer 
latencies than wholists (p = 0.47).  There was a significant effect of test quarter (F 3, 
270 = 57.569, p < .001) with latencies decreasing from the first to the last quarter.  
Most interestingly there was a significant interaction between style and test quarter 
(F 6, 270 = 24.325, p < .001).  Post hoc tests revealed that analytics were 
significantly slower than wholists in the first (F 2, 90 = 11.333, p < .001) and second 
quarters (F 2, 90 = 8.711, p < .001) but not in the third (F 2, 90 = 1.753, p = .179) 
and fourth (F 2, 90 = 674, p = .512) quarters, see Figure 9.4. 
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Figure 9.4: WAS-WA mean latencies in each test quarter by wholist-analytic 
style  
 
The findings above replicated the results in Chapter seven regarding the 
discriminatory power of the subtests and raise the question of whether the 
discriminatory power is a feature of the matching familiar figures test or whether it is 
a result of reflective tendencies to early test items.  
 
This question was addressed by performing a second multivariate ANOVA on the 
WAS-AW response latencies; again, wholist-analytic style was the between subjects 
factor with three levels, wholist, intermediate and analytic; test quarter was the 
within subjects factor with four levels, first, second, third and fourth quarter.   
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Figure 9.5: WAS-WA mean latencies in each test quarter by wholist-analytic 
style  
 
There was no significant effect of style (F 2, 102 = .766, p = .467).  There was a 
significant effect of test quarter (F 3, 306 = 18.689, p < .001) with latencies 
decreasing from the first to the second quarter and from the third to the fourth 
quarter.  There was significant interaction between style and test quarter F 6, 306 = 
12.634, p < .001).  Post hoc tests revealed that analytics were significantly slower 
than wholists in the first (F 2, 104 = 4.118, p = .019) and second quarters (F 2, 104 = 
3.918, p = .023), but not in the third (F 2, 104 = .318, p = .728).  The difference, in 
the fourth quarter, approached significance (F 2, 104 = 3.064, p = .051) see Figure 
9.4. 
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The discriminatory power of the WAS analysis lays in the first subtest, regardless of 
the type of task, either embedded or matching figure task.  The WAS Analysis 
discriminates, amongst those who have a tendency to produce longer latencies to 
early test items.  The presentation order of the matching figures and embedded 
figures subtests determines the style of the participants based on their cautious 
approach to early test items.  In the WAS-WA individuals who are slower in the first 
subtest are labelled analytic; in the WAS-AW, the same people would be labelled 
wholist.   Participants who have a tendency to approach early test items with caution 
are expected to do so because they have a reflective style.  The question remains 
whether the WAS analyses discriminate entirely between reflective-impulsive 
characteristics or whether they are also sensitive to differences in part-whole 
processing.  The following two hypotheses address this question. 
 
9.3.2 Reflective individuals will produce significantly higher ratios than 
impulsive individuals when responding to the WAS-WA 
 
It was reasoned, in Chapter four, that the tendency of reflective participants to be 
slower in the first subtest of the WAS-WA would be amplified by concomitant 
analytic tendencies to be relatively slower at the matching figures tasks than the 
embedded figures tasks. 
 
9.3.3 Reflective individuals will not produce significantly different ratios than 
the impulsive individuals when responding to the WAS-AW 
 
 It was also reasoned that the tendency of reflective individuals to be slower in the 
first subtest of the WAS-AW than in the second would be nullified by concomitant 
analytic tendencies to be relatively slower at the matching figures tasks than the 
embedded figures tasks. 
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The findings revealed a greater proportion of the reflective individuals responded 
more slowly to items in the first half of the test, 77.6% of reflective individuals 
compared to 63.9%, 60% and 63.3% for the impulsive, fast and slow groups, 
respectively, providing initial support for the hypotheses.    
 
A univariate analysis of variance examined the effect of presentation order (WAS-
WA versus WAS-AW) and reflective-impulsive style (reflective versus impulsive) 
on the wholist-analytic ratio.  The results revealed significant interaction between 
reflective-impulsive style and the presentation order of the wholist-analytic sections 
(F 1, 118 = 5.96, p = .016) see Figure 9.6.   
 
 
Figure 9.6: Wholist-Analytic ratios produced by reflective and impulsive 
individuals when order of presentation of wholist-analytic sections is 
manipulated 
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Two post hoc t-tests revealed that, when the matching figure items were presented 
first, in the WAS-WA, reflective individuals produced significantly more analytic 
ratios than the impulsive individuals (ratios of 1.31 and 1.16, respectively, t = 2.138, 
df = 56, p = .018, d = 0.56).  Therefore, reflective individuals did produce 
significantly higher ratios than impulsive individuals when responding to the WAS-
WA. 
 
When the analytic items were presented first in the WAS-AW condition, reflective 
individuals produced more wholist ratios than the impulsive individuals but this 
difference was not significant (ratios of 0.96 and 1.03, respectively, t = 1.204, df = 
59.95, equal variances not assumed, p = 0.233, d = 0.30).  This supports the 
hypothesis that predicted no significant difference between the ratios of reflective 
and impulsive individuals.   
 
The results suggest that the wholist-analytic ratio is indeed very sensitive to the 
influence of reflective-impulsive style; this casts doubt on the construct validity of 
the wholist-analytic dimension.  However, the results also suggest that the wholist-
analytic ratio is subject to complimentary and conflicting effects of concomitant 
differences in reflective-impulsive style and wholist-analytic style that are dependent 
on the presentation order of the subtests.  This provides support for the construct 
validity of the wholist-analytic dimension despite casting doubt on the method used 
to measure it. 
 
The evidence provided so far supports the prediction that participants generally tend 
to appear more wholist when the embedded figures subtest is presented first and 
more analytic when the matching figures subtest is presented first because people 
have a tendency to react more slowly to early test items; and that this tendency is 
greater for individuals with a characteristic reflective style.  This is summarised 
clearly by the 95% confidence intervals illustrated in Figure 9.7 
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Figure 9.7: 95% Confidence Intervals of Wholist-Analytic ratios produced by 
reflective and impulsive individuals by order of subtest presentation 
 
The remaining hypotheses addressed a postulated asymmetry in the wholist-analytic 
ratio.  Chapter four argued that where possible individuals will use their preferred 
processing style; it was also argued that the matching figure items allow a choice of 
wholist or part processing style whilst the embedded figure task constrains the 
respondent to employ part processing.  This sets up an asymmetry in which part 
processors employ part processing for both tasks and are labelled as analytic because 
part processing is more suited to embedded figures tasks than matching figures tasks.  
However, whole processors use whole processing for the matching figures tasks but 
are forced to use part processing on the embedded figures tasks and are labelled 
wholists because they are more proficient when employing a whole processing 
strategy. 
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In order to explore this asymmetry the number of constituent shapes in the complex 
geometric figures was varied from three to five; part processing five-part figures 
should take proportionately longer than part processing three-part figures but whole 
processing five-part figures should not take proportionately longer than whole 
processing three-part figures.  Therefore those that took proportionately longer to 
process five-part matching figure items in comparison to three-part matching figure 
items must have employed part processing but those who did not take 
proportionately longer must have employed whole processing. 
 
The matching figure five to three part ratio or „part-whole ratio‟ was calculated based 
on the ratio of the median reaction time to three-part compared to five-part matching 
figure items.  Lower ratios indicate proportionately larger increases in speed of 
processing five-parts to three-part figures and which will provide indirect evidence of 
part processing.   
 
9.3.4  The Part-Whole ratio will be significantly lower for analytic individuals 
than wholist individuals 
 
A one-way ANOVA was employed to examine the effect of wholist-analytic style on 
the part-whole ratio and there was a significant effect of wholist-analytic style on the 
part-whole ratio (F 2, 195 = 3.118, p = .046).  Wholist, intermediate and analytic 
group means were 0.81, 0.80 and 0.76, respectively, see Figure 9.8.   
 
To give a clearer picture of the effect illustrated in Figure 9.8, the scale used begins 
at .60 which represents and individual whose processing time increased consistently 
with the number of parts in the figure, for example if it took 6 seconds to disembed 
the simple shape from a complex figure made up of 3 parts then it would take 10 
seconds to perform the same task on a complex figure consisting of 5 parts.  At the 
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other end of the scale, a ratio of one means that the same time was taken to process 
the five-part figures and the three-part figures.  
 
 
Figure 9.8: Mean part-whole ratios by wholist-analytic style 
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Figure 9.9: 95% confidence intervals for mean part-whole ratios by wholist-
analytic style 
 
Post hoc tests revealed that analytics had lower ratios than wholists and this 
difference approached significance (p = .070) suggesting that the processing of 5 part 
figures slowed their processing speeds more than it did for the wholists, with a 
moderate effect size of d = .41 
 
Based on 95% confidence intervals, the population means for wholists and 
intermediates would be expected to be between .77 and .84, respectively, suggesting 
that it would take them between 17.5% and 29% longer, respectively, to process 5 
part figures than 3 part figures.  Analytics would be expected to take on average 28% 
- 38% longer to complete the 5 part figure tasks than the 3 part figures, see figure 9.9 
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The construct validity of the part-whole ratio relies on the fact that there should not 
be a similar ratio difference between wholists and analytics on the ratio derived from 
the embedded figures tasks.  If the embedded figure ratio did discriminate between 
wholists and analytics in the same way as the part-whole ratio did then the difference 
could be attributed to the increased complexity which was introduced by the five-part 
figures. Therefore, a second ratio was calculated which reflected the median reaction 
time to three-part compared to five-part embedded figure items. 
 
9.3.5 There will be no significant difference between the embedded figure 
ratios of wholist and analytic individuals  
 
A second one-way ANOVA was performed to examine the effect of wholist-analytic 
style on the embedded figures ratio.  There was no significant effect of cognitive 
style on the embedded figures ratio (F (2, 195) = 0.455, p = 0.635); this supports the 
notion that all participants are using part processing to complete the embedded 
figures items and is evidence for the construct validity of the part-whole ratio.   
 
The mean embedded figure ratios, for wholist, intermediate and analytic groups, 
were .92, .94 and .93 respectively, see Figure 9.10.  The mean ratios produced by all 
groups were between .92 and .94, which suggests that it took them approximately the 
same time to disembed from a three-part figure as it did from a five-part figure.  For 
example, a ratio of .93 shows that if it takes 6 seconds to disembed from a three-part 
figure, it only takes 6.45 seconds to perform the same task on the five-part figure. 
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Figure 9.10: Mean embedded figure ratios by wholist-analytic style 
 
There does appear to be an asymmetry in the processing being used by wholists and 
analytics suggesting that analytics are using part processing and wholists are using 
whole processing.  To explore this further three groups were created by making two 
equal cut points in the matching figure ratios; those producing the lowest ratios were 
labelled „Part processors‟, those in the intermediate groups were labelled 
„Intermediates‟, and those producing the highest ratios were labelled „Whole 
processors‟, see sample statistics in Table 9.6.  There was no significant difference in 
age (F 2, 194 = 1.860, p = .158) or sex (X² = 2.425, p = .298) between the groups.  
 
Given the influence of subtest presentation order on the wholist-analytic ratio it is 
important to establish that the part-whole style ratio is not sensitive to the same 
confounds.  Based on 95% confidence intervals the figure below shows the effect of 
Part-Whole processing style on the Wholist-Analytic ratio for both versions of the 
WAS Analysis. 
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Table 9.6: Age and summary part-whole ratio statistics 
 
Processing Style Mean 
Age  
Matching Figures Ratio Statistics 
Mean Min. Max. Std. Dev 
Part Processors 23.11 .65 .47 .71 .06 
Intermediates 22.12 .78 .71 .84 .04 
Whole processors 21.02 .93 .85 1.12 .07 
 
 
 
Figure 9.11: 95% confidence intervals for mean wholist-analytic ratios by part-
whole processing style 
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Figure 9.11 shows that part processors are the most analytic, followed by the 
intermediates and then the Whole processors.  As is to be expected, all the groups 
produced higher ratios in the WAS-WA but more importantly the pattern of results 
remains consistent across the versions suggesting that it is not influenced by the 
confounds of reflective-impulsive style.  
 
Using the part-whole processing ratio, the notion that part processors are reflective 
and whole processors are impulsive was explored.  A chi-squared test showed a 
significant association between the part processors and the reflective individuals and 
the whole processors and the impulsive individuals (X² = 20.164, p < .001), see the 
cross tabulated data in Table 9.7 (expected count in brackets). 
 
Table 9.7: Frequency of reflective-part processors and impulsive-whole 
processors 
 
Style 
Groups 
Part Processors Intermediates Whole 
Processors 
Total 
Impulsive 9 (20.1) 22 (19.7) 28 (19.2) 59 
Reflective 33 (21.9) 19 (21.3) 12 (20.8) 64 
Total 42 41 40 123 
 
There were 34% more reflective, part processors than expected by chance and 42% 
fewer reflective, whole processors than would be expected.  Similarly, there were 
55% fewer impulsive, part processors than would be expected and 46% more 
impulsive, whole processors than would be expected. 
 
A t-test echoed these results showing that reflective participants had significantly 
lower part-whole ratios than impulsive participants (t = 4.471, p < .0001, df = 121, 
means of .74 and .84, respectively). 
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In order to emphasise the validity of these findings, there is no similar difference 
between reflective and impulsive individuals on their embedded figure ratios, both 
groups produced mean ratios of .95 (t = .239, p = .406, df = 120.96, equal variances 
not assumed) and no association between reflective-impulsive individuals and those 
producing high, intermediate and low embedded figures ratios (X² = 2.351, p = .309).    
This supports the notion that the link between reflective-impulsive individuals and 
their part-whole processing styles are based on part whole differences and not merely 
an artefact of increasing the complexity of the figures by including more constituent 
parts. 
 
The final hypothesis addressed the increased complexity introduced by the 
manipulation of three and five-part geometric figures. 
 
9.3.6 All participants will produce longer latencies to the five-part figures 
because of the increase complexity of the 5 part figures; therefore, 
processing times for 5 part figures should be greater than for 3 part 
figures irrespective of cognitive style. 
 
There is of course likely to be some increase in response latency as a result of 
processing the more complex five-part figures than the less complex three- part 
figures but this increase is predicted to effect all participants and would not be 
limited to a particular style. 
 
A series of paired t-tests confirmed that wholist, intermediate and analytic 
participants; reflective, impulsive, slow and fast participants; and part processors, 
intermediate processors and whole processors all had significantly longer mean 
latencies to trials involving five-part figures than three-part figures (p < .001 for all 
tests, Bonferroni corrected, p < .05 corrected to p < .005).   
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9.4 Discussion 
 
The wholist-analytic ratio is extremely sensitive to the order in which the matching 
figure and embedded figure subtests are presented.  There is a general tendency for 
respondents to produce slower median reaction times in the first subtest and faster 
times in the second subtest.  This has the effect of increasing the wholist-analytic 
ratio when the matching figures section is presented first and decreasing the ratio 
when the embedded figures section is presented first.  The implication of this finding 
is that since the CSA always presents the matching figure subtest first, respondents 
will produce inflated ratios and therefore appear more analytic.  This explains 
Riding‟s consistent finding that the population as a whole is skewed toward being 
more analytic and the mean ratio is 1.25 (Riding, 1998; 2005) 
 
9.4.1 The influence of reflective-impulsive style on the wholist-analytic ratio 
 
More interesting, however, is the systematic difference, which emerged between 
individuals characterised as having a reflective or impulsive style. 
 
Reflective individuals were identified by their relatively slower median response 
latencies and their greater accuracy.  The tendency to produce slower median 
reaction times to the first subtest was greater amongst the reflective group and 
resulted in reflective individuals appearing more analytic   when the matching figures 
section was presented first.  It is important to note, however, that when the embedded 
figures section was presented first there was no significant difference between the 
wholist-analytic ratios of reflective and impulsive individuals.  The findings suggest 
that the wholist-analytic ratio is influenced by individual differences in reflective-
impulsive approaches and part-whole processing style.    
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It appears that when the matching figures subtest is presented first, as in the WAS-
WA version of the WAS analysis and in the CSA (Riding, 1991),  the differences 
between analytic and wholist styles are amplified by concomitant differences in 
reflective-impulsive style, for example individuals with an analytic style and a 
concomitant reflective approach will be relatively faster in the second subtest by 
virtue of the order of presentation and the nature of the task.  Conversely, when the 
embedded figures section is presented first, differences between analytic and wholist 
styles are cancelled out by the concomitant differences in reflective-impulsive style, 
for example, an analytic style would produce relatively faster responses to the first 
subtest by virtue of the nature of the task but a concomitant reflective approach 
would produce faster responses to the second subtest by virtue of the order of 
presentation.  
 
It seems that the reliance on differential speed and the problems relating to the order 
of subtest presentation confounds the wholist-analytic ratio with the influence of 
reflective-impulsive style.  When the wholist section is presented first, as it is in the 
CSA (Riding, 1991), the confounding influence inflates the wholist and analytic 
differences in a way, which is consistent with Ridings‟ theoretical assumption that 
part processors will have a reflective style and whole processors will have an 
impulsive style. 
 
Two future approaches may adequately control for the influence of reflective style.  
The first is to use a measurement of wholist-analytic style, which does not involve 
processing speed or accuracy as the basis of the measurement.  For instance, 
completion of embedded figures and matching figures tasks could be conducted 
whilst using apparatus, which would track eye movements.  This would be a more 
direct measure of the tendency to use part or whole processing.  The second option, 
and perhaps the most practical alternative, would be to adapt the existing 
measurement, employing counterbalancing methods in a similar fashion to those 
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used for the verbaliser-imager dimension of the CSA.  Rather than presenting 
matching figure items and embedded figure items in different subsections, the two 
task types could be randomly presented within the same section.  In this way a 
tendency to produce slower processing speeds at the beginning of the test would 
affect the speed of processing matching figure items and embedded figure items 
alike.  
 
These results question the validity of the wholist-analytic dimension measure of the 
wholist-analytic dimension, providing evidence that the present methodology of the 
CSA renders the wholist-analytic ratio very sensitive to the influence of reflective-
impulsive style and to order effects.  However, the research does provide some 
support for Riding‟s theoretical assumption that analytic-wholist style is likely to 
correlate with similar constructs, i.e. reflective-impulsive style, thus providing 
support for the validity of the wholist-analytic construct if not the measure. 
 
9.4.2 A processing asymmetry in the wholist-analytic ratio 
 
The manipulation of the number of constituent parts in the embedded figures stimuli 
was intended to assess whether there was an asymmetry in the nature of the 
processing used by respondents.  It was suggested that if there was no significant 
difference in the extent to which the more complex figures reduced the processing 
speed of wholists and analytics, then the wholist-analytic ratio would appear to be 
based on the individual‟s capacity to whole process matching figure items and part 
process embedded figures items.  However, if the increase in constituent parts of the 
matching figure items slowed down the analytic individuals more than the wholist 
individuals then this would suggest that the analytic individuals were part processing 
the matching figure items whilst wholists were whole processing these items.  No 
difference was expected between the degrees to which analytics were slowed down 
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on the embedded figure items compared to the wholists because the embedded 
figures test is assumed to necessitate part processing.  
 
As predicted there was no significant effect of wholist-analytic style on the 
embedded figures ratio suggesting that all participants were using part processing to 
complete the embedded figures tasks.  There was, however a significant effect of 
wholist-analytic style on the matching figures ratio; the increase in the numbers of 
parts in the complex geometric figures slowed down the analytic participants 
significantly more than the wholists or intermediates suggesting that the wholists and 
intermediates used whole processing but the analytics used part processing to 
complete the matching figures tasks. 
 
There does, therefore, appear to be an asymmetry in the nature of processing used by 
analytics and wholists, which reduces the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio.  
Wholists and intermediates use whole processing for the matching figures tasks and 
part processing for the embedded figures tasks.  This is an ideal situation since their 
ratios are based on their ability to whole process against their ability to part process, 
which is the fundamental characteristic of wholist-analytic style.  Where the problem 
lies is with the analytics; they use part processing for the matching figures and the 
embedded figures task and therefore their ratios are based on the relative efficacy of 
a part processing strategy across tasks.  The solution would be to find a task to 
replace the matching figures trials that would force the analytics to use whole 
processing, but this is likely to be more difficult than it sounds.   
 
Whilst the part-whole processing ratio has highlighted an asymmetry in the wholist-
analytic ratio, it has also indirectly demonstrated that analytics and wholists do have 
a preferred processing style and that given the opportunity wholists will use whole 
processing and analytics will use part processing.  This is the central premise of 
Riding‟s wholist-analytic dimension despite the fact that the existence of such a 
difference has not been demonstrated sufficiently in the literature.  This provides 
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further support for the construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension but again 
casts doubt on the wholist-analytic ratio calculation, as does the reported link 
between the part-whole ratio and reflective-impulsive style. 
 
It was found that reflective individuals were more often than expected classified as 
part processors and impulsive individuals were more often classified as whole 
processors.  Reflective individuals also had significantly lower part-whole ratios than 
wholists or intermediates suggesting that the reflective individuals are also part 
processors.  This relationship is not an artefact of speed of processing because the 
ratio calculation prevents that and it is not an artefact of the increased complexity of 
the five-part figures because the effect was not seen with the embedded figures ratio.   
 
The part-whole ratio discriminates between those who are part processing and those 
who are whole processing and is not confounded by order effects nor is it sensitive to 
reflective-impulsive style as the wholist-analytic ratio is, however, it does not offer a 
working alternative to the wholist-analytic ratio.  The part-whole ratio was designed 
to expose an asymmetry and having done that the recommended action would be to 
eradicate that asymmetry thereby increasing the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio.  
The part-whole ratio only discriminates between analytics and wholists whilst the 
asymmetry exists; further, even if the asymmetry remains the part-whole ratio only 
measures one end of the dimension, a tendency to part or whole process analytic 
items.  The part-whole ratio is a research tool, not a viable alternative to the wholist-
analytic ratio.  However, it has demonstrated a ratio method, which is not by 
accuracy, speed and order effects and has provided evidence for the construct 
validity of the wholist-analytic dimension whilst casting doubt on the validity of the 
wholist-analytic ratio method. 
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9.5 Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
The wholist-analytic ratio has been shown to be sensitive to reflective-impulsive 
style and part-whole processing styles and a link between reflective-impulsive style 
and part-processing style has been demonstrated.  
 
The influence of reflective-impulsive style on the wholist-analytic ratio stems from 
the lack of counterbalancing of the matching figure and embedded figure subtests.  
This finding casts doubt on the validity of the CSA in its current form and suggests 
that the discriminatory power of the wholist-analytic dimension may be attributed to 
the differences in reflective-impulsive style rather than differences in part-whole 
processing. 
 
The ability of the wholist-analytic ratio to measure part-whole processing is further 
reduced by an asymmetry in the nature of processing being compared amongst 
analytics and wholists.  Analytics are being compared based on the efficacy of a part 
processing strategy across congruent and incongruent tasks and the wholists are 
being more appropriately compared by their relative ability to whole process and part 
process. 
 
The influence of reflective style can be rectified by a revision of the CSA to include 
effective counterbalancing but the asymmetry will be more difficult to address; a 
whole processing task is required to replace the existing matching figures task, which 
does not allow for the use of a part processing strategy. 
 
Whilst the wholist-analytic ratio has been demonstrated to have low validity, the 
construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension has been supported.  Evidence 
has been provided that wholists and analytics are characterised by a tendency to 
whole process and part process, respectively, and part and whole processing has been 
linked with reflective and impulsive approaches, respectively.   
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The next chapter examines the effect of reflective-impulsive style, demonstrated 
here, on the reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension, testing the explanation put 
forward in Chapter five that the theory of diminished reflection can account for the 
low temporal reliability, which has been reported in the literature.  
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Chapter 10: 
 
Testing the Effect of Diminished Reflection 
On the Reliability of the Wholist-Analytic Ratio 
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Chapter 10: Testing the effect of diminished reflection on the 
reliability of the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
10.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
The sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to individual differences in reflective-
impulsive style, which was theorised in Chapter four and demonstrated in Chapter 
nine, will diminish with subsequent test sessions.  This theory of diminished 
reflection was postulated in Chapter five and will be tested here. 
 
The theory of diminished reflection argues that the characteristic tendency of 
reflective individuals to approach early test items with caution during situations of 
uncertainty will diminish when tested on a subsequent occasion because prior 
experience of the trials leads to reduced uncertainty and a reduction in reflective 
behaviour.  The diminishing effect of reflective style will reduce the stability of the 
ratios between the test and retest sessions.  This leads to four hypotheses, outlined in 
11.1.1, 11.1.2, 11.1.3 and 11.1.4, respectively. 
 
10.1.1 When the matching figure subtest is presented first, the diminishing 
effect of reflective style will cause analytic individuals to produce lower 
analytic ratios at retest.   
 
In the WAS-WA, the CSA (Riding, 1991) and the replica and parallel forms of the 
CSA, the CSA-A and CSA-B (Peterson et al., 2003), the matching figure trials are 
presented first followed by the embedded figure trials; participants with a reflective 
style and participants with a part processing style will be slowest during the matching 
figure test items at the first test session and will therefore produce analytic ratios.  
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Reflective-part processors will produce inflated analytic ratios at the first test session 
owing to the influence of their part processing style and their reflective style.   
 
At the second test session the effect of reflective style will diminish, part processors 
will still produce analytic ratios but the ratios will not be inflated by concomitant 
reflective style characteristics.  Therefore, those who were labelled as analytic at the 
first session because of their complimentary reflective and part processing style will 
produce lower wholist-analytic ratios at the retest session because the retest ratio will 
be based on their part processing style and not on their reflective style.   The effect of 
diminished reflection can be further illustrated by the greater impact it will have on 
the wholist-analytic ratio when the subtest order is reversed. 
 
10.1.2 When the embedded figure subtest is presented first, the diminishing 
effect of reflective style cause reflective individuals to swing from 
producing wholist ratios to producing analytic ratios. 
 
In the WAS-AW the embedded figures subtest is presented first, therefore, reflective 
individuals will be slower at the embedded figures tasks because these tasks appear 
at the beginning of the test and part processors will be slower at the matching figures 
items because these items are more suited to whole processing.  Consequently, the 
concomitant tendency to be both reflective and a part processor will be in conflict. 
 
This means that many of the participants labelled as wholists at the first sitting are 
actually reflective individuals who were relatively slower at the embedded figure 
items than the matching figure items because the embedded figures trials were 
presented earlier in the test not because of differences in whole or part processing 
tendencies.  The influence of reflective style will again diminish at the retest session 
and the reflective individuals, who had previously been labelled as wholist, will 
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produce more analytic ratios because their concomitant part processing style is no 
longer in conflict with their reflective style. 
 
This theory can also account for the relatively higher temporal reliability of 
Petersons C-CSA.  This extended eighty-item test presents the wholist and analytic 
subtests twice by combining the replica form CSA-A and the parallel form CSA-B.  
If a respondent completes the CSA-A first and then after a 5 minute break completes 
the CSA-B then the CSA-A is likely to be influenced by reflective style as described 
above and this effect will be diminished in CSA-B because the response uncertainty 
has diminished.  This could account for the lack of relationship reported by Peterson 
between the CSA-A and the CSA-B (r = 0.07).  When the two modified forms of the 
CSA are combined to form the C-CSA, the combined measure is less influenced by 
the effect of reflective style at the first test session and will therefore produce 
improved correlations at retest. 
 
Based on the above the WAS Analysis has made a number of improvements to the 
wholist-analytic ratio methodology which will reduce the influence of reflective style 
and therefore improve the temporal reliability.   
 
10.1.3 The improved methodology of the WAS analysis will reduce the 
influence of reflective-impulsive style at the first test session and 
therefore temporal stability should be greater for the WAS-WA than for 
the CSA, the CSA-A and the CSA-B.   
 
The WAS analyses have been improved in two ways; there has been a change to the 
standardised instructions to remove the bias towards speed or accuracy and practice 
items prior to each subtest.   
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The effect of speed and accuracy instructions on test-retest reliability 
 
Rezaei and Katz (2004) reported the highest test-retest reliability when speed was 
emphasised at the outset of the CSA.  This verbal instruction to focus on speed is 
likely to temper the standardised computer presented instructions at the beginning of 
the wholist subtest that state “work carefully to ensure accuracy”. 
 
The CSA‟s instructions, which encourage caution and accuracy, will reinforce 
reflective tendencies to carefully consider each response to ensure accuracy.  Rezaei 
and Katz (2004) additional verbal instructions, which emphasised speed, have to 
some extent reduced reflective tendencies and increased their rate of responding to 
the first subtest which can account for the higher temporal reliability reported. 
 
The WAS analysis emphasises both speed and accuracy, presenting balanced and 
consistent instructions before and throughout the test.  Verbal instructions at the 
outset of the test state “Work as quickly and accurately as you can” and onscreen 
instructions at the beginning of each subtest state “please respond as quickly and 
accurately as you can to each item”.   
 
These instructions remove the bias, which is present in the CSA which encourages 
caution and accuracy at the start of the matching figures section but not at the outset 
of the embedded figures subtest. 
 
The modified instructions create a more consistent approach across both subtests, 
which will reduce the tendency of reflective participants to cautiously respond to the 
matching figure items relative to the embedded figure items.  The modifications 
should improve the temporal stability of the wholist-analytic ratio because they 
reduce the influence of reflective style on the wholist-analytic ratio at the first test 
session. 
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The effect of practice items on test-retest reliability 
  
The WAS analysis introduces 4 practice items at the outset of each subtest.  Two of 
the practice items are 3 part figures and two are 5 part figures; one item in each pair 
requires an affirmative response and the other requires a negative response.  The 
opportunity to complete the practice items will reduce some of the uncertainty 
surrounding the tasks and since uncertainty encourages reflection the practice items 
should serve to reduce the influence of reflective style at the first test session and 
therefore improve temporal reliability across test and retest sessions.  
 
The expected increase in temporal reliability stems from the improved validity of the 
measure at the first test session.  The revised methodology of the WAS analysis 
reduces the confounding influence of reflective-impulsive style.  The practice items 
before each subtest will reduce the reflective tendency to respond cautiously to early 
trial items and the consistent instructions will ensure that reflective individuals are 
equally likely to focus on accuracy or speed across both subtests.  By reducing the 
influence of reflective style the wholist-analytic ratio is a more valid measure of part-
whole processing differences.  The increased validity will be demonstrated by 
improved internal consistency.   
 
10.1.4 Internal consistency will be greater for the WAS-WA than for the CSA, 
the CSA-A and the CSA-B 
 
Unfortunately, the CSA does not provide individual item data, therefore, the split 
half reliability of the WAS analysis will be compared to the internal consistency of 
the modified forms of the CSA reported by Peterson et al. (2003).  They used a 
sample of 50 participants sitting the test for the first time and performed split half 
reliability test by comparing the odd responses against the evens.  The CSA-A 
produced a split half reliability of 0.62 and the CSA-B produced a reliability of 0.56 
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but the highest consistency was obtained when the CSA-A and the CSA-B were 
combined.  The combination of parallel and replica forms was referred to as the C-
CSA, now called the E-CSA (Peterson and Deary, 2006), and achieved split half 
reliability of 0.69.   
 
10.2 Method   
 
10.2.1 Participants and materials 
 
193 undergraduates completed the WAS analysis at the first test session (sample 
described in Chapter nine).  Two months later, 89 students from the same cohort 
completed the WAS analysis at the second test session.  23 of the 89 participants had 
not been present during the first test session and 11 participants completed different 
versions of the WAS analysis at each test session so their results were discarded.   
 
The remaining sample of 55 participants included 27 who completed the WAS-AW 
during both test sessions and 28 who completed the WAS-WA. There was no 
significant difference between the age and sex for samples in each test condition (t =-
.338, df = 53, p = .737 and X² = .007, df = 1, p = .931, respectively), see figure 10.1 
for a breakdown. 
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Table 10.1: Participants Age and Sex  
 
 
Test Condition 
 
N 
 
Sex  
 
Mean Age 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
WAS-AW 
 
27 
 
8M, 19F 
 
22.26 yrs 
 
7.84 yrs 
 
WAS-WA 
 
28 
 
8M, 20F 
 
21.68 yrs 
 
4.55 yrs 
  
10.2.2 Procedure 
 
At the first test session the experimenter visited all first and second year research 
methods workshops during a one-week period (five, first year workshops and three, 
second year workshops), all students present were invited to take part in a research 
study for course credit.  The workshops were labelled 1-8; the WAS-WA was 
completed during odd numbered workshops and the WAS-AW was completed 
during even numbered workshops.   
 
Two months later, at the second test session workshops were revisited and all 
students present were invited to complete the WAS analysis for a second time.  The 
WAS-WA and the WAS-AW were again completed during odd and even numbered 
workshops, respectively, thereby ensuring that the majority of students took the same 
version of the test at the first and second sitting. 
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10.3 Results  
 
10.3.1 When the matching figure subtest is presented first, the diminishing 
effect of reflective style will cause analytic individuals to produce lower 
analytic ratios at retest.   
 
A multivariate ANOVA was employed with wholist-analytic style at session one as 
the between subjects variable (three levels; wholist, intermediate, analytic) and test 
session as the within subjects variable (two levels; test and retest).   
 
A significant main effect of style was found (F 1, 15 = 10.441, p = .001), Bonferroni 
post hoc tests confirmed that those labelled as wholist at the first test session were 
more wholist overall than intermediates (p = .015) and analytics (p = .001) when 
both sessions were considered; the intermediates and the analytics did not 
significantly differ in their style across both sessions (p = .113); means of 0.91 for 
wholists, 1.16 for intermediates and 1.31 for analytics. 
 
A significant main effect of test session was found (F 1, 15 = 4.844, p = .044) 
indicating that mean ratios were lower at the second test session, with means of 1.18 
at the first session and 1.06.  Interestingly the mean at the first session was skewed 
towards being more analytic and is comparable to the population sample data for the 
CSA of 1.25 (Riding, 1998, 2005) but the mean at the second subtest is closer to the 
perfect ratio mean of 1 suggesting that the population is not generally more analytic 
and when wholist-analytic style is measured without the confounding influence of 
reflective-impulsive style the population mean may be closer to one. 
 
In relation to the hypothesis, significant interaction was found between style and test 
session (F 2, 15 = 6.603, p = .009); a series of post hoc paired t-tests revealed that the 
analytics produced significantly lower ratios at the retest session, means of 1.49 and 
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1.13 (p = .021, Bonferroni corrected p < 0.03).  Whereas the intermediates and 
wholists did not produce significantly different means at retest, means of 1.12 and 
1.19 for intermediates (p = .335) and means of 0.94 and 0.87 (p = .510).  Therefore 
the hypothesis was supported, when the matching figure subtest was presented first, 
the diminishing effect of reflective style caused analytic individuals to produce lower 
analytic ratios at retest.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Mean test and retest wholist-analytic ratios by style 
 
It is clear from Figure 10.1 that it is the analytics that are the greatest source of 
instability from test to retest.  The analytics produced the greatest variation in ratios 
compared to the intermediates and wholists (.269 compared to .038 and .041, 
respectively); this pattern persisted even when the ratios were logarithmically 
transformed to remove the effect of higher ratios creating greater variation (variances 
of .022 compared to .005 and .009.   
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Pearson correlations revealed that the test-retest reliability of the WAS-WA was .442 
(p = .009, N = 28).  Using the transformed ratios Pearson correlations were 
performed to find the test-retest reliability by cognitive style.  The findings suggest 
that the source of the instability is those classed as analytics at the first session, with 
a test-retest correlation of r = -.075 and those classed as intermediates (r = .1).  The 
wholists produced a stable test-retest correlation of .795 (p = .029). 
 
Figure 10.2 illustrates participant ratios at the first test session in comparison to the 
ratio at the second test session; the cognitive style label derived from the first session 
identifies participants as wholist, intermediates or analytics. 
 
 
Markers: +(Analytics); o (Intermediates); x (Wholists). Cut Points at 1.05 and 1.33 
represent threshold between analytic, intermediate and wholist categories for the WAS-WA. 
Figure 10.2: Comparison of test and retest wholist-analytic ratios for the WAS-
WA 
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Figures 10.3 and 10.4 clearly show the diminishing effect of reflective style across 
test quarters and across test sessions. 
 
 
Figure 10.3: Test session mean latencies for each test quarter by wholist-
analytic style 
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Figure 10.4: Re-test session mean latencies for each test quarter by wholist-
analytic style 
 
It is predicted that that the WAS-AW will be less stable than the WAS-WA because 
the diminishing effect of reflective style at retest will have a greater impact on the 
WAS-AW because the embedded figures subtest is presented first. 
 
10.3.2 When the embedded figure subtest is presented first, the diminishing 
effect of reflective style cause reflective individuals to swing from 
producing wholist ratios to producing analytic ratios. 
 
A multivariate ANOVA was employed with wholist-analytic style at session one as 
the between subjects variable (three levels; wholist, intermediate, analytic) and test 
session as the within subjects variable (two levels; test and retest).   
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There was no significant main effect of style (F 2, 20 = 2.789, p = .085) and no 
significant main effect of test session (F 1, 20 = 2.592, p = .123).  This means that 
those labelled as wholists, intermediates and analytics, did not produce significantly 
different ratios overall, means of 0.96, 1.02 and 1.11, respectively; and there was no 
significant difference between the overall mean ratios produced at test and retest, 
means of 0.98 and 1.08, respectively. 
 
There was significant interaction between style and test session (F 2, 20 = 4.923, p = 
.018) with wholists and intermediates producing more analytic ratios at re-test and 
analytics producing more wholist ratios.  The wholists produced the greatest change; 
shifting from a mean of 0.88 at the test session to 1.11 and produced the greatest 
ratio variance of .112 compared to .055 for intermediates and .045 for analytics, 
providing some support for the hypothesis that reflective individuals labelled as 
wholists at the first test session will shift to analytic ratios at the re-test session. 
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Figure 10.5: Mean test and retest wholist-analytic ratios by style 
 
As predicted the WAS-AW is less stable than the WAS-WA (-.204, p = .153 
compared to .442, p = .009).  This is convincing evidence that the order of 
presentation of the wholist and analytic subtests can fundamentally affect the 
stability of the wholist-analytic ratio, since the WAS-AW and the WAS-WA are 
identical in every other respect.  
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Markers: + (Analytics); o (Intermediates); x (Wholists). Cut Points at 0.88 and 1.05 
represent threshold between analytic, intermediate and wholist categories for the WAS-WA. 
 
Figure 10.6: Comparison of test and retest wholist-analytic ratios for the WAS-
WA 
 
10.3.3 The improved methodology of the WAS analysis will reduce the 
influence of reflective-impulsive style at the first test session and 
therefore temporal stability should be greater for the WAS-WA than for 
the CSA, the CSA-A and the CSA-B.   
 
The improved methodology of the WAS analysis should reduce the influence of 
reflective-impulsive style at the first test session thereby improving temporal stability 
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of the WAS-WA.  Test retest reliability coefficients are expected to be higher for the 
WAS-WA than those reported in the literature for the CSA-WA and modified 
versions of the CSA-WA. 
 
The WAS-WA achieved a test-retest reliability coefficient of .442.  This exceeds the 
0.30 reported for the CSA-A and the 0.31 reported for the CSA-B (Peterson et al, 
2003).  It also exceeds the 0.33 and 0.34 reported by Parkinson et al (2004) and the 
0.30 reported by Cook (2008) for the unmodified CSA.  The WAS-WA exceeds the 
stability of the CSA reported by Rezaei and Katz (2004) using the one-week interval 
(r = 0.42) and is similar to the stability reported at the one-month interval (r = 0.45). 
 
The WAS-WA was not as stable as the CSA using a one month interval when the 
instructions were manipulated to emphasise speed (r = 0.55, Rezaei and Katz, 2004) 
or the extended measure, the C-CSA, reported as r = 0.53 with a one week interval 
(Peterson et al, 2004).   
 
10.3.4 Internal consistency will be greater for the WAS-WA than for the CSA, 
the CSA-A and the CSA-B 
 
Using a split half method, two ratios were calculated based on the odd and even trial 
items.  Care was taken to ensure that each ratio calculation included the same number 
of yes/no responses and 3/5 part figures.  There are ten items of each type therefore, 
ratio 1 consisted of the odd numbered items in each set of ten and ratio 2 consisted of 
the even numbered items; this is illustrated in Table 10.2. 
 
Split half reliability statistics were calculated for both versions of the WAS analysis.  
The WAS-WA and the WAS-AW produced satisfactory split half reliability 
coefficients of 0.70 and 0.72.   
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Table 10.2: Split half reliability – Item breakdown 
 
Item type Ratio 1: 
Items used 
Ratio 2: 
Items used 
10 Matching figure items, 3 
part, ‘yes’ response 
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Matching figure items   3 
part, ‘no’ response 
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Matching figure items   5 
part, ‘yes’ response 
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Matching figure items   5 
part, ‘no’ response  
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Embedded figure items, 3 
part, ‘yes’ response 
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Embedded figure items, 3 
part, ‘no’ response 
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Embedded figure items, 5 
part, ‘yes’ response 
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
10 Embedded figure items, 5 
part, ‘no’ response  
1,3,5,7,9 2,4,6,8,10 
 
 
There are no reported internal consistency figures for the CSA so the only internal 
consistency figures to which the WAS analysis may be compared are those reported 
by Peterson et al (2003).  Both versions of the WAS analysis were more stable than 
Petersons replica form of the CSA, the CSA-A (r = 0.62) and the parallel form of the 
CSA, the CSA-B, (r = 0.56).  The greatest consistency was obtained when the CSA-
A and the CSA-B were combined to form the C-CSA.  This extended test achieved a 
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reliability of 0.69, making it marginally less stable than the WAS-WA and the WAS-
AW.  
 
 
10.4 Discussion 
 
10.4.1 The diminishing effect of reflective style on the stability of the WAS-WA 
and the WAS-AW 
 
The WAS-AW and the WAS-WA both demonstrate good internal stability with split 
half correlation coefficients of 0.70 and 0.72, respectively.  However, when temporal 
stability is compared, the WAS-WA is moderately stable at r = 0.44 but the WAS-
AW is not stable producing a non-significant, weak, negative correlation of -.204. 
 
The source of reduced stability in the WAS-WA 
 
The theory of diminished reflective style predicted that the source of instability in the 
WAS-WA would be the analytic group who, with the diminished influence of 
reflective style, produce less analytic ratios at retest.  The findings were consistent 
with the theory; the test-retest correlations suggest that both the analytic and the 
intermediate group produced unstable test-retest ratios of -.075 and .1.  As expected 
the wholists produced a stable test-retest correlation of .795. 
 
The source of instability in the WAS-AW 
 
It was further predicted that the diminished influence of reflective style would have a 
greater impact on the stability of the WAS-AW and the source of the instability 
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would be the wholist group shifting from wholist to analytic order ratios.  This was 
supported by the negative test-retest ratio of -.561 produced by the wholists.   
 
Some unexpected findings were that the analytic and intermediate groups also 
produced unstable test-retest correlations of -.2 and -.108, respectively.  This is 
relatively easy to explain for the intermediates since some of the intermediates are 
likely to have a reflective style; the necessarily arbitrary 30% cut off point is likely to 
create an overlap with a proportion of the reflective respondents being labelled as 
intermediates.  The wholist and intermediate groups are likely to be a mixture of 
reflective respondents and true wholists, therefore at retest the wholists will produce 
similar ratios as they did in session one and the reflective respondents will produce 
more analytic ratios.   
 
It is more difficult to explain why the analytic participants produced unstable ratios; 
the analytic group are likely to consist of part processors who do not have a 
concomitant reflective style or they are intermediates, who were placed in the highest 
30% ratios because, in relation to the reflective participants and the wholist 
participants, they did produce higher ratios.  It is possible that a proportion of those 
classed as analytic at the first session have a weak concomitant reflective style. 
 
10.4.2 Comparing the temporal reliability of the WAS-WA with the CSA and 
similar modified forms of the CSA 
 
The theory of diminished reflective style predicts that the effect of reflective style 
will confound any measurement of wholist-analytic style that does not 
counterbalance the presentation order of wholist and analytic subtests.  The effect of 
reflective style will be present during the first test session and will diminish in 
subsequent sessions leading to reduced temporal reliability. 
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It follows then that any modified versions of the CSA, which successfully reduce the 
influence of reflective style at the first test session, will be expected to demonstrate 
improved temporal reliability.  
 
The WAS-WA has two methodological improvements that are intended to reduce the 
influence of reflective style; these are 1) the inclusion of bias free instructions, which 
emphasise both accuracy and speed, and 2) the inclusion of practice items to reduce 
uncertainty.  The WAS-WA should be more reliable from test to retest than the CSA 
and modified forms of the CSA that do not control for the influence of reflective 
style. 
 
The WAS-WA demonstrated moderate test-retest reliability of r = .44 and is 
therefore more stable over time than the unmodified CSA-WA, r = 0.33 and 0.34 
(Parkinson et al, 2004) and r = 0.30 (Cook, 2008); and, more stable than the replica 
and parallel forms of the CSA-WA, r = 0.30 and 0.31, respectively (Peterson et al, 
2003).  The changes in the WAS-WA methodology to reduce the influence of 
reflective style appear to have improved the test-retest reliability. 
 
The stability of the WAS-WA is comparable to the reliability coefficients reported 
by Rezaei and Katz (2004).  They tested an unmodified form of the CSA with a one 
week and a one month retest interval, reporting temporal reliability of r = 0.42 and 
0.45.  It is unclear whether Rezaei and Katz used ratio or category data for their test-
retest correlation; in the absence of a statement to the contrary it will be assumed that 
untransformed ratio data was used.  The CSA has been used without modification 
and yet has produced higher stability than previous reports of 0.30 to 0.34 with 
comparable test retest intervals.  With the limited information available regarding 
these reliability figures there is no real explanation for the improved stability.  It 
would have been useful to compare the ratio variances to assess whether there is any 
difference in the sample spread of ratios that would have an impact on the stability 
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but there is insufficient data reported by Rezaei and Katz (2004) to enable such 
analysis.  
 
It is unclear then whether the modifications to the WAS-WA have led to 
improvements in temporal stability; when compared with unmodified versions of the 
CSA it shows improvement over 4 out of 6 of the reported test-retest studies but 
demonstrates equivalent stability with the other two.  
 
The versions of the CSA which have greater stability than the WAS-WA are the 
modified CSA which emphasised speed, r = 0.55 (Rezaei and Katz, 2004) and the 
extended C-CSA which altered the order of presentation, r = 0.53 (Peterson et al, 
2003).  These findings are consistent with the theory of diminished reflectivity. 
 
The WAS-WA removed the biased instructions that are a feature of the CSA, which 
encourage reflective characteristics when approaching the wholist subtest, but not in 
relation to the analytic subtest.  The WAS-WA replaced them with consistent, 
balanced instructions, which emphasised accuracy and speed at the beginning of each 
subtest.  However, it appears that Rezaei and Katz approach, which biased 
instructions against reflective characteristics, is more effective in reducing the 
influence of reflective style.  This may account for the increased stability (r= .55) 
reported when overall speed was emphasised.  
 
The C-CSA also demonstrated greater stability than the WAS-WA and this is likely 
to be due to the changes in presentation order that is a feature of the C-CSA.  The C-
CSA was formed by combining the responses on the 40 item CSA-A, a replica 
version of the CSA, with the responses on the 40 item CSA-B, a parallel form of the 
CSA.  This post hoc treatment of the data was performed to examine the effect of 
increased trials on stability.  Since the C-CSA was developed from two tests it 
inevitably consisted of four subtests with a total of 80 trials; 20 matching figure trials 
followed by 20 embedded figure trials then, after a five minute break, a further 20 
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matching figure trials and 20 embedded figure trials.  The subtest presentation order 
was constant and preserved the order of the CSA but the repetition served to reduce 
the influence of reflective style and this can account for the improved stability at 
retest (r = 0.53).   
 
10.4.3 Internal consistency: Comparing the WAS-WA with Peterson’s modified 
versions of the CSA. 
 
There are no internal consistency data for the CSA because the individual items are 
not open to analysis, therefore the only statistics available for comparison with the 
WAS analysis is Peterson et al‟s (2003) CSA-A, CSA-B AND C-CSA.  Both the 
WAS-WA and the WAS-AW are internally stable, r = 0.72 and 0.70, respectively.  
They are more stable than the CSA-A (r = 0.62) and the CSA-B (r = 0.56) and are 
comparable to the stability reported for the C-CSA of r = 0.69.   
 
The greater internal stability of the WAS analyses and the C-CSA may be a 
statistical artefact of having double the items than that of the CSA-A and the CSA-B.  
This is good in terms of reliability but doesn‟t make them more valid than the shorter 
tests.  Alternately, the extended trials may better capture the differences in part-
whole processing and be less influenced by reflective style because the effect is 
lessened across a greater number of trials.  However, it is clear from the temporal 
reliability data that the WAS-WA and the WAS-AW is still confounded by 
reflective-impulsive style despite an improved methodology.  The WAS analyses and 
the C-CSA are internally stable but whether they are consistently measuring 
reflective-impulsive style or part-whole processing style is to be determined.   
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10.4.4 Conclusion 
 
The difference in temporal reliability between the WAS-WA and the WAS-AW 
illustrates the confounding effect of reflective style on the wholist-analytic ratio and 
the effect of diminishing reflectivity on test-retest stability.  The improvements to the 
WAS analyses methodology, the inclusion of practice items and unbiased 
instructions, which reduce the effect of reflective style at the first test session, have 
led to greater temporal stability than unmodified forms of the CSA. Creating a bias in 
the instructions to encourage overall speed improved stability further; however if 
satisfactory counterbalancing methods were put in place the influence of reflective 
style would be removed and instruction bias towards speed or accuracy would be 
redundant.   
 
The WAS-WA is moderately stable over time and internally consistent but it is not 
valid because it is confounded by reflective style.  The WAS analysis is not intended 
as an alternative to the CSA it is merely a tool for the purpose of demonstrating the 
inherent problems of any measure of wholist-analytic style which presents the 
wholist and analytic subtests without adequate counterbalancing measures. 
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Chapter 11: 
 
Testing the Unidimensional Theory  
of Wholist-Analytic Style – Part I 
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Chapter 11: Testing the unidimensional theory of wholist-analytic 
style – Part I 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
The construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension predicts that the wholist-
analytic dimension and other styles in the wholist-analytic family should correlate 
(Riding, 1991).  However, reviews in this area have reported a lack of correlational 
data to support the unitary perspective of style (Riding and Cheema, 1991).  In 
Chapter three it was demonstrated that the most consistent relationship reported in 
the literature has been between field independent-dependent style and reflective-
impulsive style, specifically when the childrens‟ embedded figures test has been used 
as the measure of field independent-dependent style.  
 
There is no correlational evidence linking convergent style with analytic style and no 
correlational evidence linking the wholist-analytic dimension to any of the five 
principal style dimensions, reflective-impulsive style, convergent-divergent style, 
field independent-dependent style, serial-holist style or leveller-sharpener style.  The 
dearth of supporting research has contributed to the move towards a more complex 
multidimensional view (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003) in favour of the 
unidimensional perspective (Riding and Cheema, 1991; Allinson and Hayes, 1996). 
 
The aim of the current study is to examine the relationship between the wholist-
analytic dimension and two sub-ordinate styles: reflective-impulsive style (Kagan et 
al., 1964) and convergent-divergent style (Hudson, 1967).    The construct validity of 
the wholist-analytic dimension predicts that analytic individuals should be more 
reflective and convergent and that wholist individuals should be more impulsive and 
divergent.  The wholist-analytic dimension will also be compared to the analytic-
intuitive dimension (Allinson and Hayes, 1996).  Since the analytic-intuitive 
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dimension represents a similar super ordinate global-analytic construct it is predicted 
that wholists should be more intuitive.   
 
One of the major problems, which confound the styles literature, is the tendency for 
style measures to be sensitive to the influence of other styles.  For this reason care 
has been taken to employ style measures which control for the influence of such 
confounding factors. 
 
11.1.1 Style Measurements 
 
Wholist-analytic Style 
 
Chapter nine demonstrated that the wholist-analytic dimension is confounded by 
sensitivity to reflective-impulsive style, which could lead to a difficulty in 
interpreting any emerging correlations with other styles in the wholist-analytic 
family.  Therefore, the WAS analysis will be employed here as the measure of 
wholist-analytic style rather than the CSA (Riding, 1991); whilst the WAS analysis is 
sensitive to both reflective-impulsive style and wholist-analytic style, because it is 
constructed in the same way as the CSA, it will be possible to obtain a clearer picture 
of the relationships at work by using both versions of the WAS analysis. 
 
The WAS-WA is expected to correlate with the other style measures; wholists will 
be more divergent, more impulsive and more intuitive which is consistent with the 
unitary perspective of style. 
 
The WAS-AW is predicted to have little or no relationship with the other measures; 
if a relationship emerges it will be in the opposite direction to that predicted by the 
literature; wholists will appear more reflective, convergent and analytic.  This is 
because the WAS-AW measures conflicting differences in wholist-analytic style and 
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reflective-impulsive style.  In the WAS-AW individuals who are slower at the early 
test items because of their reflective characteristics will acquire a wholist ratio.   
 
The part-whole ratio derived from the WAS analysis will also be compared to the 
other styles in the wholist-analytic family; Whole processors are expected to be more 
intuitive, divergent and impulsive.  The relationship between the part-whole ratio and 
the other measures of style should be consistent across the WAS analysis test 
versions because the part-whole ratio calculation is not affected by the same 
methodological limitations which have caused the sensitivity to reflective-impulsive 
style in the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
Reflective-Impulsive Style 
 
Reflective-impulsive style will be calculated based on the response latency to trials 
in the WAS analysis and the accuracy of the responses.  Reflective-impulsive 
characteristics are stable across a range of tasks and therefore can be measured by 
any novel task, which measures speed and accuracy (Nietfeld and Bosma, 2003) 
 
The Matching familiar figures test is the traditional measure of reflective-impulsive 
style but it will not be used here because of reports that the trial items are biased 
towards analytic processing (Zelniker and Jeffery, 1979), see Chapter eight.  The 
WAS analysis affords an opportunity to measure latency and accuracy in across 
analytic and global processing tasks thus removing the potential analytic bias 
associated with the matching familiar figures test. 
 
Convergent-Divergent Style 
 
The tests employed here have been extensively piloted (see Chapter seven) and they 
represent a valid measurement of convergent-divergent thinking.  They are free from 
the confounds with ability demonstrated by Al-Naeme, 1991 and Bahar and Hansell, 
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1999; and they consist of a selection of convergent items which have been 
specifically designed and tested to avoid bias toward analytic processing and the 
influence of prior knowledge and experience. 
 
Analytic-Intuitive Style 
 
Allinson and Hayes‟s (1996) Cognitive Style Index will be used to measure analytic-
intuitive style.  The CSI has been included here because it represents the most 
reliable and comparable measure of super ordinate style; it has demonstrated sound 
test retest reliability and internal reliability (Allinson and Hayes, 1996). 
 
11.2 Method 
11.2.1 Participants 
 
The sample consisted of 303 participants (75 male, 227 female, 1 not stated), which 
represented a full cohort of first and second year psychology students.  The sample 
mean age was 22.23 years with a standard deviation of 6.61 years; there was no 
significant difference in age between the sexes (Males 22.55 yrs, s.d. 6.68 yrs; 
females 22.12 yrs, s.d. 6.60 yrs).  
 
The students were approached over a period of five weeks during their weekly 
research methods classes and invited to complete the CSI, two convergent thinking 
tests (one verbal, one non-verbal), one divergent thinking test (the object uses test) 
and the WAS analysis.  The CSI was administered in the first week, the convergent 
and divergent tests were administered during the second week (presentation order 
was counterbalanced) and the WAS analysis was administered over a further two 
week period; in the final week students who were absent during any of the test 
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sessions were invited to complete any of the tests they had missed.  Students received 
partial course credit for participation.   
 
Of the total sample, 218 students completed the CSI (52 male, 166 female), with a 
mean age of 22.83 years and a standard deviation of 7.31 years (Males 22.85, 7.35; 
females 22.83, 7.32).   
 
199 completed the non-verbal convergent test (51 male, 148 female); 199 completed 
the verbal convergent test (57 male, 142 female); 146 participants completed both 
convergent thinking tests.  216 completed the divergent thinking test (56 male, 160 
female). 
 
To calculate a relative measure of convergent-divergent style respondents must 
obtain both a convergent and divergent score; 154 completed the verbal convergent 
test and the divergent test; 161 completed the analytic verbal test and the divergent 
test; 121 completed all three tests. 
130 participants completed the WAS analysis (35 male, 95 female), 117 of which 
had also completed the CSI, 101 had also completed at least one of the convergent 
tests plus the divergent test.  73 completed the entire battery of tests. 
 
11.2.2 Data Analysis 
 
To examine the relationship between the styles in the wholist-analytic family each 
measure was manipulated so that it produced a score in the form of a continuous 
variable. 
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Convergent-Divergent Style 
 
Convergent – Divergent style was measured by comparing the relative performance 
on the object uses test, the VCT and the NVCT (measurements described in full in 
Chapter seven).  Performance on the convergent and divergent tests was standardised 
as Z scores and participant‟s position on the convergent-divergent dimension was 
calculated by subtracting the convergent score from the divergent score; therefore, 
lower scores indicate relatively more convergent thinking and higher scores indicate 
relatively more divergent thinking.   
 
Analytic – Intuitive Style 
 
The 38-item Cognitive Styles Index (CSI) (Allinson and Hayes 1996) was used to 
measure analytic-intuitive style.  This self-report instrument invites respondents to 
indicate a true, uncertain or false response to 21 statements that relate to the analytic 
pole and 17 that relate to the impulsive pole.  True, uncertain and false responses are 
given 0, 1 or 2 points, respectively and scores are reversed for impulsive items.  The 
CSI has a theoretical minimum and maximum score of 0 and 76, with a perfect mean 
of 38.  Lower scores indicate a more intuitive cognitive style and higher scores 
indicate a more analytic style. 
 
Wholist – Analytic Style 
 
Wholist-analytic style was measured using the WAS analyses; the median time taken 
to complete the matching figures section was compared to the median time taken to 
complete the embedded figures section producing a ratio for each participant.  Lower 
ratios indicate a more wholist style whereas higher ratios indicate a more analytic 
style. 
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Reflective – Impulsive Style 
 
The time taken to complete the WAS analysis and the accuracy with which it was 
completed was measured.  The completion time was based on the sum of both the 
matching figures and the embedded figures subtests and is therefore not confounded 
by wholist-analytic style; accuracy was measured as percentage of items completed 
correctly.  Time and accuracy were standardised as Z scores and summed to produce 
a scale for which high scores indicate a more reflective style and low scores indicate 
a more impulsive style. 
 
Table 11.1: Distribution of Style Scores  
 
Style 
 
Min. 
 
Mean  
 
Max.  
 
Kolmogorov Smirnov 
 
Convergent-Divergent 
 
-2.85 
 
0.15 
 
3.99 
 
Z =0.739, p=0.646 
 
Analytic-Intuitive 
 
11.00 
 
41.24 
 
68.00 
 
Z =0.991, p=0.280 
 
Reflective-Impulsive  
 
-.4.04 
 
0 
 
3.78 
 
Z =0.810, p=0.528 
 
Wholist-Analytic 
 
0.38 
 
1.10 
 
2.32 
 
Z =1.525, p=0.019 
 
All of the style measurements demonstrated a satisfactory distribution with the 
exception of the wholist-analytic scores (Z =1.525, p=0.019); this is to be expected 
given the findings in Chapter nine.  There is a significant and substantial difference 
between the range and level of scores derived from the different versions of the WAS 
analysis.  The findings of Chapter nine are replicated here with WAS-AW 
respondents appearing more wholist than the WAS-WA respondents.  When the 
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distribution of scores for each test version are examined separately the scores are 
approximately normally distributed, see Table 11.2 below. 
 
Table 11.2: Distribution for each version of the WAS Analysis 
  
 
Wholist-Analytic Style 
Test Version 
 
Min. 
 
Mean  
 
Max.  
 
Kolmogorov Smirnov 
 
WAS-AW 
 
0.38 
 
0.98 
 
1.64 
 
Z=1.049, p=0.221 
 
WAS-WA 
 
0.72 
 
1.24 
 
2.32 
 
Z=0.774, p=0.587 
 
11.3 Results  
 
Pearson correlations were employed to examine the relationship between wholist-
analytic style, convergent-divergent style, reflective-impulsive style and analytic-
intuitive style.  The wholist-analytic ratios produced by each version of the WAS test 
were input as separate variables, see Figure 11.3. 
 
Two significant relationships emerged (presented in red in Figure 11.1) Reflective-
impulsive style correlated with analytic-intuitive style (r = .245, p = .004); reflective 
individuals reported that they were more analytic and impulsive individuals reported 
that they were more intuitive.  
 
Reflective individuals produced significantly more analytic ratios when wholist-
analytic style was measured by the WAS-WA (r = .334, p = .005) but not when the 
WAS-AW was used (r = -.061).    
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Figure 11.1: Pearson correlations (1 tailed) – Relationship between styles 
 
There was no relationship between convergent –divergent style and the other styles: 
analytic-intuitive (r = -.034); wholist-analytic style (r < .001); or reflective-impulsive 
style (r = .092).   
 
Pearson correlations were also performed using the part-whole ratio, which was 
introduced in Chapter four and validated in Chapters six and nine.  The part-whole 
ratio was designed to reveal a tendency to approach matching figures task using part 
processing or whole processing.  Lower part-whole ratios indicate part processing 
and higher ratios indicate whole processing.  The advantage of this measurement 
over the wholist-analytic ratio is that it offers a measure of part - whole processing 
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which is not influenced by the order in which subtests are presented and therefore not 
confounded by reflective-impulsive style.  The relationship between part-whole 
processing style, reflective-impulsive style, analytic-intuitive style and convergent-
divergent style is illustrated below. 
 
 
Figure 11.2: Style relationships with Part-Whole processing ratio  
 
The findings suggest that convergent-divergent style is independent of part-whole 
processing preferences, analytic-intuitive style and reflective-impulsive style (r = 
.016; r = .055; and r = .092, respectively).   
 
It also appears that there was a reciprocal relationship between reflective-impulsive 
style, analytic-intuitive style and part-whole processing preferences.  However, the 
weak correlation between part-whole processing preferences and analytic-intuitive 
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style was spurious and mediated by reflective-impulsive style.  When the effects of 
reflective-impulsive style are partialled out the coefficient suggests that part-whole 
processing and analytic-intuitive style are independent (r = .088, p = .172) 
 
11.3.1 Principle component analysis 
 
The style scores for the 74 individuals who completed the entire battery of 
measurements were entered into a principle component analysis.  Two factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than one were extracted which accounted for 69% of the 
variance. 
 
 
Figure 11.3: Scree plot for showing principle components derived from CSI 
scores, reflective-impulsive scores, convergent-divergent score and part-whole 
processing ratio 
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Reflective-impulsive style (.813); part-whole processing (-.799); and analytic-
intuitive style (.620) loaded on factor one which explained 42% of the variance.  
Convergent-divergent (.930) loaded on it‟s own on factor two, explaining 27% of the 
variance. 
 
Table 11.3: Correlation matrix and summary data for Analytic-Intuitive style 
scores (A-I), reflective-impulsive scores (R-I), convergent-divergent score (C-D) 
and part-whole processing ratio (P-W) 
 
  
P-W style 
 
A-I style 
 
C-D style 
 
R-I style 
 
P-W style 
 
r = 1.000 
 
p = .015 
 
p = .379 
 
p < .001 
 
A-I style 
 
r = -.252 
 
r = 1.000 
 
p = .128 
 
p = .009 
 
C-D style 
 
r = .036 
 
r = -.134 
 
r = 1.000 
 
p = .285 
 
R-I style 
 
r = -.481 
 
r =  .276 
 
r = .067 
 
r = 1.000 
 
Note: Significance levels above the diagonal; correlation coefficients below the diagonal 
 
A Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisations converged in three iterations on the 
matrix in table 11.4.  Component one was characterised by part processing style, 
analytic style and reflective style and component two was characterised by 
convergent style.  The results of the principle component analysis presented here 
should be considered with a degree of caution, since they have been performed on 
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seventy-four participants when the minimum recommended sample is one hundred 
people (Kline, 2000) 
 
Table 11.4: Rotated Varimax matrix with Kaiser transformation for Analytic-
Intuitive style scores (A-I), reflective-impulsive scores (R-I), convergent-
divergent score (C-D) and part-whole processing ratio (P-W) 
 
Style 
Measures 
Components 
1 2 
 
P-W style 
 
-.804 
 
 
A-I style 
 
.560 
 
 
C-D style 
  
-.928 
 
R-I style 
 
.838 
 
 
 
11.3.2 Validity of the part-whole processing preference ratio 
 
The construct validity of the part-whole processing dictates that the embedded 
figures ratio should not correlate with the part-whole ratio, reflective-impulsive style, 
convergent-divergent style or analytic-intuitive style.   
 
A two-tailed Pearson correlation revealed that the embedded figure ratio did not 
significantly correlate with wholist-analytic style (r = .106 and -.204, p = .380 and 
.122, for WAS-AW and WAS-WA respectively) reflective-impulsive style (r = -.051, 
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p = .564), part-whole processing preference (r = .010, p = .913) or analytic-intuitive 
style (r = -.051, p = .587).  Additionally, when entered in the principle component 
analysis with the other variables, the embedded figure ratio did not load sufficiently 
on factor one (-.351) or factor two (.371). 
 
This suggests that the part-whole ratio is indeed measuring part-whole processing 
differences and not merely the ability to process figures of greater complexity; these 
findings replicate those in Chapter nine. 
 
11.4 Discussion 
 
Convergent-divergent style did not correlate with analytic-intuitive style, reflective-
impulsive style, wholist-analytic style or the new measure of part–whole processing 
preferences.  This is consistent with the styles research presented in Chapter 3, which 
yields no empirical evidence linking convergent-divergent style with other styles in 
the wholist-analytic family. 
 
There was a weak correlation between analytic-intuitive style and part-whole 
processing preferences but this was found to be a spurious association resulting from 
their mutual relationship with reflective-impulsive style.   
   
The only relationships, which have emerged from the present study, have involved 
reflective-impulsive style. This is again consistent with the styles literature, 
presented in Chapter nine, which revealed that the only relationships that have been 
reported have been between reflective-impulsive style and field independent-
dependent style. 
 
The relationship between reflective-impulsive style and wholist-analytic style is 
likely to have been an artefact of the wholist-analytic ratio being confounded by 
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reflective-impulsive differences rather than a genuine link between part-whole 
processing and reflective-impulsive style.  However, the relationship between the 
part-whole processing ratio and reflective-impulsive style demonstrated an 
association between part processing and reflective style and between whole 
processing and impulsive style.   
 
The finding that analytic-intuitive style correlates with wholist-analytic style and 
reflective-impulsive style but not with part-whole processing style suggests that the 
CSI is also measuring reflective–impulsive differences rather than global-analytic 
differences. 
 
11.4.1 Implications for the construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension 
and the unitary perspective of style. 
 
The findings in this study are not generally supportive of the unidimensional 
perspective of style and cast doubt over the construct validity of the wholist-analytic 
dimension.  However, the results do provide indirect evidence of the link between 
reflective-impulsive style and part-whole processing. 
 
The finding that the wholist-analytic style ratio only correlates with reflective – 
impulsive style when the WAS-WA is used but not when the WAS-AW is used 
demonstrates the complimentary relationship between reflective, part processing 
styles and impulsive, whole processing styles.  The complimentary reflective and 
part processing styles reinforce each other to produce an analytic ratio in the WAS-
WA, which naturally correlates with reflective-impulsive style.  However, in the 
WAS-AW, the complimentary reflective and part processing styles are in conflict, 
the opposite effects cancel each other out and no relationship emerges between 
wholist-analytic ratios and reflective-impulsive style.  This supports the findings of 
Chapter nine suggesting that the wholist-analytic ratio measures both wholist-
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analytic style and reflective-impulsive style because of the methodological 
limitations in the form of a lack of adequate counterbalancing which has led to order 
effects. 
 
The part-whole processing ratio also correlated with reflective-impulsive style; the 
part-whole ratio is not confounded by order effects and therefore demonstrates a 
genuine, albeit weak to moderate, relationship between reflective-impulsive style and 
the defining characteristics of wholist-analytic style, i.e. the tendency for part or 
whole processing.   
 
The principle component analysis produced two factors, with reflective-impulsive 
style and part-whole processing preferences loading high with analytic-intuitive style 
loading moderately high on the first factor and convergent-divergent style loading 
high on the second factor.  These results are similar to Allinson and Hayes (1996) 
factor analytic study, in that convergent-divergent did not load sufficiently to be 
included in the CSI items.    
 
11.5 Conclusion 
 
The factor analytic findings and the correlational data have provided further evidence 
for a relationship between reflective-impulsive style and the part-whole processing 
preferences, which define Riding‟s wholist-analytic style.  No evidence was found 
for a relationship between convergent-divergent styles and other styles in the 
wholist-analytic family.  This casts doubt over the construct validity of the wholist-
analytic dimension, and any construct, which takes an all-encompassing 
unidimensional view of global-analytic style.  However, there appears to be a 
consistent relationship between part-whole processing tendencies and reflective-
impulsive style.  This, combined with the pervasive nature of reflective-impulsive 
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style across tasks make it all the more important for care to be taken when accuracy 
and speed are used in the assessment of style. 
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Chapter 12: 
 
Testing the Unidimensional Theory 
of Wholist-Analytic Style – Part II 
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Chapter 12: Testing the unidimensional theory of wholist-analytic 
style – part II 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter demonstrated a relationship between part processing and 
reflective style and whole processing and impulsive style.  This chapter re-examines 
the relationship between wholist-analytic style, reflective- impulsive style, 
convergent-divergent style and analytic-intuitive style reported in the previous 
chapter but this time uses an unmodified version of the CSA and a computer version 
of the MFFT (described in Chapter eight) to assess wholist-analytic style and 
reflective-impulsive style respectively. 
 
Chapter eleven found relationships between the wholist-analytic ratio and part-whole 
processing preferences, reflective-impulsive style and analytic-intuitive style; these 
relationships were mediated by individual differences in reflective-impulsive style.  
Based on the previous findings; wholist-analytic style is expected to correlate with 
reflective-impulsive style such that reflective participants are more analytic.  Wholist 
style is also expected to be associated with intuitive style but this is likely to be a 
spurious relationship mediated by reflective-impulsive style.  No correlation is 
predicted between wholist-analytic style and convergent-divergent style. 
12.2 Method  
12.2.1 Participants 
 
Two student samples were used; sample one consisted of 280 participants and 
completed the CSA, the CSI and the MFFT and sample two consisted of 51 
participants and completed the CSA and the convergent-divergent thinking tests. 
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Sample One 
 
280 participants took part (  age 21.66 years), representing an entire cohort of first 
and second year research methods students from academic year 2005/6 and an entire 
cohort of first year research methods students from academic year 2006/7 (85 males, 
 age 21.21 years and 195 females,  age 21.86 years).  The higher proportion of 
female students reflects the trend for greater number of females taking psychology 
courses.  
 
225 participants completed the CSA (69 males and 156 females); 8 people either 
failed to meet the minimum accuracy level of 85% (Riding, 1991, 1998, 2005) for 
the wholist-analytic dimension or produced extreme wholist-analytic ratios between 
2.74 and 3.94; these data were deleted.   
 
200 participants completed the MFFT, however 81 sets of MFFT results did not 
successfully convert owing to a computer fault, leaving 119 participants with useable 
results (37 males and 82 females); 174 participants completed the CSI (45 males and 
129 females). 
 
72 participants completed both the CSA and the MFFT and 147 completed both the 
CSA and the CSI.   
 
Sample Two 
 
58 participants (49 female and 2 male, 7 not stated) with a mean age of 22.73 years 
(standard deviation 6.25 years) took part; 52 completed the convergent-divergent 
thinking tests and 46 completed the CSA and 42 participants completed both 
measures.  The convergent thinking test consisted of the non-verbal and verbal tests 
and the divergent test consisted of the object uses test outlined in Chapter seven and 
used in Chapter eleven.  The convergent and divergent thinking tests had a 15-minute 
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time limit each and presentation order was counterbalanced, participants were then 
given a 10 minute break before completing the CSA. 
Seven months later 19 participants from the original sample completed the 
convergent-divergent tests for a second time.  Participants were all female and their 
mean age was 23.47 years, standard deviation 7.69 years.  A Pearson correlation 
revealed excellent test-re-test reliability of r = 0.81 for convergent-divergent style 
scores; temporal reliability was r = 0.92 for the divergent thinking test and r = 0.79 
for the convergent thinking test. 
 
12.2.2 Data Analysis 
 
To aid direct comparisons with the data in the previous chapter, reflective-impulsive 
style and convergent-divergent style were analysed as continuous variables and a 
Pearson correlation was performed to assess the relationship between reflective-
impulsive style, analytic-intuitive scores, convergent-divergent scores and wholist-
analytic ratios.  
 
Wholist-analytic Style Groups 
 
Wholist-analytic style was measured using the CSA.  Higher ratios indicate a more 
analytic style and lower ratios indicate a more wholist style.   
 
Reflective-impulsive style scale  
 
Participants completed the newly constructed computer based Matching Familiar 
Figures Test; reflective-impulsive style was calculated using the median time taken 
to complete the MFF items and the total number of attempts it took to achieve correct 
answers across 12 trials.  
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Accuracy scores were normally distributed (z = 1.234, p = .095) with a minimum 
score of 13 indicating a near perfect score and a maximum score of 50 suggesting 
that some participants regularly clicked on four of the eight figures before happening 
upon the correct answer reducing the odds of eventually making the right choice to 
50-50. 
 
 
Figure 12.1: Normal QQ Plot – Accuracy of responses on matching Familiar 
Figures Test 
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Figure 12.2: Normal QQ Plot  - Latency to first response on the Matching 
Familiar Figures Test 
 
Response times were normally distributed (z = 1.064, p = .207). The normal range 
for responding was between 1 second and 36 seconds; there were 3 extreme scores 
with responders taking on average close to a minute to make their choice (minimum 
and maximum median latencies, 996ms and 54586ms, respectively).  
 
A Pearson correlation showed that „latency to first response‟ and the „number of 
errors made before the correct answer was achieved‟ negatively correlated (r = -.554, 
p < .001, n = 119) demonstrating that the longer reflection times lead to greater 
accuracy. 
 
The median latencies to first response and the number of errors made on the 
matching familiar figures test were standardised as Z scores, standardised error 
scores were reversed and summed with standardised latency scores to produce a 
scale in which high scores represent reflective style and low scores represent 
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impulsive style; fast-accurate and slow-inaccurate participants should achieve 
intermediate scores. 
 
Convergent-divergent style scale 
 
Convergent – Divergent style was measured by comparing the relative performance 
on the object uses test, the VCT and the NVCT (measurements described in full in 
chapter seven).  Performance on the convergent and divergent tests was standardised 
as Z scores and participants‟ position on the convergent-divergent dimension was 
calculated by subtracting the convergent score from the divergent score; therefore, 
lower scores indicate relatively more convergent thinking and higher scores indicate 
relatively more divergent thinking.   
 
 
Analytic-Intuitive Style 
 
Analytic-intuitive style was measured using the CSI.  Higher scores indicate more 
intuitive style and lower scores indicate a more analytic style.  The minimum and 
maximum scores were 6 and 58, respectively, compared to the theoretical minimum 
and maximum scores of 0 and 76.  The mean CSI score was 33.54, which is close to 
the theoretical mean of 38.  Scores were approximately normally distributed (Z = 
.798, p = .547). Lower scores indicate a more analytic cognitive style and higher 
scores indicate a more intuitive style. 
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12.3 Results 
12.3.1 Wholist-analytic style and reflective-impulsive style 
 
A one tailed Pearson correlation revealed that wholist-analytic style has a weak, non- 
significant relationship with reflective-impulsive style (r = -.165, p = .086).  The lack 
of correlation may to a certain extent be due to the inclusion of fast-accurate and 
slow-inaccurate participants in the reflective-impulsive scores.  In consideration of 
this, the style groups were analysed by category and a chi squared test employed to 
assess the relationship between style groups. 
 
Reflective – Impulsive Style Groups 
 
Reflective and Impulsive individuals were categorised using the double median split 
method.  54 participants were labelled as „Accurate‟ and 65 as „Inaccurate‟, scoring 
above or below a median of 25 responses over 12 trials.  59 participants were 
labelled „Slow‟ and 60 as „Fast‟, responding above and below the median latency of 
14594.50 milliseconds per trial.   
 
42 participants were both slow and accurate which characterised a reflective style 
and 47 participants were fast and inaccurate which characterised an impulsive style.  
There was no significant difference in mean age between the groups (F = .378, df 
3,114, p = .769, means between 21.83 and 23.94 years) and no significant difference 
in sex (χ2 = 0.51, df = 3, p = .997) 
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Table 12.1: Classification of reflective - impulsive style 
 
Labels N Latency to first  
response (ms) 
Total no. 
of responses 
Median Min Max Median Min Maxi 
Reflective 42 23134 14820 54586 19 13 24 
Impulsive 47 8870 996 14369 33 25 50 
Slow 17 22080 15358 30286 29 25 40 
Fast 12 10695 6431 14250 23 17 24 
Total 118 14595 966 54586 25 13 50 
 
 
Wholist-analytic Style Groups 
 
Wholist-analytic ratios were cut into 3 equal groups and participants labelled as 
wholist, intermediate or analytic.  The cut points for groups are shown in Table 12.2; 
they were similar to the recommended cut points provided in the CSA manual, see 
guidelines provided for reference. 
 
Table 12.2: Classification of wholist-analytic style ratio 
 
Classification labels CSA CSA 
Guidelines 
N Mean Min Max Ratio Ratio 
Wholist 74 0.85 0.62 0.98 < 0.99 ≤ 1.02 
Intermediate 71 1.11 0.99 1.23 ≥0.99 - 1.23 1.03 - 1.35 
Analytic 72 1.50 1.24 2.29 ≥ 1.24 ≥ 1.36 
Total 217 1.15 0.62 2.29  
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There was no significant difference in mean age between the groups (F = .277, df 
2,214, p = .758, means between 21.12 and 21.72 years) and no significant difference 
in sex (χ2 = 1.576, df = 2, p = .455).  Scores were approximately normally 
distributed (Z = 1.247, p = .089) 
 
A chi-squared test compared the number of wholists, intermediates and analytics that 
were categorized as reflective, impulsive, slow or fast against with the number 
expected by chance. 
 
Table 12.3: Observed and Expected counts for wholist-analytic style by 
reflective-impulsive style. 
 
Style Observed N (Expected N) 
Wholist Intermediate Analytic Total 
Impulsive 6 (8.1) 17 (12.2)* 9 (11.7) 32 
Reflective 3 (5.8)* 5 (8.7)* 15 (8.4)* 23 
Fast 6 (2.8)* 4 (4.2) 1 (4)* 11 
Slow 3 (1.3)* 1 (1.9) 1 (1.8) 5 
Total 18 27 26 71 
 
 
The observed count significantly deviated from the expected count (χ2 = 20.369, df = 
6, p = .002).  65% of participants with a reflective style also had an analytic style, 
which is much higher than the expected 37%.  53% of the participants with an 
impulsive style also had an intermediate style, which is also higher than the expected 
38% 
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The chi-squared test suggests that there are more „fast and accurate‟ responders and 
„slow and inaccurate‟ responders in the wholist group than would be expected by 
chance, there are more impulsive responders in the intermediate group and more 
reflective responders in the analytic group. 
 
This was confirmed by a one-way analysis of variance, which demonstrated a 
significant effect of reflective-impulsive style (reflective, impulsive, fast, slow) on 
the wholist-analytic ratio (F = 5.010, df 3, 67, p = .003).  Post hoc tests revealed that 
the reflective group were significantly more analytic than the impulsive group (p = 
.047) and the fast group (p = .011) and approaching significance for the slow group 
(p = 0.79).  Figure 12.3 demonstrates clearly that based on 90% confidence intervals 
there is no overlap between the expected population means of reflectives and 
impulsives.   
 
 
Figure 12.3: Means and 90% confidence intervals for wholist-analytic ratio by 
reflective-impulsive style categories 
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12.3.2 Wholist-analytic style and analytic-intuitive style 
 
A Pearson correlation revealed no significant relationship between wholist-analytic 
style and analytic-intuitive style (r = .114, p = .088).  It is unlikely that the low 
correlation is an artefact of the measures, as was suggested above for the reflective-
style scale, since both measures do represent a true bipolar continuum.  However, in 
the interests of thoroughness a chi-squared test was also performed to cross tabulate 
the wholist-analytic style labels with the analytic-intuitive style labels.  The 
relationship between the style labels did not significantly deviate from chance (χ2 = 
.267, df = 2, p = .865). 
 
12.3.3 Reflective-impulsive style and analytic-intuitive style 
 
A Pearson correlation revealed no significant relationship between wholist-analytic 
style and analytic-intuitive style (r = -.094, p = .288).  A chi-squared test was 
performed to cross tabulate the reflective-impulsive style labels with the analytic-
intuitive style labels.  The relationship between the style labels did not significantly 
deviate from chance (χ2 = 1.958, df = 3, p = .561). 
 
12.3.4 Wholist-analytic style and convergent-divergent style 
 
A Pearson correlation revealed a significant relationship between wholist-analytic 
style and convergent-divergent style (r = -.353, p = .011).  Convergent individuals 
were more analytic and wholists were more divergent.  No statistics are available 
comparing performance on convergent-divergent style with reflective-impulsive style 
and analytic-intuitive style. 
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12.4 Discussion 
 
This study was designed to replicate the findings of the previous correlation study by 
using the traditional methods of assessing wholist-analytic style and reflective-
impulsive style to allow direct comparisons to be made with the styles literature.  The 
CSA was used instead of the WAS analyses as the basis of the wholist-analytic ratio; 
and the MFFT was used instead of the speed and accuracy data derived from the 
wholist-analytic trials.   
 
A weak relationship was found between reflective-impulsive style and wholist-
analytic style, which replicated the findings in Chapter eleven.  The weak nature of 
the relationship appears to contradict the notion that the wholist-analytic ratio is 
confounded by reflective-impulsive style, however, the low correlations are likely to 
be an artefact of using a continuous reflective-impulsive scale, which will inevitably 
include slow and fast participants who are not characterised by a reflective or 
impulsive approach.  A one-way ANOVA confirmed that reflective groups produced 
more analytic ratios. 
 
Reflective-impulsive style did not correlate with analytic-intuitive style, which is not 
consistent with the findings in the previous chapter.  A chi squared test confirmed the 
absence of a relationship which means the lack of correlation was not because of the 
inclusion of slow and fast participants in the continuous reflective-impulsive scale.  
The lack of correlation with the MFFT could be a result of the MFFT being sensitive 
to analytic-global differences.   
 
Convergent-divergent style correlated with wholist-analytic style, which again 
contradicts the findings in the previous chapter.  In this case the equivocal 
correlational data may be a result of a slight change in the administration of the 
convergent-divergent tests; in the previous chapter the presentation of the non-verbal 
convergent test, the verbal convergent test and the divergent test was 
285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
counterbalanced and each test was given a 7.5 minute time limit.  However in this 
chapter, the non-verbal and the verbal convergent test were combined as one test and 
given a 15 minute time limit and was counterbalanced with the divergent test which 
was also given a 15 minute limit.   
 
Therefore, the time limit apportioned to the convergent tests remained constant and 
was consistent with the MENSA guidelines but the time limit for the divergent test 
doubled.  The increased time limit for the divergent, object uses test was more in 
keeping with Hudson‟s (1967) recommendations.  The test-retest reliability of the 
convergent-divergent tests used in this chapter was excellent producing a coefficient 
of r = 0.74. 
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Chapter 13: Discussion 
 
13.1 Chapter introduction 
 
This thesis questioned the validity of the wholist-analytic style ratio to measure the 
relative ability to use part or whole processing strategies.  Two overarching 
hypotheses were presented which related to the nature of the processing being 
measured by the wholist-analytic ratio: the first hypothesised that the wholist-
analytic ratio is confounded with a sensitivity to reflective-impulsive style; and the 
second hypothesised an asymmetry in the ratio which has resulted in wholists, but 
not the analytics, being judged by their relative ability to part or whole process.  The 
rational for each hypothesis is summarised below and the findings will be discussed 
in 13.2 and 13.3, respectively. 
 
It was suggested that the wholist-analytic ratio is sensitive to differences in 
reflective-impulsive style and that high, more analytic ratios may be indicative of an 
individuals tendency to take a reflective approach in uncertain situations rather than 
indicating their relative ability to use part or whole processing.  The sensitivity to 
measures of reflective-impulsive style was hypothesised to be a result of a limitation 
in the methodology employed by the CSA (Riding, 1991), which failed to 
counterbalance the presentation of the matching figure and embedded figures tasks.   
The lack of counterbalancing, coupled with the fact that the ratio method compared 
the median speed to complete the first subtest with the median speed to complete the 
second subtest, meant that individuals were labelled as wholists or analytics based on 
the hesitancy of their approach to early test items regardless of whether the test items 
were wholist or analytic in nature, and this is the theory of diminished reflection. 
 
It was further hypothesised that there is an asymmetry in the nature of part and whole 
processing being compared between wholists and analytics.  The wholist-analytic 
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ratio purports to measure relative ability use part or whole processing with analytics 
being better at part processing than whole processing because part processing is their 
preferred style; and wholists being better at whole processing than part processing 
because whole processing is their preferred style.  It was hypothesised that whilst 
wholists were being labelled based on their relative ability to whole or part process, 
analytics were being labelled based on the efficacy of a part processing style to 
process tasks which are congruent on incongruent to a part processing strategy.  This 
asymmetry is hypothesised to be the result of the matching figures tasks allowing 
respondents a strategy choice between part and whole processing but the embedded 
tasks force the use of a part processing strategy.  When given an option part 
processors will habitually choose part processing and will therefore chose to employ 
part processing to complete the matching figures task and the embedded figures task, 
whereas, the whole processors will choose whole processing to complete the 
matching figures tasks but will be forced to use part processing for the embedded 
figures tasks.  Therefore, the part processors relative ability to part process and whole 
process is not being assessed; the only thing that is being demonstrated is that they 
have a preferred part processing strategy.  
 
This thesis has also offered an explanation for the low reliability that has been 
reported in the literature.  It was hypothesised that the theory of diminished reflection 
can account for the lack of temporal stability, which has been widely demonstrated 
(Peterson et al., 2003; Parkinson, et al., 2004; Rezaei and Katz, 2004; Cook, 2008).  
The effect of diminished reflection will be much reduced at subsequent test sessions 
because the second test session is not characterised by uncertainty.  It is the 
uncertainty that is inherent in the first session, which induces reflection over 
responses to ensure accuracy.    The findings in relation to this hypothesis are 
discussed in 14.4. 
 
The final strand to the research addressed the unidimensional perspective of style; 
the conception of the wholist-analytic dimension was based on the notion that many 
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of the analytic-global constructs in the literature were merely describing different 
aspects of one super-ordinate wholist-analytic dimension, which is characterised by a 
tendency towards synthesis or differentiation in organisation and processing 
information.  Attempts to demonstrate the hypothesised relationship between 
subordinate style constructs in the wholist-analytic family have met with limited 
success which has led to a growing disillusionment with the unitary perspective in 
favour of a multidimensional perspective (Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith, 2003; 
Peterson and Deary, 2006).  It is entirely likely, however, that the dearth of evidence 
in support of a relationship between the global-analytic styles is a result of the 
inherent methodological problems, which pervade many measures of style.  In line 
with Riding‟s (2005) recommendations, the current thesis compares performance on 
four measures of style to assess the relationship between them.  Care was taken to 
use reliable and valid measures of style and extensive periods of construction, 
development and validation were undertaken for each measure in the pursuit of 
psychometrically sound instruments.  The findings relating to the unidimensional 
perspective of style are discussed in 13.5. 
  
13.2 The theory of diminished reflection: effects on the validity of the wholist-
analytic ratio method 
 
When administering any psychological test it is best practice to control for the 
confounding influence of order effects by counterbalancing the presentation of items 
or tasks.  This reduces unwanted variables such as boredom or practice effects from 
influencing the outcome of the test.  This need for counterbalancing is even more 
vital in the context of the CSA (Riding, 1991) because it employs a ratio method that 
compares performance on one subtest with performance on another subtest.  
Therefore, any order effect which influences a respondent to begin slowly in the first 
subtest and then speed up as they progress through the second subtest will directly 
effect the ratio of response times to the first and second subtest.   
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To illustrate this problem two versions of the WAS analysis were used to 
demonstrate the influence of order effects on the wholist-analytic ratio.  The WAS 
analyses were based on the wholist-analytic subtests of the CSA and were identical 
in every respect except that the WAS-WA presented the matching figure subtest first 
and the embedded subtest second and the WAS-AW presented the embedded figure 
subtest first followed by the matching figure subtest.  
  
Both versions of the WAS analysis calculate the wholist-analytic ratio using the 
same method as the CSA, by working out the ratio of the median latency on the 
matching figures test to the median latency on the embedded figures test.  In each 
case a ratio of less than one would indicate that an individual took relatively longer 
to complete the embedded figure items and a ratio of more than one would indicate 
that they took relatively longer on the matching figure items. 
 
It was hypothesised that the presence of order effects would lead to the WAS-WA 
producing a significantly higher mean ratio than the WAS-AW.  This hypothesis was 
supported; the WAS-WA, which presented the matching figure subtest first, 
produced much higher ratios and the difference represented a large effect size.  
Almost 70% of the people, who completed one of the versions of the WAS analysis, 
took longer to respond to the first subtest than the second subtest.  When generalised 
to the population it is predicted that the WAS-WA would produce mean ratios 
between 1.12 and 1.35, and across three samples tested here the means were between 
1.19 and 1.24, see Chapter six and nine and Davies and Graff (2006).  These data are 
comparable to the normative data provided by Riding  (1991; 1998; 2005) suggesting 
mean ratios in the region of 1.10-1.25.   
 
Riding‟s standardised data give the impression that the population are slightly 
skewed towards more analytic styles; however, the expected population mean ratio 
based on the WAS-AW was 0.92 and 1.06, and the sample mean was 0.99 which is 
292 
 
 
 
 
 
 
near the perfect theoretical mean of one.  This suggests that rather than being skewed 
towards being more analytic the population follows a, perhaps unsurprising, trend to 
being more hesitant during early test items. 
 
This robust order effect had an unanticipated impact on the discriminatory power of 
the WAS analyses and by extension would be expected to have the same effect on 
the discriminatory power of the CSA.   As hypothesised the inadequate 
counterbalancing of the matching figure and embedded figure subtests, coupled with 
the fact that the ratio method compared the median speed to complete the first subtest 
with the median speed to complete the second subtest, meant that individuals were 
labelled as wholists or analytics based on the hesitancy of their approach to early test 
items rather than on their relative ability to part or whole process.  However, an 
unanticipated effect, although in hindsight a result that should have been predicted, 
was the impact this would have on the discriminatory power of each subtest.  
 
The findings demonstrated that the ratios produced by the wholists and the analytics 
significantly differed in the first and second test quarter, which constitutes the first 
subtest; but not in the third and fourth test quarter, which constitutes the second 
subtest; the difference in processing speeds diminished as the test progressed and this 
effect was replicated see Chapter six and Chapter nine. 
 
Therefore, the first subtest differentiated between wholist and analytic styles but the 
second subtest did not.  When the matching figures subtest was presented first, it was 
the speed of processing the matching figures not the embedded figures that 
distinguished between wholists and analytics; analytics were significantly slower 
than wholists when processing matching figure tasks but not significantly different 
when processing embedded figure tasks.   
 
Similarly, when the embedded figures subtest was presented first, it was the speed of 
processing the embedded figures not the matching figures that distinguished between 
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wholists and analytics; wholists were significantly slower than analytics when 
processing embedded figure tasks but not significantly different when processing 
matching figure tasks.  The implication is that whilst ratios have been based on 
relative ability to process the first or second subtest; the greatest variance and 
therefore the discriminatory power lays only in one subtest, that is whichever subtest 
is presented first.   
 
In the context of the CSA, this means that the discriminating factor between the 
wholists and the analytics is their speed of processing the matching figures subtest.  
This undermines the major strength of the wholist-analytic ratio, which is purported 
to be its bipolar basis (Riding and Cheema, 1991; Riding, 1998; 2005) Riding argued 
that the cognitive styles analysis was a superior measure of style because it 
“positively assesses both ends of the style dimensions”, he goes on to state that this is 
very important “since otherwise it could be objected that the assessment is simply of 
ability and not of style.” (Riding, 1998; 2005, p. 5).  
 
13.2.1 Interaction between order effects and reflective-impulsive style  
 
Importantly, the order effects demonstrated here do not affect all respondents 
equally; the effects were hypothesised to influence reflective participants to a greater 
extent than impulsive participants because the tendency to begin slowly during early 
test items is a characteristic of individuals with a reflective style.  Reflective 
individuals were predicted to take longer over their responses to ensure accuracy, 
whereas an impulsive individual would be focused on speed rather than accuracy 
(Kagan et al., 1964).  Reflective behaviour occurs in situations of uncertainty, 
therefore, it was expected to be at its peak at the beginning of the test; and then as the 
reflective individuals assessed the trial items to be consistently easy, their reflection 
time would diminish and their response times decrease.   
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This hypothesis that reflective and impulsive individuals would be differentially 
effected by the order of presentation was supported; the reflective group had 
significantly more analytic ratios than the impulsive group when they completed the 
matching figures subtest first, indicating that they were slower at the first subtest 
than the second subtest.   
 
Riding‟s unitary perspective of wholist-analytic style could account for this finding 
(Riding, 1991).  It could be argued that the reflective individuals would be expected 
to be more analytic because the reflective-impulsive construct is part of the wholist-
analytic family and reflective style is at the analytic pole of the wholist-analytic 
dimension.  Therefore, the occurrence of higher ratios is because they have a 
preferred part processing style indicative of an analytic style and not because they are 
just slower at early test items.  From this perspective the wholist-analytic ratio is 
valid and the finding that reflective individuals are also analytic is merely support for 
the unidimensional view of wholist-analytic style.   
 
However, further findings convincingly demonstrate that reflection has a direct 
influence on the wholist-analytic ratio and that the tendency of analytics to be more 
reflective is not just one of association.  The influence of reflective style on the 
wholist-analytic ratio was effectively demonstrated by manipulating the order in 
which the subtests were presented by administering either the WAS-WA or the 
WAS-AW versions of the WAS analysis.  
 
If the tendency of reflectives to achieve more analytic ratios was just a matter of 
association and not a result of reflective style interacting with order effects then 
reflectives should have more analytic ratios when they complete the WAS-WA and 
when they complete the WAS-AW.   
 
The findings confirmed that when the matching figures test was presented first, the 
reflective group were relatively slower to process the matching figure trials in 
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comparison to the embedded figure trials which led to them being classified as 
„Analytics‟, producing a mean ratio of 1.31. However, when the order of the subtests 
was reversed and the embedded figure trials were presented first, the reflective group 
were relatively slower to process the embedded figure trials in comparison to the 
matching figure trials which led to them being classified as „Wholist‟, producing a 
mean of 0.96.   
 
Since the only difference between the WAS-AW and the WAS-WA is the order of 
presentation, this is strong evidence that reflective participants achieve analytic ratios 
because of their reflective behaviour and not just because part processors who 
achieve analytic ratios are expected to also have a reflective style.  
 
Further, evidence to support this comes from the absence of order effects on the 
impulsive participants. Presentation order had little impact on the impulsive group, 
they produced intermediate level ratios regardless of the order in which the subtests 
were presented, suggesting that their processing speed was relatively uniform across 
the two subtests; although they did obey the general population trend to produce 
higher ratios in the WAS-WA and lower in the WAS-AW; the impulsive group mean 
ratios were 1.16 in the WAS-WA and 1.03 in the WAS-AW.  This presents another 
unforeseen problem with the discriminatory power of the wholist-analytic ratio; not 
only does the power lay mainly in the first subtest but the source of the variation may 
rest with a subsection of the participants, that is, those with a reflective style.   
 
The findings support the theory of diminished reflection, which suggests that the 
wholist-analytic ratio is sensitive to reflective-impulsive style and therefore raises 
doubts over the validity of the wholist-analytic dimension.  If the ratio is measuring 
reflective-impulsive style then this must be reconciled with the large body of 
research pertaining to the validity of wholist-analytic dimension. 
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Chapter two evaluated a collection of studies, which effectively demonstrated the 
power of the CSA to discriminate between the performance of wholists and analytics 
in open ended or closed end learning situations (Roberts, 2006); and to discriminate 
between their instructional preferences and media preferences which related to 
collaborative learning (Sadler-Smith and Riding, 1999) and to discriminate 
differences in task and non task related, alpha suppression in EEG studies (Riding et 
al., 1997; Glass and Riding, 1999).  Further, appendix 1 describes a number of 
studies linking differences in interpersonal and social functioning and preferences 
with wholists and analytics (Riding and Craig, 1998; 1999; Riding, 1991).   
 
The studies which more directly assessed the power of the CSA to discriminate 
between the wholists and analytics need for structure based on their relative ability to 
whole and part process were more equivocal, demonstrating very little support for 
the prediction that wholists need help imposing structure in unstructured situations or 
that they benefit from such help.  There was no consistent evidence linking wholist-
analytic style with learning performance when the structure of learning material has 
been manipulated; Riding and Sadler-Smith (1992) found no significant interaction 
effect of structure and wholist-analytic style when manipulating either small step 
versus large step or presence or absence of an advance organiser.  Riding and 
Douglas (1993) did find that the presence of a title benefited wholists rather than 
analytics but this was not replicated by Riding and Al-Sanabani (1998) who found no 
significant interaction between the use of sections with headings and wholist-analytic 
style.   
 
Riding and Sadler-Smith (1992) found evidence to suggest that complimentary styles 
benefited from a small step structure but unitary styles did not, but again this was not 
replicated by Riding and Al-Sanabani (1998) who found no interaction between 
wholist-analytic style, verbal-imager style and the use of sections with headings. 
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In addition, the effect of style on performance in relatively more structured subjects 
such as science has been equivocal (Newton et al., 1995; Riding and Agrell, 1997; 
Riding and Grimley, 1999; Riding and Pearson, 1994; Riding et al., 2003) and the 
one study which directly assessed the power of the wholist-analytic dimension to 
predict local and global processing, found no association between a tendency to 
process globally or locally and wholist-analytic style (Peterson and Deary, 2006). 
 
It was concluded that whilst there was evidence for the subordinate style predictions, 
there was limited evidence for super-ordinate predictions.  Subordinate style 
predictions are those that predict behaviour or characteristics, which would be 
associated with any of the style constructs within the wholist-analytic family.  Super-
ordinate predictions would be those that validate the claim that the wholist-analytic 
ratio is successfully measuring differences in part-whole processing.   
 
The difficulty with validating global-analytic style measures is that, given the 
unidimensional perspective, any of the global-analytic styles would be predictive of 
similar preferences and differences in social functioning.   This means that if the 
wholist-analytic ratio is sensitive to differences in reflective-impulsive style, then 
this could account for the learning and social preferences which have been linked to 
the wholist-analytic dimension.  It also follows that the influence of reflective-
impulsive style may be confounding the studies that relate to super-ordinate 
predictions, masking the effects of part and whole processing preferences.  These 
two explanations are not mutually exclusive.  
 
The effect of reflective style is clear and the influence of diminished reflection on the 
wholist-analytic ratio reduces the validity of the current ratio method of measuring 
wholist-analytic style.  However, the findings lead to a number of positive 
conclusions, firstly, the effect of diminished reflection can be easily rectified with 
adequate counterbalancing and this and other recommendations will be discussed in 
14.7; secondly, the findings demonstrate the presence of a part-whole processing 
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difference which until now had just been assumed but not demonstrated, this and 
other evidence for the presence of part-whole processing will be discussed in 13.3; 
thirdly, the theory of diminished reflection offers a much needed explanation for the 
low temporal stability which characterises the wholist-analytic ratio, this too will be 
improved once the CSA has been adequately counterbalanced and this will be 
discussed in 13.4; and, finally the evidence which links reflective style with part 
processing style by demonstrating the complimentary and conflicting effects of 
changing presentation order provides some support for the unidimensional 
perspective of style and this will be discussed along with the correlational and 
factorial analyses data in 13.5 
 
13.3 The wholist-analytic ratio: A measure of part versus whole processing 
 
Riding (2005, p. 6) stated “The most important feature of a test is its construct 
validity  - if there is no evidence that it assesses what it purports to measure then it is 
of no use.”  The wholist-analytic style dimension purports to measure differences in 
relative ability to part and whole process. It determines “whether an individual tends 
to organise information in wholes or parts.” (Riding, 2005, p. 1) and “the relevant 
underlying abilities are differentiation and synthesis” (Riding, 2005, p. 3).   
 
Chapter two demonstrated that there is insufficient evidence to validate the notion 
that that the wholist-analytic dimension is a measure of relative ability to part and 
whole process.  Chapters six and nine demonstrated that the wholist-analytic ratio is 
confounded by measures of reflective-impulsive style and these style differences can 
offer an alternative explanation for the power of the CSA to discriminate between 
individual differences in social and interpersonal preferences and the EEG 
differences that have been documented in the literature. 
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Until now the has been no clear evidence that the wholist-analytic ratio is actually 
measuring part-whole processing differences, however, two sources of evidence have 
emerged during the course of the present research, which provide evidence that the 
wholist-analytic ratio is measuring part-whole processing differences thereby 
providing partial support for the construct validity of the measure. 
 
The first strand of evidence comes from the conflicting effects of concomitant part-
whole processing and reflective-impulsive styles on the wholist-analytic ratio, which 
were demonstrated when the presentation order of the matching figure and embedded 
figure subtests was reversed.   
 
13.3.1 Style conflicts: Reflective-impulsive approach and part-whole processing 
 
It was demonstrated in Chapter six and nine that the wholist-analytic ratio is 
confounded by reflective style, but is the ratio also measuring differences in part-
whole processing style?  Examining the combined effects of reflective-impulsive 
style and part-whole processing when the presentation order of the subtests was 
manipulated can reveal the answer to this question.  If the wholist-analytic ratio was 
measuring reflective-impulsive differences as a result of the lack of counterbalancing 
but was not measuring part-whole processing differences then two predictions should 
have been fulfilled; reflectives should have produced significantly higher wholist-
analytic ratios than impulsives when the matching figures subtest was presented first 
and significantly lower ratios than impulsives when the embedded figures subtest 
was presented first.  The findings did demonstrate that reflectives produced 
significantly higher ratios than impulsives when the matching figure subtest was 
presented first but the reflectives did not produce significantly lower ratios than 
impulsives when the embedded figures subtest was presented first.  
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These findings demonstrate the presence of part-whole processing differences in a 
way than has not been previously been achieved in the literature.  The evidence 
suggests that the inflated ratios achieved by analytics and reflectives on the WAS-
WA was a result of complimentary part-whole plus reflective-impulsive style effects 
whereas the lack of significant difference between the reflectives and impulsives on 
the WAS-AW was the result of conflicting part-whole versus reflective-impulsive 
style effects; the evidence is outlined below. 
 
The inflated wholist-analytic ratio, which was produced by the reflective group when 
the matching figures test was presented first, was hypothesised to be a result of their 
reflective approach to the early matching figure test items but also to be an effect of a 
part processing preference which made them faster at processing embedded figure 
items and slower at processing matching figure items.  Since the unidimensional 
theory of style suggests that analytics are also more likely to have a reflective style it 
was predicted that their concomitant reflective and part processing styles would work 
in the same direction, that is both styles would lead to the individual being slower in 
the first, matching figures subtest.  Partial support for this comes from the finding 
that reflective individuals did produce significantly higher ratios than impulsive 
individuals on the WAS-WA, with means of 1.31 for reflectives and 1.16 for 
impulsives, indicating that they had an analytic style.  However, only by considering 
the opposite assumption can the hypothesis be tested convincingly.   
 
When faced with the WAS-AW version of the WAS analysis which reverses the 
order of the subtests; an analytic individual with a part processing preference and a 
reflective approach to early test items would be faced with conflicting style effects.  
The reflective style approach would create a tendency to be slower at the embedded 
figure items at the beginning of the test and speed up through the matching figure 
items towards the end of the test.  The part processing preference would create an 
opposing tendency to be faster at the embedded figure items in comparison to the 
matching figure items.  If the wholist-analytic ratio was sensitive to both styles then 
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the reflective style should have been cancelled out by an opposite effect of part 
processing style; this hypothesis was supported, the reflective individuals group 
mean ratio of 0.96 was not significantly different to the impulsive groups mean ratio 
of 1.03. 
 
Therefore, the influence of reflective style on the wholist-analytic ratio when the 
embedded figure task was presented first was not apparent.  The two versions of the 
WAS analysis which were used to manipulate subtest order were identical in every 
way except for the order of the subtest; therefore the only explanation for the reduced 
impact of reflective style when the embedded figure subtest was presented first was 
that concomitant differences in part-whole processing differences were working in 
against the reflective style differences to cancel out the effects.  This provides 
support for the construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension whilst raising 
doubts over the ratio method currently used to measure it.  The efficacy of the 
matching figures tasks and the embedded figures tasks to discriminate between part 
and whole processing preferences is hampered by of the lack of counterbalancing 
which confounds the ratio with differences in reflective-impulsive style. 
 
The second strand of evidence providing support for the efficacy of the wholist-
analytic ratio to differentiate between part and whole processing preferences stems 
from the experimental manipulation of the number of simple shapes in the complex 
geometric stimuli in the wholist-analytic subtests, which has provided evidence that 
the matching figure tasks and the embedded figures tasks do discriminate between 
part and whole processing preferences but not in the way Riding (1991) intended.   
 
13.3.2 A part-whole processing asymmetry 
 
Riding stated that wholist-analytic style is an “ability difference, rather than a 
preference as such” (Riding, 2005, p. 5). The suggestions being that individuals have 
302 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a preference for which style they employ, either part or whole processing, and will 
perform relatively better when using their preferred style than when using an 
alternate style.  Riding argues that an individual with an analytic style is better, i.e. 
quicker; at completing the embedded figures test because they are better when using 
their preferred part processing strategy and, that an individual with a wholist style is 
better, i.e. quicker: at completing the matching figures tasks because they are using 
their preferred whole processing strategy.   The implication is that the embedded 
figures task requires part processing and the matching figures task requires whole 
processing, however, this is not strictly the case. 
 
This thesis hypothesised that the matching figures test could be completed using a 
part or whole processing style and therefore part processors would choose to part 
process matching figures tasks and whole processors would choose to use whole 
processing.  It was further hypothesised that the embedded figures task could only be 
completed using a part processing strategy so part processors would use their 
preferred processing strategy and whole processors would be forced to use a strategy 
which wasn‟t their preferential method of processing.  These hypotheses were 
supported and the effects replicated (see chapter six and nine), the asymmetry was 
exposed through the manipulation of complex figural stimuli into geometric figures 
made up of five simple shapes or geometric figures made up of three simple shapes. 
 
It was theorised that all participants were likely to take a little longer to process the 
five part figures because they were more complex and therefore more difficult; 
however, those people employing a part processing strategy were expected to be 
slowed down significantly more than those employing a whole processing strategy 
because each additional part of the whole would increase the processing time 
proportionately for part processors but not for whole processors. 
 
Two ratios were calculated comparing the speed of processing the three part figures 
to the speed of processing the five part figures; one ratio was based on the matching 
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figures latencies and the other on the embedded figure latencies.  The matching 
figures ratio was expected to differentiate between those who had chosen a part 
processing strategy and those who had chosen a whole processing strategy; this ratio 
was called the part-whole processing ratio.  The embedded figure ratio was not 
expected to differentiate between part and whole processors because everyone should 
have been forced to employ part processing to complete the tasks.   
 
It was found that analytics and reflectives had lower part-whole processing ratios 
than wholists and impulsives, respectively.  This supported the hypotheses that 
analytics and reflective individuals employed part processing to complete the 
matching figures tasks whereas; wholists and impulsives employed whole 
processing.  
 
The embedded figure ratio did not differentiate between wholists and analytics or 
between reflectives and impulsive; this supports the hypotheses that reflectives and 
impulsives, and, analytics and wholists, employed part processing for the embedded 
figures test.  
 
The implications of these findings are two fold; firstly, they demonstrate that when 
faced with a choice of processing strategy, analytics and reflectives choose part 
processing and wholists and impulsives choose whole processing.  This is support for 
the construct validity of the wholist-analytic dimension suggesting that analytics and 
wholists do have a preferred processing strategy and it is partial support for the 
unidimensional view because reflectives and impulsives share the preference for part 
and whole processing.  However, the second implication casts doubt on the validity 
of the wholist-analytic ratio method to capture symmetrical differences in part-whole 
processing.  
 
The findings supported the hypotheses that part processors employed part processing 
for both tasks and whole processors employed whole processing for the matching 
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figures tasks and were forced to choose part processing for the embedded figures 
tasks.  This means that the wholists were judged by their relative ability to employ 
their preferred and non-preferred processing strategy, which is consistent with 
Ridings notion that the ratio measures relative abilities to part and whole process.  
However, analytics were judged on the efficacy of a part processing approach to 
tackle tasks that are either a match or a mismatch for a part processing strategy.  This 
is inconsistent with the notion that the ratio method measures relative abilities to 
whole and part process.  This creates and asymmetry in the basis of the wholist-
analytic ratio which undermines its validity but the presence of the asymmetry itself 
confirms that wholists and analytics have whole and part processing preferences.  
Therefore, the findings support the validity of the wholist-analytic dimension but not 
the method of measuring it. 
 
 
13.4 The reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension  
 
The wholist-analytic dimension has been reported to have low temporal reliability 
(Peterson et al., 2003; Rezaei and Katz, 2004; Parkinson et al., 2004; Cook, 2008).   
 Riding has been critical of such reports and has emphasised the methodological 
shortcomings of the reported reliability correlations.  Riding argued that Peterson et 
al.,‟s (2003) test-retest interval was too short and therefore not a fair test of 
reliability; and recommended test-retest intervals of at least one year as an 
appropriate test of temporal reliability.  It has also been argued that Peterson et al. 
(2003) used a modified form of the CSA and therefore, the reported test-retest 
correlations do not reflect the reliability of the CSA (Riding, 2003; Redmond, 
Parkinson and Mullally, 2007).  However, Cook (2008) and Parkinson et al., (2004) 
employed test-retest intervals of eighteen months and twenty-three months, 
respectively, using the unmodified CSA and reported similarly low correlations, 
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which were consistent with test-retest coefficients produced over shorter intervals 
and with Peterson et al‟s (2003) replica form.   
 
Until now, no explanation has been offered to account for the low temporal 
reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension.  Riding has considered the possibility 
that there may be a systematic difference leading to low temporal reliability posing 
the question “if test results do change, is there a systematic pattern to the shift rather 
than just a random change, and what does this indicate?” (Riding, 2005, p. 13). The 
theory of diminished reflection can provide a much-needed explanation for the low 
temporal reliability that is characteristic of the wholist-analytic dimension. 
 
13.4.1 Diminished reflection across test sessions 
 
Reflective characteristics occur in situations of uncertainty, the act of reflection is 
focussed on achieving accuracy of the first response and the uncertainty relates to 
whether accuracy can be achieved or how easily accuracy can be achieved.  
Therefore, the first time a reflective individual approaches the wholist-analytic 
subtests; they will proceed with caution through the early test items and speed up as 
they progress through the test.  The diminished reflection represents a change in the 
degree of uncertainty, which is inherent in the test situation.  At the start of the test 
there is uncertainty about the difficulty level and likelihood of accuracy from trial to 
trial but over the course of the test it becomes apparent that the tasks are consistently 
simple and as uncertainty changes to certainty, reflection diminishes. 
 
When the same individual is required to complete the wholist-analytic subtests for a 
second time, the uncertainty, which characterised the first test session, will be 
considerably reduced.  Analytics will produce lower ratios at the retest session 
because the ratio is no longer being inflated by concomitant differences in reflective 
style.   
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The findings supported this hypothesis demonstrating that when the matching figures 
task was presented first, the analytics did produce significantly lower ratios but the 
source of the instability between test and re-test was not limited to the analytic 
individuals.  The test-retest reliability of the WAS-WA was a moderate r = 0.4, but 
when the test-retest coefficients were examined by style group it was found that the 
analytics and the intermediates were the source of instability producing correlations 
of r = -.1 and 0.1, but the wholists produced a satisfactory reliability correlation of r 
= 0.8.   
 
The effect of diminished reflection was further demonstrated by its affect on the 
wholist-analytic ratio when the subtest order is reversed.  When the embedded 
figures subtest was presented first, the reflective, part processors were 
inappropriately labelled as wholists because of the effect of reflective style and 
subtest order.  At the second test session when the effect of reflective style had 
diminished, the reflective, part processors who had been previously labelled as 
wholists produced the highest mean ratio and were relabelled more appropriately as 
analytics.   
 
This is evidenced by the instability of the WAS-AW producing a negative test-retest 
correlation of - 0.2.  All the style groups were unstable across test sessions; those 
labelled analytics and intermediates at the first test session were as likely to be 
wholists or intermediates at the second test session.  The wholists either remained 
wholist or became high analytics; this means that some of the participants were 
genuinely whole processors and therefore remained wholist across both sessions but 
a high proportion of those labelled wholist at the first session were merely reflective, 
part processors whose reflective style made them process the first, embedded figures 
test more slowly. At the second subtest the diminished affect of reflection meant that 
the part processors swung from being labelled as wholists to being labelled as 
analytics. 
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The difference in the temporal stability of the WAS-AW and the WAS-WA can only 
reasonably be attributed to the interaction between diminished reflective style and 
order effects present because of the lack of counterbalancing.   
 
13.4.2 Explaining the variability in test-retest correlations in modified forms of 
the wholist-analytic measure 
 
The theory of diminished reflection has the explanatory power to account for the low 
temporal reliability of unmodified forms of the wholist-analytic measure and to 
explain improvements, which have been achieved in the literature when the 
methodology of the wholist-analytic measure has been manipulated.  The effect of 
diminished reflection predicts low test-retest reliability in any measure of wholist-
analytic style, which relies on a ratio method and fails to adequately counterbalance 
the completion of the matching figures and embedded figures subtests.  This is 
because the first test session will measure the combined effects of reflective-
impulsive style and part-whole processing style and the second test session will 
measure the effects of part-whole processing style without the influence of reflective-
impulsive style. 
 
The theory of diminished reflection therefore, also predicts that any test that reduces 
the influence of reflective-impulsive style at the first test session will improve the 
test-retest correlations between session one and session two. 
 
Unmodified forms of the wholist-analytic dimension have produced test-retest ratios 
between .30 and .045 (Parkinson et al., 2004, Rezaei and Katz, 2004; Cook, 2008) 
and Peterson et al.‟s, (2003) replica and parallel forms of Riding‟s CSA (1991; 1998; 
2005), which reproduce the CSA‟s test instructions, have produced similarly low 
correlations of 0.30 and 0.31, respectively. 
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The WAS analysis has made a number of revisions to the wholist-analytic subtests 
which were predicted to increase reliability and exceed the coefficients produced by 
unmodified forms of the CSA and the forms which preserve test instruction.  The 
WAS analysis corrected a bias in Riding‟s (1991, 1998; 2005) CSA instructions 
which encouraged a cautious approach to the matching figure subtest but not to the 
embedded figure subtest; this bias was postulated to have encouraged greater 
reflection amongst reflective participants and therefore increased the effect of 
diminished reflection and decreased the reliability of the wholist-analytic dimension.  
The WAS analysis also introduced four practice items before each subtest with a 
similar aim of reducing uncertainty and the effects of reflection on the reliability of 
the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
The WAS analysis produced an improved test-retest correlation of 0.44 which 
exceeds the correlations typically reported in the literature (Peterson et al., 2003; 
Parkinson et al., 2004; Cook, 2008) but did not exceed the correlations produced by 
Rezaei and Katz (2004) when they employed unmodified forms of the CSA.  The 
improvement in reliability of the WAS analysis has been attributed to its improved, 
more balanced test instructions and the inclusion of practice items which reduce the 
influence of reflective style.  However, the temporal reliability was equivalent to but 
did not exceed Rezaei and Katz (2004) test-retest correlations; Two out of the three 
samples reported in Rezaei and Katz, (2004) study employed an unmodified form of 
the CSA which preserved the bias in test instruction so the fact that the WAS 
analysis did not improve on these correlations does limit the conclusions which can 
be drawn regarding the effectiveness of the improvements to the test instructions and 
inclusion of practice items.  However, it is unclear whether Rezaei and Katz (2004) 
test-retest correlations are based on ratio scores or label classifications and the 
slightly increased coefficients may be a reflection of the use of labels as the basis for 
the calculation which has be shown to lead to and increase in the correlation 
(Peterson et al., 2003; Parkinson et al., 2004). 
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The temporal reliability of the WAS analysis was lower than Rezaei and Katz‟s 
(2004) correlation of 0.55 when test instructions were manipulated to produce a bias 
towards speed, and Peterson et al.‟s (2003) extended version of the CSA, the C-CSA 
or the E-CSA (Peterson and Deary, 2006).  Both of these studies have inadvertently 
reduced reflective tendencies at the first subtest and therefore improved the 
correlation between test and retest.   
 
The bias created by Rezaei and Katz (2004) by encouraging overall speed of 
response is likely to have had the greatest influence on analytic participants, reducing 
their reflective tendencies.  This is consistent with Nietfeld and Bosma (2003) who 
found that the greatest increase in speed was produced by reflectives when speed was 
emphasised. 
 
Peterson et al. (2003) combined the replica and parallel version of the CSA to form 
the extended CSA, which has produced improved test-retest correlations of 0.53.  
The way in which the forms were combined are likely to account for the 
improvement; instead of adding the two groups of twenty matching figure items 
together from each test version to form the matching figure subtest and adding the 
two groups of twenty embedded figure items together to form the embedded figure 
subtest, Peterson et al. have merely bolted together the replica version to the parallel 
version.  Participants are, therefore, presented with the first matching figures subtest 
followed by the first embedded figures test and then after a five minute interval they 
are presented with the second matching figures test followed by the second 
embedded figures test.  The result is that the first two subtests are likely to be subject 
to the postulated effects of diminished reflection but the second set of subtests will 
be less affected because of a reduction in uncertainty.  When the trial items are 
combined to produce the wholist-analytic ratio, the measure is less susceptible to the 
confounding effects of reflective style and therefore produces higher correlations at 
retest. 
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The final evidence in support of the theory that diminished reflection is the cause of 
the wholist-analytic ratio‟s lack of temporal reliability is provided by the detrimental 
effect that reversing the subtest presentation order had on the stability of the ratio.  
The conflict, which is created, between the concomitant styles of reflection and 
analysis when the subtest order is reversed leads the reflective individuals to oscillate 
from producing the lowest mean wholist ratio in the first test session to producing the 
highest mean analytic ratio at retest.  This pendulum swing creates greater instability, 
which is apparent from the weak, negative test-retest correlation of -.20. 
 
13.5 The unidimensional perspective: Is there a relationship between style 
labels in the wholist-analytic family? 
 
The unidimensional perspective of style predicts that relationships should exist 
between analytic-global constructs, which are thought to measure different aspects of 
the same dimension.  To explore this, two studies were done to compare performance 
on wholist-analytic style, convergent-divergent style, reflective-impulsive style and 
analytic-intuitive style. 
 
The first study employed the WAS analyses as the measures of wholist-analytic 
style, this measure was chosen instead of the CSA to allow an exploration of the 
effects of subtest presentation order on the relationship between the wholist-analytic 
ratio and similar style constructs and to allow an examination of the relationship 
between the new part-whole ratio and other related styles.  Reflective-impulsive style 
was measured by calculating the median latency and the response accuracy across 
the eighty trials in the WAS analysis.  Reflective-impulsive style is demonstrated to 
be stable across a variety of tasks (Nietfeld and Bosma, 2003) and this method 
controlled for the local and global nature of the tasks by calculating reflective-
impulsive style across the matching figure and embedded figure tasks.  This method 
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was chosen in light of the criticisms of the MFFT, which is the traditional method of 
assessing reflective-impulsive style; the MFFT is reported to be biased toward 
analytic processing (Zelniker and Jeffrey, 1979) and have low internal consistency 
(Buela-Casal et al., 2003).  Convergent-divergent style was measured by the newly 
constructed and extensively developed and validated convergent and divergent 
thinking style tests.  Finally, analytic-intuitive style was measured using the 
Cognitive Styles Index (CSI), a self-report instrument measuring a similar super-
ordinate dimension of style.  The CSI was chosen because it has demonstrated the 
best reliability and validity of any of the global-analytic measures (Allinson and 
Hayes, 1996, Coffield et al., 2004). 
 
The second study was designed to replicate the findings of the previous correlation 
study by using the traditional methods of assessing wholist-analytic style and 
reflective-impulsive style to allow direct comparisons to be made with the styles 
literature.  Therefore, in this study the CSA, the MFFT, the CSI and the convergent-
divergent thinking test were employed to examine the relationship between wholist-
analytic style, reflective-impulsive style, analytic-intuitive style and convergent-
divergent style. 
 
 
13.5.1 Wholist-analytic style and reflective-impulsive style 
 
A weak relationship was found between reflective-impulsive style and wholist-
analytic style, this relationship was evident when the WAS analysis and the CSA 
were used as the basis of the wholist-analytic ratio.  The weak nature of the 
relationship appears to contradict the notion that the wholist-analytic ratio is 
confounded by reflective-impulsive style, however, the low correlations are likely to 
be an artefact of using a continuous reflective-impulsive scale, which will inevitably 
include slow and fast participants who are not characterised by a reflective or 
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impulsive approach.  The effect of reflective-impulsive style on the wholist-analytic 
ratio is more apparent when reflective-impulsive style is used as an independent 
factor and wholist-analytic style is the dependent variable.  Reflective groups 
produced more analytic ratios, this effect was evident when the WAS analysis was 
used as the basis of the reflective style and analytic style categorisation and was 
replicated when the MFFT and the CSA was used as the basis of the categorisations.  
These findings demonstrated a link between wholist-analytic style and reflective-
impulsive style, however, the findings raised two further questions: 
 
Firstly, was the link between wholist-analytic style and reflective-impulsive style a 
real relationship or did it just reflect the sensitivity of the wholist-analytic ratio to 
reflective-impulsive style? 
 
Secondly, the link between reflective style and analytic style is greater when the 
WAS analysis is used as the basis of wholist-analytic style.  Ironically, this leads to 
the possibility that the WAS analysis is more sensitive to reflective-impulsive style 
than the CSA. 
 
In answer to the first question, there was a relationship between the part-whole 
processing ratio and reflective-impulsive style suggesting that there is a genuine 
relationship between the part and whole preferences of analytics and wholists and 
their reflective-impulsive styles.  Additionally, the conflict between reflective style 
and part processing or analytic style, which has been demonstrated when the order of 
the matching figure and embedded figure subtests is reversed, would only occur if 
part processors have a concomitant reflective style. 
 
The second question brings into focus the effect of the increased complexity that was 
introduced to the WAS analysis by increasing the number of simple shapes which 
constitute the complex geometric stimuli in the wholist-analytic subtests.  It is 
possible that the increased level of complexity has led to a more pronounced effect of 
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reflective style.  If this is the case then the conclusions drawn from the WAS analysis 
would still inform the methodology of the CSA but smaller effect sizes may be 
expected in the context of the CSA.   
 
 
13.5.2 Cognitive styles index (CSI) and reflective-impulsive style 
 
The only construct, which correlated with analytic-intuitive style, was reflective-
impulsive style but the findings were equivocal; when the MFFT was used to 
measure reflective-impulsive style the CSI did not correlate but when reflective-
impulsive style was calculated by the speed and accuracy of responses on the WAS 
analysis, a weak correlation was found.  The findings suggest that the CSI is 
associated with differences in reflective-impulsive approaches and not to part-whole 
processing differences.  The lack of correlation with the MFFT may be a result of the 
MFFT being sensitive to analytic-global differences.   
 
The reflective-impulsive style measurement based on the WAS analysis was free 
from bias towards analytic or global processing and therefore demonstrated a 
relationship with the CSI. Analytic-intuitive style failed to correlate with wholist-
analytic style when the CSA was used and when the WAS analysis was used as the 
basis of the ratio calculation; it also failed to correlate with the part-whole ratio and 
convergent-divergent style.  However, when part-whole processing style, reflective-
impulsive style, analytic-intuitive style and convergent-divergent style scores were 
entered into a principle component analysis; two factors were extracted and analytic-
intuitive style loaded moderately on the first factor, with reflective-impulsive style 
and part-whole processing style loading highly on the same factor. 
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13.5.3 Convergent-divergent Style and Wholist-analytic style 
 
The only construct that correlated with convergent-divergent style was wholist-
analytic style and the findings were equivocal.  Convergent-divergent style did not 
correlate with wholist-analytic style when the WAS analysis was used but it did 
correlate when the CSA was used.  In this case the equivocal correlational data may 
be a result of a slight difference in the administration of the convergent-divergent 
tests; in Chapter eleven the presentation of the non-verbal convergent test, the verbal 
convergent test and the divergent test was counterbalanced and each test was given a 
7.5 minute time limit.  However in Chapter twelve, the non-verbal and the verbal 
convergent test were combined as one test and given a 15 minute time limit and was 
counterbalanced with the divergent test which was also given a 15 minute limit.   
 
Therefore, the time limit apportioned to the convergent tests remained constant and 
was consistent with the MENSA guidelines but the time limit for the divergent test 
doubled.  The increased time limit for the divergent, object uses test was more in 
keeping with Hudson‟s (1967) recommendations.  The test-retest reliability of the 
convergent-divergent tests using the methodology employed in Chapter twelve was 
very good. 
 
Convergent-divergent style did not correlate with reflective impulsive style, part-
whole processing style, wholist-analytic style or analytic intuitive style when the 7.5 
minutes methodology was employed; and in the principle component analysis, 
convergent-divergent style did not load on factor one with reflective-impulsive, part-
whole processing and analytic-intuitive style, it loaded highly on its own in factor 
two.  When the 15-minute methodology was employed, convergent-divergent style 
did correlate with wholist-analytic style but correlational data and principle 
component analyses are not available to compare it to reflective-impulsive style,  
analytic-intuitive style or part-whole processing style.  
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13.5.4 Implications for unidimensional view 
 
These results offer partial support for the unidimensional view of style demonstrating 
a consistent relationship between the habitual tendency towards part or whole 
processing and a tendency to take a reflective or impulsive approach to tasks; these 
findings were replicated and emerged repeatedly in a number of experimental 
situations.  Those individuals who took longer than average and were more accurate 
when completing the WAS analysis, which is characteristic of a reflective style, 
achieved higher ratios, indicating a more analytic style, and were slowed down most 
by the increase in the number of simple shapes which made up the complex 
geometric figures in the matching figure trials, indicating that they adopted a part 
processing approach to complete both the matching figure and the embedded figures 
tasks.   
 
Similarly those who were slowest and most accurate when completing the matching 
familiar figures test (MFFT), which is characteristic of a reflective style, produced 
higher ratios on the wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA, indicating that they were 
more analytic.  Most convincingly, a complimentary effect of reflective and part 
processing style was evident which inflated analytic ratios when the matching figure 
subtest was presented first and this was contrasted with the presence of a conflicting 
effect when the subtest order was reversed which led to the habitual reflective 
approach cancelling out the effect of the preference for part processing.   
 
The conflict between reflective and part processing approach when then the subtests 
are reversed also led to a dramatic shift in the ratios achieved across test sessions.  At 
the second test session the reflection style diminished and the styles were no longer 
in conflict, leading to the WAS-AW producing unstable negative correlations in 
comparison to the moderately stable WAS-WA. 
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In summary, reflective-impulsive style had the most consistent links with the other 
global-analytic style constructs; reflective individuals were more analytic, as 
measured by the CSA, the WAS analysis and the CSI, and they demonstrated a 
preference for part processing.   The links with the CSA, the WAS analysis and the 
CSI may have been mediated by the sensitivity of the measures to reflective-
impulsive style rather than demonstrating a genuine relationship between reflective-
impulsive style and global-analytic constructs, however the tendency for reflective 
individuals to approach the matching figures task with a part processing approach, as 
measured by the part-whole ratio, demonstrates an association which is not 
confounded by other styles.  The complimentary nature of reflective-impulsive style 
and part-whole processing was also demonstrated by the WAS analysis; ratios were 
more stable when the styles worked in harmony but were less stable when the style 
were in conflict.  Therefore there does appear to be a robust and consistent 
relationship between the habitual tendency to reflect on response alternatives in 
situations where accuracy is uncertain and the tendency to choose a part processing 
approach. 
 
The relationship between the two super-ordinate measures of style was not 
supported; The CSI did not correlate with the CSA, the WAS analysis or the MFFT, 
which are all sensitive to both reflective-impulsive style and local-global or part-
whole style differences.  Further, the CSI did not correlate with the part-whole ratio 
or convergent-divergent style, but did correlate with reflective-impulsive style when 
a measure was used that was not sensitive to differences in local-global processing 
differences.  This suggests that the CSI self-report items appear to be measuring 
control and tempo variables associated with reflective style rather than analytic-
global processing differences. 
 
The relationship between convergent-divergent style and wholist-analytic style was 
equivocal, perhaps owing to the slight difference in the timing used for the divergent 
test between studies.  Convergent-divergent style did not correlate with reflective-
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impulsive style which may explain it‟s lack of correlation with the CSI and the WAS 
analysis; it did correlate with wholist-analytic style when the CSA was used but this 
data has not been replicated.  The principle component analysis loaded convergent -
divergent style highly on its own factor. 
 
The findings partially support the unidimensional perspective, demonstrating that 
people with a reflective style are more likely to also have a part processing 
preference, which is characteristic of an analytic style. Beyond that, the conclusions 
should be treated with a degree of caution and need further replication, however, two 
further conclusions can be tentatively drawn; firstly, the CSI is not a similar style 
construct to the wholist-analytic dimension, and that whilst they are both super-
ordinate styles, the CSI appears to be more related to differences in reflection rather 
than differences in part and whole processing.  Secondly, convergent-divergent style 
is not related to differences in reflective-impulsive style but there is equivocal 
support for a link between convergent-divergent thinking and individual differences 
part-whole processing which characterise the wholist-analytic dimension. 
 
Alternately the consistent link found between reflective-impulsive style and global-
analytic constructs offers support for Kagan‟s original conception of reflective style 
as a determinant of analytic processing (Kagan, et al. 1964) and is consistent with the 
wider findings in the styles literature.  Factor analytic evidence of the link between 
reflective style and analytic style has been provided by Riding and Dyer, (1987) and 
Allinson and Hayes (1996) and almost without exception, where links between the 
style labels have been demonstrated in the literature, reflective style has invariably 
been one of the correlation variables.   
 
It is clear from the styles literature and from the current findings that one of the most 
pervasive and damaging problems in the styles research is the lack of valid measures.  
In particular, the use of accuracy and latency as the basis for measurements invites 
confounds with reflective-impulsive style, the use of figural items invites confounds 
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with local-global processing and the use of closed end items invites confounds with 
convergent-divergent style.  The problems with measurement create background 
noise, which prevent a clear picture of the style relationships from being established.    
The measurements employed in the test of this thesis were carefully selected with a 
view to avoid confounds with ability and related styles but, despite this, there are a 
number of limitations with the methodologies and measures which have limited the 
conclusions which may be drawn in relation to the unidimensional debate, this will 
be discussed in respect to future recommendations in 14.6. 
 
13.6 Summary, conclusions and recommendations for future research 
 
The wholist-analytic dimension (Riding, 1991) is a structural theory of style 
(Coffield et al. 2004) that implies a relatively fixed tendency towards differentiation 
or synthesis of information, which is likely to have a biological basis.  Ridings 
(1991) construct and the constructs on which it was based, the leveller-sharpener 
dimension (Holzman and Klein, 1954) and the field independent-dependent 
dimension (Witkin, 1950), have an intuitive appeal because they echo the way in 
which many of the perceptual systems organise and process sensory stimuli.  The 
notion that information processing often involves a trade off between thorough, 
detailed, analytic, bottom up processing versus a quicker, more cognitively 
economical, global, top down processing is consistent with the way that many of the 
systems in the brain have been hypothesised to function (Hill and Frith, 2003).   
    
For example in the visual system there are feed forward mechanisms and feedback 
mechanisms, which mature at different rates, maturation of the bottom up processes 
occurs first and then the top down processes mature later; problems during the 
maturational stage may set up a preference for global or local processing (Burkhalter, 
1993).   
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Frith (2003) suggested that a failure during the maturation of the top down systems 
can occur several times during development across different functional systems and 
could account for the incidence of weak central coherence, which presents as a 
tendency to prefer local processing to global processing.  Frith‟s (2003) suggestion 
relates to the presence of weak central coherence as a clinical symptom of autism but 
Happe (1999) argued that the autistic phenotype with its link between an impersonal 
approach and a tendency towards local processing may represent the clinically 
extreme end of a normal cognitive style continuum along which the whole 
population is positioned (Frith, 1989; Happe, 1999).  Evidence in support of such 
theorizing is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
The parallels between the notion of strong and weak central coherence (Happe, 1999) 
drawn from the research on autism and the concept of the wholist-analytic style 
dimension have not been made in the cognitive styles literature before, but the 
parallel lends credence to the notion that the population is characterized by a 
tendency towards a differentiation or synthesis approach to information processing. 
 
The concept of wholist-analytic style therefore makes intuitive sense in a way that 
many of the multidimensional style theories do not because it proposes individual 
differences along a continuum based on differentiation and synthesis, which makes 
good evolutionary sense and has a viable biological basis.   
 
The wholist-analytic dimensions, reflects a unitary perspective of style, which 
predicts that many of the style constructs are merely measuring different aspects of 
one super-ordinate dimension.  This perspective has been criticised as an 
oversimplification and the lack of inter-correlations between the style constructs has 
done little to dispel such criticism (Sadler-Smith and Hodgkinson, 2003).   
 
Since Riding‟s (1991) initial conception of the wholist-analytic dimension, very little 
has been done to explore the relationships between subordinate style constructs.  
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Riding (2005) and Hodgkinson and Sadler-Smith (2003) recommended the 
administration of a number of cognitive style measures to establish whether they 
inter-correlate.  The current thesis has taken this approach to explore the unitary 
assumptions of the wholist-analytic dimension by comparing wholist-analytic style 
with reflective-impulsive style, convergent-divergent style and analytic-intuitive 
style.  Consistent support was found for a relationship between reflective-impulsive 
style and wholist-analytic style and partial support was found for the relationship 
between convergent-divergent style and wholist-analytic style.  The direction of the 
relationship was as predicted, wholist individuals were more divergent and impulsive 
and analytic individuals were more convergent and reflective.  There was no 
relationship between reflective style and convergent style, suggesting that perhaps 
subordinate style constructs should be considered as uncorrelated predictors of 
wholist-analytic style.   
 
In this sense correlations between the style measurements may not be strictly 
necessary to support the unitary dimension of style.  If an individual‟s position on the 
sub-ordinate style constructs could be considered as predictive of their super-ordinate 
style then regression models dictate that predictor variables should not correlate with 
each other.  Style could be viewed as a function of the degree to which an individual 
possesses each aspect of global-analytic style as measured by the principle style 
dimensions, which form the super-ordinate dimension.  Perhaps a useful analogy can 
be made with left and right sidedness which is a function of preferences for left or 
right foot, hand, ear, and so on. 
 
Support the unitary perspective is also apparent in the common and repeated 
distinctions that have been made between social and interpersonal differences in 
functioning and preferences.  It is argued in appendix 1 that convergent-divergent 
style (Hudson, 1967), field independent-independent style (Witkin, 1950) and 
wholist-analytic style (Riding, 1991) each discriminate between the same 
impersonal-interpersonal style differences and therefore have the power to 
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discriminate among the same social and personal characteristics.  The importance of 
this common discriminatory power has not been given its due; first, it suggests that 
the styles, which are measuring different aspects of a tendency towards 
differentiation and synthesis, are also describing similar groups of people and is 
therefore strong support for the unitary perspective.  Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, it brings into focus the pervasive link between differences in social 
functioning and a tendency to use local or global processing.   
 
This link between impersonal-interpersonal style and local versus global processing 
leads back to the literature on autism and suggests the existence of a cognitive style 
phenotype (Happe, 1999), in which local processing is associated with an impersonal 
style and global processing is associated with an inter-personal style.  There are 
many parallels to be drawn with the research into social functioning and central 
coherence in autistic individuals, and research has already suggested a genetic basis 
for the style differences, providing evidence that the fathers of autistic offspring have 
a non-clinical tendency towards local processing and an impersonal style which 
reinforce the possibility that some of the clinical symptoms of autism are merely the 
clinically extreme analytic pole of a normal individual difference continuum (Happe, 
1999). 
 
In conclusion the construct of wholist-analytic style has a strong theoretical basis; it 
remains a promising means of conceptualising individual style differences and of 
consolidating similar constructs in the literature.  The new parallels which have been 
drawn here with the literature of autism opens the door to a wealth of research which 
is tackling very similar questions to those being posed in the styles research and 
could aid the progress of style researchers in establishing a genetic and biological 
basis for wholist-analytic style. 
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However, whilst the wholist-analytic construct is judged to have strong theoretical 
foundations, the method by which it is measured lacks validity and reliability and 
progress can only be made once these have been addressed.   
 
13.6.1 Recommendations to improve the validity and reliability of the wholist-
analytic ratio method 
 
The current research supports the validity of the wholist-analytic dimension but not 
the method that has been used to measure it.   The theory of diminished reflection 
proposed in this thesis has demonstrated that the confounding influence of reflective 
style reduces the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio but in doing so the theory also 
explains the low temporal reliability of the measure and demonstrates a link between 
reflective-impulsive style and part-whole processing.  Additionally, an asymmetry 
that has been demonstrated in the nature of the processing which underlies the ratio; 
this too reduces the validity of the measure but simultaneously demonstrates the 
tendency for analytics to choose part processing approach and for wholists to chose a 
whole processing approach in a way which to-date had not been satisfactorily 
evidenced in the styles literature.  A number of recommendations can be made to 
improve the validity and consequently the reliability of the wholist-analytic ratio. 
 
Controlling for the effect of diminished reflection 
 
The effect of diminished reflection on the wholist-analytic ratio can be removed very 
simply by counterbalancing the presentation of the matching figure and embedded 
figure tasks.  It is important that this is not achieved by merely alternating the 
presentation of the subtests because this would still retain the influence of diminished 
reflection and would not improve the validity of the measure.  Ideally the matching 
figure tasks and the embedded figure tasks should be combined in the same subtest 
and presented randomly within that subtest. This approach is the same as that used 
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for the verbal and imager items in Riding‟s CSA (1991).  In this way, any tendency 
to begin more slowly during the early test items would equally affect matching figure 
items and embedded figure items and would therefore have no effect on the wholist-
analytic ratio.  This would eradicate the influence of reflective style, which will lead 
to improved validity and consequently improved temporal reliability.  The presence 
or absence of practice items and the issue of biased instruction, which can mediate 
the effects of reflection and were discussed in Chapter four and five, will become 
irrelevant if adequate counterbalancing methods are employed. 
 
Rectifying an asymmetry 
 
The asymmetry in the nature of processing, which forms the basis of the ratio, is 
potentially more difficult to rectify than the effect of diminished reflection.  The 
wholist-analytic ratio purports to measure an ability difference, which is apparent 
when individuals use their preferred and non-preferred methods of processing.  
However, whilst wholists are being measured on their relative ability to employ part 
and whole processing strategies, to complete tasks which favour part and whole 
processing; , respectively; analytics are being compared on the efficacy of a part 
processing strategy to complete tasks which favour or disadvantage a part processing 
approach.  There are two ways to eradicate the asymmetry; either, the matching 
figures task should be replaced with a task, which can only be completed by using a 
whole processing approach; or, the embedded figures task should be replaced with a 
task, which can be completed using either a part processing or whole processing 
approach but that favour a part processing strategy. 
 
The first option is favourable, since it would ensure that the analytics and the 
wholists were being assessed based on their relative ability to employ their preferred 
and non-preferred processing strategy in task appropriate situations.  The second 
option would demonstrate that whole processors habitually choose whole processing 
strategies and that part processors habitually choose a part processing strategy but the 
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performance differences would stem from the efficacy of part and whole strategies 
when applied to tasks with congruent and incongruent task demands.  In either 
situation higher ratios would indicate analytic style and lower ratios would indicate 
wholist style.     
 
The revisions to the CSA outlined above should be applied in stages; the 
counterbalancing should be employed first since it will improve the validity and 
reliability without introducing new confounds to the measure.  The effect of the 
counterbalancing, on reliability and validity, should be established before the issue of 
the asymmetry is addressed, since any change to the tasks in the wholist-analytic 
measure will potentially introduce new confounds. 
 
Improving the discriminatory power of wholist-analytic subtests 
 
There is a need for a version of the CSA, which is open to individual item inspection.  
This will eliminate the trend for new measures to be devised in order to examine the 
psychometric properties of the wholist-analytic ratio (e.g. Peterson, et al., 2003 and 
Davies and Graff, 2006).  The style measures are very sensitive to small changes in 
methodology and therefore, use of the same measure of wholist-analytic style is 
strongly recommended to avoid further confounds.  It is recommended that the 
measure used should be the CSA since it has already amassed a substantial body of 
literature, but the CSA will be of limited use whilst its output is restricted to 
summary speed, accuracy and ratio data.   
 
Access to individual item data would allow the discriminative power of the wholist-
analytic ratio to be assessed; the current research suggested that only one subtest was 
discriminating between wholists and analytics, this appeared to be a result of the 
influence of reflective style and should be eradicated with adequate counterbalancing 
measures but this merely reinforces the need for analysis at the individual item level 
if progress is to be made with the validity of the wholist-analytic ratio.  Similarly, the 
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exposure of the systematic effects of diminished reflection on the validity and 
reliability of the wholist-analytic ratio were only possible using the individual item 
data provided by the WAS analysis but the effects need to be replicated using the 
CSA itself. 
 
13.6.2 Recommendations for future research 
 
Effects of counterbalancing on reliability 
 
Temporal reliability and internal consistency tests should be repeated using a 
counterbalanced version of the wholist-analytic dimension of the CSA.  Matching 
figure and embedded figure items should be randomised and presented within the 
same subtest to ensure that any influence of reflective style will equally affect both 
types of task and therefore have no impact on the ratio calculation.  The stimuli used 
in the trials, the instructions and the test length should remain true to the original 
CSA.  A test-retest reliability study should be undertaken using an interval of 
approximately twelve months and should aim employ a minimum of one hundred 
people.   
 
Generally, the sample sizes used in the literature to assess temporal reliability have 
ranged from twenty-seven to eighty-nine participants (Peterson et al., 2003; 
Parkinson et al., 2004; Rezai and Katz, 2004; Cook, 2008) with power estimates 
suggesting fifty people is sufficient to ensure adequate statistical power. The sample 
size recommended here is higher because with the absence of the influence of 
reflective style, effect size is anticipated to be lower.  Using the effect size of the 
part-whole ratio as a guide (see Chapter six), a low to moderate effect size is 
anticipated which will require one hundred participants to ensure adequate test 
power.  The counterbalanced version of the test should allow item level analysis to 
examine the progress of analytics, intermediates and wholists through the test and 
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compare this from test to re-test.  In addition to the overall test-retest reliability, the 
test-rest correlations of each style group should be investigated to identify the source 
of any instability. 
 
 
 
Relationship between the styles constructs 
 
More needs to be done to establish the relationship between styles in the wholist-
analytic family and between the subordinate styles and super-ordinate styles; a 
number of recommendations can be made for testing of the unidimensional 
perspective.  It is recommended that a sample of one hundred people be assessed on 
their wholist-analytic style, reflective-impulsive style, leveller-sharpener style and 
convergent-divergent style.  
 
Wholist-analytic style should be assessed by using a revised version of the wholist-
analytic dimension of the CSA, as described above, which employs adequate 
counterbalancing should be employed to measure wholist-analytic style to provide a 
valid measure of part-whole processing without the confounds of reflective-
impulsive style.  Leveller-sharpener style should be measured by the traditional 
schematasizing test. 
 
The test of convergent-divergent style using the methodology employed in Chapter 
twelve has proved to be a reliable measure of style with very good discriminant 
validity and standardisation of performance allows a relative convergent-divergent 
score to be calculated.  When choosing convergent items it is important to include an 
equal number of verbal and non-verbal items and when using the object uses test as 
the divergent measure, participants should be allowed fifteen minutes to complete it. 
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Reflective-impulsive style should be calculated in one of two ways, either the median 
speed of processing the forty items on the wholist-analytic measure and the number 
of errors made during completion should be used as an indicator of reflective-
impulsive style; or the MFFT-20 should be employed.  Unlike the traditional 
matching familiar figures test, both these measurements will control for the influence 
of local-global preferences, however, care should be taken to assess the presence of 
ceiling effects in the accuracy variable.  In either case, the median split method 
should be used to create style groups rather than using a continuous style variable.  
This is because the slow-inaccurate and fast-accurate individuals cannot be treated as 
intermediate between the reflective and impulsive style groups; their reflective or 
impulsive behaviour is mediated by efficiency, which masks their style.  
 
If the subordinate variables demonstrate a relationship lower than r = .3 or .4 then 
multiple regression techniques should be employed with wholist-analytic style as the 
criterion variable to assess their role as predictor variables.  A sample of 100 people 
would be sufficient for a multiple regression using four variables and would also be a 
minimum requirement for a principle component analysis. 
 
Unipolar or bipolar effects: the source of the ratio difference 
 
Using a revised measure of wholist-analytic style, which employs adequate 
counterbalancing and allows an item level analysis the power of each group of tasks 
to discriminate between wholists and analytics should be determined.  This is 
particularly important in light of the asymmetry which has been exposed in this 
thesis.   
 
If the discriminate power of the wholist-analytic ratio is derived predominantly from 
the matching figures tasks then the ratio reflects a tendency to choose a part or whole 
processing style but does not provide any evidence relating to relative abilities to use 
either strategy.  In this case wholists and analytics may be equally efficient using part 
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or whole strategies but just have a tendency to employ one or the other when a 
choice is possible. 
 
If on the other hand the power of the ratio is predominantly derived from the 
embedded figure tasks then this suggests a unipolar difference in disembedding 
ability which is akin to measures of field independence-independence and is 
therefore subject to the same criticisms relating to issues of intelligence and 
efficiency. 
 
The third outcome is that the ratio as derived from differences in performance in both 
types of tasks.  This would demonstrate a difference in disembedding ability and a 
preference for part or whole processing but further tests would be needed to assess 
any difference in ability to whole process, since it has been shown in Chapter nine 
that this is not measured by the wholist-analytic dimension, because analytics use 
part processing for all tasks. 
 
 
Increasing the complexity of the wholist-analytic style measure 
 
Riding recently recommended the development of a more difficult test of wholist-
analytic style, stating that “a problem with the existing WA test is that the items are 
very easy and it depends on rather fragile response times, there could be a test of 
relative performance on harder items.” (Riding, 2005, p.13).  The present findings 
urge caution with taking this approach unless the matching figure and embedded 
figure items are first counterbalanced.  In its present form, any increases in 
complexity may well exacerbate the confounding influence of reflective style.  
However, in conjunction with adequate counterbalancing the increase in complexity 
should amplify the size of the effect between style groups and would also offer a 
better indicator of reflective-impulsive style, as described in 14.8.2 which would be 
less susceptible to ceiling effects.   
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Exploring the cognitive style phenotype 
 
The theory that the clinical symptoms of weak central coherence and problems with 
interpersonal functioning, which characterise individuals with autistic spectrum 
disorder, is merely a clinically extreme end of a cognitive style continuum (Happe, 
1999; 2006) opens an interesting avenue of research which could explain the 
pervasive link between global-analytic styles and interpersonal-impersonal styles of 
social functioning.  The methodology outlined in 13.8.1 could be extended to include 
a measure of social functioning and could inform the unidimensional versus multi 
dimensional debate. 
 
The notion of a phenotype implies a genetic component to cognitive style and studies 
have shown evidence of an increased incidence of impersonal styles and bias‟ for 
local processing in the close relatives of autistic individuals (Baron-Cohen and 
Hammer, 1997; Happe et al., 2001; Hill and Frith, 2003).  These findings need to be 
replicated in non clinical samples to support a genetic basis of style; in particular the 
fathers of analytic individuals should be assessed to establish any relationship 
between styles. 
 
Biological basis of style 
 
Another new direction, inspired by the literature on autism, is the link between brain 
maturation and cognitive style.  If a lack of synaptic pruning during the maturation of 
systems relating to global processing (Burkhalter, 1993) is the source of local 
processing preferences then drawing on Geschwinds maturational hypothesis 
(Geschwind and Galaburda, 1987), there may be a link between individual 
differences in maturation rate and preferences in global-local cognitive styles.   
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Early maturers may spend proportionately longer in the local processing maturational 
phase and late maturers may spend proportionately more time in the global 
processing maturational phase.  It would be interesting to explore a possible link 
between brain maturation and wholist-analytic cognitive style.  
 
Onset of puberty is an indirect but practical and robust correlate of brain maturation.  
Individual differences in maturation rates can be attributed to a genetic cause or an 
environmental cause such as children being born to older mothers; sex differences 
may also be a factor in maturation rates.  These variables should be considered in any 
investigation relating to maturational rates and cognitive style. 
 
The key to successfully addressing the research questions outlined above is the 
availability of a reliable and valid measure of style.  The wholist-analytic dimension 
of style has a large research base and strong theoretical foundation and the 
recommendations made in this thesis should lead to the improved validity and 
reliability of the wholist-analytic ratio. 
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Appendix 1: Impersonal, Analytic Style versus Interpersonal, 
Global Style 
 
1.1: Introduction 
 
Chapter three demonstrated the lack of satisfactory correlational evidence to support 
the unitary perspective of style; however, there are robust individual differences in 
social and interpersonal functioning and preferences, which provide a common 
thread linking the global-analytic constructs together. Impersonal-interpersonal style 
was reported independently in the early convergent-divergent style (Hudson, 1967) 
and field independent-dependent style (Witkin, 1950) research.  The differences 
continue to be reported in relation to the more recent super-ordinate conception of 
wholist-analytic style (Riding, 1991; 1998; 2005). 
 
The implications of the association between global-analytic style and interpersonal-
impersonal style seem to have been largely missed; the robust link demonstrates 
striking parallels with current autism research, which may be the key to establishing 
the genetic and biological basis of style. 
 
Autistic individuals are characterised by impaired social functioning (A.P.A. 1995; 
Hill and Frith, 2003; Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, Terwogt and Stegge, 2008) and they also 
demonstrate „weak central coherence‟ which is a term used in the autism literature to 
refer to a local processing style (Happe, 1999; Hill and Frith, 2003).  Autistics have 
superior function on the EFT (Shah and Frith, 1983; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 
1997); and demonstrate a tendency for local processing over global processing across 
a number of tasks and modalities (Hermelin and O‟Connor, 1967; Shah and Frith, 
1983; Frith and Snowling, 1983; Snowling and Frith, 1986; Tager-Flusberg, 1991; 
Happe, 1997; Happe, 1999). 
 
346 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The autism literature has suggested that the autistic phenotype may represent the 
extreme end of a cognitive style dimension, which is characterised by differences in 
social functioning and global versus local processing (Happe, 1999; Hill and Frith, 
2003). 
 
Autism research and the notion of an autistic phenotype as an extreme at the analytic 
pole of a global-analytic dimension may offer the coherence and credibility, which 
the cognitive styles literature currently needs.  At the very least, it should inform the 
ongoing unidimensional versus multidimensional style debate. 
 
1.2: Social and interpersonal functioning in cognitive style 
 
Consistent differences in the social and interpersonal preferences of those with global 
or analytic styles have been noted throughout the literature.  The distinctions drawn 
from the early literature relating to field independent-dependent style and 
convergent-divergent style are particularly convincing because they were reported 
independently of each other.   
 
Field dependent individuals have been characterised as having an interpersonal 
orientation and field independent people as having an impersonal orientation (Witkin 
and Goodenough, 1981).  A similar distinction has been drawn between convergers 
and divergers, Hudson writes “the converger takes refuge from people in things – the 
diverger takes refuge from things in people” (Hudson, 1967, p.109). 
 
Field dependents are more attentive to social information; they spend more time 
looking at faces (Konstadt and Forman, 1965; Ruble and Nakaura, 1972) and 
consequently are better at recall of faces (Crutchfield, Woodworth and Albrecht 
1958; Messick and Darmarin, 1964).  This also extends to verbal social information 
(e.g. Fiztgibbons and Goldberger, 1971; Goldberger and Bendich, 1972).  Field 
dependents prefer situations that bring them into contact with others whilst field 
347 
 
 
 
 
 
 
independents are more solitary (Witkin and Goodenough, 1981), these preferences 
impact on career and educational choices (Witkin, 1976; Witkin et al. 1977).  Field 
dependents are described as being “more open with their feelings” (Witkin and 
Goodenough, 1981, p.44). 
 
Donoghue, McCarrey and Clement, (1983) found that field dependents were more 
affected by social facilitation than field independents.  Their laughter was enhanced 
to a significantly greater extent by the presence of a confederate. Saracho and 
Spodek, (1981; 1986) also found field dependent individuals to be more social and 
interested in others. 
 
Social differences have also been identified in childrens‟ play behaviour; field 
dependent children have been found to engage in a greater variety of play 
behaviours, select more social play areas and engage in more associative play, which 
involves interaction whereas field independent children engage more in parallel play 
where children play next to each other without interacting (Saracho, 1998). 
 
Hudson (1967) makes a number of comparable distinctions between convergers and 
divergers.  Divergers‟ drawings more often featured people than convergers‟ 
drawings; the converger avoids discussion of a personal nature whilst the diverger 
“positively seeks it out” (Hudson, 1967, p.109).  The diverger prefers the human 
aspects of culture, literature and politics whereas the converger prefers the technical 
and the practical.  In describing the converger, Hudson notes “his concentration upon 
the impersonal aspects of his culture, both in school and out.” and “the caution with 
which he expresses his feelings.  At some stage in his life he seems to have turned 
his back on the sphere of personal relations, and focussed all his attention on areas 
where people and personal emotions are least likely to obtrude” (Hudson, 1967, 
p.102-103) 
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More recently, similar interpersonal distinctions have been reported in the CSA 
literature thereby providing a strong link between the subordinate and super-ordinate 
styles. 
 
Riding and Craig (1998) found that wholists were considered more sociable, and 
more pleasant and likeable.  Analytics were considered more solitary, more 
unsociable, had a tendency to blame others and lacked empathy.   Riding and Craig 
(1999) found that within a sample of boys exhibiting problem behaviour in special 
schools, analytics were more often reported for incidences of solitary behaviour.  
Similarly, Riding (1991) stated that wholists are more dependent and gregarious 
whilst analytics are more isolated and self-reliant.   
 
Interestingly, there also appears to be interpersonal differences between verbal and 
imager styles.  Riding (1994) stated that verbal individuals focus outward toward 
others, preferring a stimulating environment.  Their social group will be an extension 
of themselves.  Imagers, on the other hand, focus inward, are more passive and 
content with a static environment.  Their social group are distant from themselves 
and they are less socially aware. Following the notion of unitary and complimentary 
styles proposed by Riding and Sadler-Smith (1992), this suggests that wholist-
verbalisers and analytic-imagers have unitary interpersonal styles and wholist-
imagers and analytic-verbalisers have complimentary interpersonal styles.  This is 
contrary to the complimentary and unitary pairings, which are based on wholist and 
analytic processing. 
 
The link between global-analytic processing and interpersonal-impersonal style 
parallels the characteristic differences seen in autistic individuals and autism 
researchers have themselves drawn parallels with the notion of autism as a clinically 
extreme end of a normal cognitive style dimension.   
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1.3: Cognitive style and the autistic phenotype 
 
In a 2003 review of the autism literature, Hill and Frith identified two current 
theories, which universally characterise autistic individuals; these are social 
impairments and a bias towards local processing.  Naturally, these characteristics are 
clinically extreme but they each have parallels in the cognitive styles literature. 
 
1.3.1: Social impairments 
 
Autistic individuals have social impairments, which can make them appear aloof and 
withdrawn from other people (Hill and Frith, 2003).  The diagnostic statistical 
manual of mental disorders characterises the social impairments of autistic disorders 
as “marked impairments in the use of multiple nonverbal behaviours such as eye-to-
eye gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to regulate social 
interaction”, “a lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, interests, or 
achievements with other people” and “a lack of social or emotional reciprocity” 
(A.P.A. 1995, p. 72)  
 
Begeer et al. (2008) reviewed empirical studies that considered emotional 
competence in autism; they reported that, at one year old, children with autistic 
spectrum disorders (ASD) looked less at faces and people (Osterling, Dawson and 
Munson, 2002; Palomo, Belinchon and Ozonoff, 2006); at three to four years old 
they were less attracted to human faces (Dawson, Carver, Meltzoff,  Panagiotides, 
Partland and Webb, 2002). ASD individuals also showed impaired identification and 
memory for faces but not for objects (Davies, Bishop, Manstead and Tantam, 1994; 
Boucher, Lewis and Collis, 1998; Blair, Frith, Smith, Abell and Cipolotti, 2002) 
 
The impaired memory and identification of facial stimuli has been attributed to ASD 
individuals focussing on discrete elements rather than integrating the facial stimuli 
into a coherent whole.  Evidence for this comes from the finding that when face 
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stimuli is inverted ASD individuals demonstrated no impairment and sometimes 
show superior performance in identification of facial stimuli (Tantam, Monaghan, 
Nicholson and Stirling, 1989; Teunisse and de Gelder, 2003). 
 
ASD individuals also appear to focus on different facial details than control subjects; 
individuals without ASD tend to focus relatively more on the eye region than the 
mouth, whereas ASD individuals focus on the mouth area relative to the eyes (Joseph 
and Tanaka, 2003; Klin, Jones, Shultz, Volkmar and Cohen, 2002). 
 
Autistics show impairments in face recognition and the reading of emotion from the 
eyes, which have been demonstrated at a physiological level (Critchley, Daly, 
Bullmore, Williams, Van Amelsvoort, Robertson, Rowe, Phillips, McAlonan, 
Howlin and Murphy, 2000; Shultz, Gauthier, Klin, Fulbright, Anderson, Volkmar, 
Skudlarski, Lacadic, Cohen and Gore, 2000; Pierce, Muller, Ambrose, Allen and 
Courchesne, 2001).   
 
School aged children and adults are also generally less emotionally expressive during 
social interaction; they demonstrate more neutral, flat or idiosyncratic expressions 
(Czapinski and Bryson, 2003).  They also laugh less with others during social 
interactions (Reddy, Williams and Vaughan, 2002). 
 
1.3.2: Local processing bias 
 
Autistic individuals are characterised by having „weak central coherence‟.  This 
describes „a tendency to focus on local, rather than global aspects of an object‟ (Hill 
and Frith, 2003, p. 283).  They display this tendency in verbal and non-verbal tasks.   
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Non-verbal processing tasks 
 
Autistics demonstrate superior performance on Witkin‟s embedded figures test (Shah 
and Frith, 1983; Jolliffe and Baron-Cohen, 1997) and on the block design test from 
the Wechsler Intelligence test (Shah and Frith, 1983).   
 
This finding should be particularly interesting to cognitive style researchers because 
the same connection between performance on the EFT and the block design tasks 
have been documented in the styles literature; in fact it is one of the reasons why the 
EFT has been accused of measuring ability rather than style because it correlates 
with some intelligence test items.  However the correlation between superior 
performance on the EFT and superior performance on the block design task, amongst 
autistics, remains even with low functioning autistics that are characterised by very 
low IQs around seventy (Happe, 1999). 
 
Shah and Frith (1983) have also demonstrated that the superior functioning of 
autistics in comparison to controls on the Wechsler block design test is a result of 
their tendency to part process objects rather than be distracted by the gestalt view of 
the block designs.  When the blocks were artificially segmented, control subjects 
improved to the level of autistics but there was no improvement for autistics. 
 
Autistics are also less susceptible to visual illusions that rely on interference from 
context.  The Titchener circles illusion presents two small circles embedded within 
two larger circles.  The task requires respondents to judge whether the two inner 
circles are the same size and this task is made more difficult in the context of the 
larger circles.  Autistic individuals gave more accurate judgements than normal 
controls or controls with mild learning disorders (Happe, 1996). 
 
Further, when the illusion was presented in three-dimensional form, which helped to 
artificially disembed the inner circles from the outer circles, the control groups 
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improved to the level of the autistics but the autistics showed no improvement.  This 
suggests that the superior performance of the autistics in the two-dimensional version 
of the illusion can be attributed to them being less affected by the interference of 
context (Happe, 1996). 
 
Verbal processing tasks 
 
The tendency towards local processing in preference to global processing in autistics 
is also apparent in verbal-semantic tasks.  The usual tendency for individuals to 
recall more information if it is linked semantically rather than unrelated strings of 
words is diminished in autistic individuals (Hermelin and O‟Connor, 1967; Tager-
Flusberg, 1991), they also perform similarly on Bartlett‟s (1932) story recall task 
whether they are given a cue to the context or not, whereas, normal controls recall 
more information when cues to context are provided.   
 
The effect is not just limited to verbal memory tasks; autistics also fail to process 
global semantic context when reading homographs (Frith and Snowling, 1983; 
Snowling and Frith, 1986; Happe, 1997).  For example, when reading the following 
sentences “In her eye there was a big tear” and “In her dress there was a big tear” 
(examples taken from Happe, 1999), autistic individuals failed to use the sentence 
context to inform the pronunciation of the homograph “tear”.   
 
Even more interestingly, when the autistics were prompted to use the sentence 
context to assist their pronunciation of the homographs, they successfully did so, 
suggesting that the tendency to locally process the words, at the expense of globally 
processing the sentence context, is a cognitive style not a lack of ability (Snowling 
and Frith, 1986). 
 
 
 
353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4: Increased incidence of social impairments and processing bias in family 
members 
 
The social impairments and local processing biases which are characteristic of the 
autistic individual are also found more frequently in the close relatives of those 
diagnosed with autistic spectrum disorders.   
 
Baron-Cohen and Hammer (1997) found that the parents of ASD individuals were 
less able than controls to identify emotion from eyes and were more field 
independent than controls on the embedded figures test. 
 
Happe, Briskman and Frith, (2001) found that the fathers and brothers of autistic 
individuals performed better on the Wechsler Block design test, were more field 
independent on the EFT and were less susceptible to visual illusions that relied on 
context interference. 
 
In non-autistic family members, the detail focussed style is not considered an 
impairment and in many ways is viewed as an asset, particularly to their chosen 
careers; higher numbers of fathers with autistic children are found in engineering 
careers than would be expected by chance (Hill and Frith, 2003) 
 
The incidence of social impairments and local processing style in the families of 
individuals with ASD is important in three ways; it provides further evidence that an 
interpersonal style tends to occur in those with local processing biases, or vice versa; 
it supports the notion that the clinical signs of ASD represent an extreme end of a 
style continuum, since the family members have similar characteristics but to a 
lesser, non-clinical, degree; and, it suggests a genetic basis to these differences which 
imply a neurobiological substrate. 
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1.5: Neurobiological basis of social impairments and local processing 
 
The focus of autism researchers is on identifying the neurobiological substrates of 
social impairments and local processing differences and gaining insight into the 
behavioural aspects of ASD to inform assessment and intervention (Noens and van 
Berckelaer-Onnes, 2008).  To this end they face the same research challenges as 
cognitive style researchers and they have a number of theories relating to the 
biological bases of impersonal style and local processing biases, which could inform 
the cognitive style literature. 
 
Baron-Cohen, Ring, Williams, Wheelwright, Bullmore, Brammer and Andrew 
(1999) found that during a task, which involved judging emotion from a photograph 
of peoples‟ eyes, fMRI data revealed that ASD individuals showed less activation of 
the frontal lobes and no activation in the amygdala.   
 
ASD individuals are characterised by a lack of understanding or attribution of mental 
states to others, termed mentalisation, which leads to their impersonal style (Hill and 
Frith, 2003).  These impairments are demonstrated by less activation of the medial 
prefrontal region (Happe, Ehlers, Fletcher, Frith, Johannsson, Gillberg, Dolan, 
Frackowiak and Frith, 1996; Castelli, Frith, Happe and Frith, 2002) and temporal 
regions (Castelli et al., 2002) during tasks that involve mentalisation.  
 
Neurobiological explanations for local processing bias focus on a lack of neuronal 
pruning during development and are expected to have a genetic basis.  The theory 
suggests that bottom up, local processing occurs at an earlier stage in the maturation 
of the brain than top down, global processing.   
 
In ASD individuals, the bottom up maturation proceeds normally but the top down 
maturation stage does not proceed through the normal process of neuronal pruning, 
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which either has a detrimental effect on the efficiency of global processing 
(Burkhalter, 1993) or an enhancing effect on the ability to discriminate or in extreme 
cases could lead to perceptual overload (Gerland, 1997).  This abnormality in 
development can occur in any system of the brain and could therefore account for an 
array of cognitive differences, which have a local-global basis (Hill and Frith, 2003). 
 
1.6: Summary and conclusions 
 
The most robust link between the constructs in the style literature is their tendency to 
discriminate between individuals with interpersonal styles and those with impersonal 
styles. The social differences which have repeatedly been reported in relation to 
cognitive style constructs provides a common thread which binds the styles together, 
demonstrating a relationship which correlation studies, based on style performance 
measures, have failed to do. 
 
The link between global-analytic styles and interpersonal style is further 
strengthened by their occurrence in individuals with autism.  The brief insight into 
the autism literature presented here is not intended as an exhaustive review and is 
necessarily an oversimplification of the bases and definitions of autism; its inclusion 
here is intended to highlight the similarities between the styles and the autism 
literature and to suggest new and potentially fruitful avenues of research. 
 
The impersonal characteristics and local processing tendencies of autistic individuals 
provide a clue to a phenotype of cognitive style, which could inform current research 
and suggest future directions.  It may be that autism represents the clinical pole of 
global-analytic style, if this were the case; the more exaggerated deficits and 
enhancements which are present in clinical samples are likely to give a clearer 
picture of the behavioural aspects and the neurobiological substrates of style.  
Comparisons between clinical samples and normal controls are likely to yield larger 
effects than comparisons between global and analytic individuals in non-clinical 
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populations.  The clinical data could be used to shape hypotheses that could be 
applied to non-clinical populations.   
 
The increased frequency of field independent style and impersonal style in the family 
of individuals diagnosed with autism supports the notion that style has a genetic basis 
and demonstrates how a genetic basis can lead to degrees of severity from normal 
individual differences in some family members to clinically significant symptoms in 
others.   
 
In the context of the discussion of validity of the wholist-analytic dimension; 
recurring interpersonal-impersonal style differences have been demonstrated in at 
least two of the principal subordinate styles; field independent-dependent style and 
convergent-divergent style.  The same individual differences have been 
discriminated by the wholist-analytic dimension and have been echoed in clinical 
populations characterised by local processing biases.  This supports the notion that 
the style constructs are related, to the extent that they discriminate between the same 
category of differences in social functioning and preferences.  From this perspective, 
each aspect of global-analytic style, as measured by the constructs in the wholist-
analytic family should be predicted to discriminate between the same interpersonal-
impersonal characteristics. 
 
In conclusion, whilst the predictive validity and construct validity of the wholist-
analytic dimension have been questioned in chapter two and three, the recurring links 
between analytic-impersonal characteristics on the one hand and wholist-
interpersonal characteristics on the other, provides support for the notion that the 
styles in the wholist-analytic family may well be measuring different aspects of a 
global-analytic style which has been repeatedly linked with an interpersonal-
impersonal style.   
 
